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In this dissertation, I explore the experience of Karen refugees living inside a
refugee camp along the Thai-Myanmar border in one of the world’s most protracted
refugee situations. This research situates displacement within theories of time,
(im)mobility and resistance while also drawing on literature in forced migration
concerning repatriation, exile, protracted refugee situations and policy development. A key
component of this work focuses on analyzing the relationship between resistance and
waiting by applying these concepts to the experience of Karen refugees who have spent
decades waiting in camps while currently being faced with a voluntary repatriation
program. I frame voluntary repatriation as a globally accepted durable solution to
protracted refugee situations and as such, the preferred outcome of protracted
displacement by the international refugee regime. Building on conceptualizations of
waiting as an active strategy, I add both strategy and resistance to this concept in the
context of protracted refugee situations, showing how I will further develop this theoretical
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framework through my own ethnographic work. Since my contribution to this theoretical
trajectory is to make ‘waiting as resistance’ and ‘waiting as strategy’ central to an analysis
of the repatriation framework, I will explain how holistic frameworks of return can guide
effective policy implementation.
This dissertation also traces the specific histories and geo-political situations that
gave rise to the current state of a protracted refugee crisis along the Thailand-Myanmar
border. With special consideration paid to the emergence of a voluntary repatriation
program being implemented by the UNHCR in the region, I explore how Karen refugees
respond to the notion of return to Myanmar. In the concluding chapters I offer an applied
contribution in the form of a policy recommendation for Thailand that I have termed
Protracted Sanctuary Status. Within this framework I offer a suggestion that is modeled
after the U.S. immigration category of Temporary Protected Status with a few key changes
that address both the need for legal employment in Thailand as well as the precariousness
refugees from Myanmar currently face.
To explore these issues, this dissertation is based on three months of archival
research at The University of Oxford’s Refugee Studies Centre in addition to a total of 10
months of fieldwork in Yangon, Myanmar, Mae Sot, Thailand and Mae La Refugee Camp on
the Thai-Myanmar border. During this time, 28 interviews were conducted during the pilot
phase of research in 2015, and an additional 40 interviews were conducted with both
refugees and other stakeholders during the primary fieldwork period in 2017. Other data
was collected through the use of participant observation while living inside Mae La Refugee
camp as well as two focus groups and an ongoing analysis of local publications, media, art
and music related to repatriation and the refugee experience along the border.
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A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY AND PSEUDONYMS
Myanmar or Burma?
The military government of Burma officially changed its name to the “Union of
Myanmar” in 1989, while also renaming many of the cities and regions that bore English
translations that dated back to Burma’s colonial period. Many political and ethnic
opposition groups contested the renaming as they did not recognize the legitimacy of the
ruling military government or its authority to rename the country. Political reforms in
Myanmar between 2011-2012 resulted in the dissolution of the military junta and the
country was once again renamed to the “Republic of the Union of Myanmar”. Subsequently,
general elections were held in November 2015, marking the first openly contested
elections since 1990. While the results gave the National League for Democracy and its
leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, an absolute majority of seats in both chambers of the national
parliament, the military retained 25 percent of seats, effectively making any constitutional
changes impossible without their consent. In light of this, many of those who have fled the
country as the result of civil war and persecution, still refer to the country as Burma and
reject the legitimacy of the name Myanmar. However, as a result of on-going democratic
reforms, many people and organizations now recognize the country as “Myanmar”
including the United Nations and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
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Throughout this dissertation I have chosen to use “Myanmar” when speaking
generally about the country, and “Burma” when relating conversations or quotations from
individuals who have used this name, out of respect for their preferences.
Use of Pseudonyms
In accordance with the American Anthropological Association’s 2012 Statement on
Ethics, pseudonyms may be utilized in order to avoid identification of a source and to
protect confidentiality and limit exposure of people to risks. As such, all names of research
participants and informants in this dissertation have been changed to maintain anonymity,
unless I have received express written consent otherwise.

xiii

LIST OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS
ASEAN: Association of South East Asian Nations
ASSK: Aung San Suu Kyi
CBO: Community Based Organization
COERR: Catholic Office for Emergency Relief and Refugees
EAO: Ethnic Armed Organization
EBO: Ethnic Based Organization
IDP: Internally Displaced Person
INGO: International Non-governmental Organization
IOM: International Organization for Migration
KNU: Karen National Union
KNLA: Karen National Liberation Army
KRC: Karen Refugee Committee
KRCEE: Karen Refugee Committee Educational Entity
KWO: Karen Women’s Organization
MNHRC: Myanmar National Human Rights Commission
MOI: Ministry of Interior (Thailand)
NCA: Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement
NGO: Non-governmental Organization
NLD: National League for Democracy, a social-democratic and liberal democratic political
party in Myanmar
NMSP: New Mon State Party
PRS: Protracted Refugee Situation
RTG: Royal Thai Government
Tatmadaw: The official name of the armed forces of Myanmar
TBC: The Border Consortium
UDHR: Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN: United Nations
UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Thai-Myanmar Friendship Bridge
Straddling the banks of the broad and muddy Moei River sits a fairly non-distinct
bridge connecting the border towns of Mae Sot, Thailand and Myawaddy, Myanmar. I first
visited the bridge in the late summer of 2015 with Nee Puh, a friend of mine who was
currently working with an NGO based in Mae Sot. Nee Puh was from Hpa-An, a
predominately Karen city in Myanmar about four hours west of Myawaddy. She had spent
the last several years living in Mae Sot, working as a field guide and translator for an
organization that transported educational resources to rural villages in Karen State. Earlier
that day we had headed to the border by scrambling into the back of a crowded red
songthaew, one of the local covered pickup trucks with two rows of seating along the back.
The songthaew was full of men wearing the traditional Longyi I had grown accustomed to
seeing in Yangon, and several women wore designs of yellowish thanaka paste on their
cheeks. While we were technically still in Thailand, the border zone surrounding Mae Sot
was an interesting mix of Thai, Chinese, Hmong, Lisu and Myanmar's majority Bamar
population along with various ethnic minorities from Myanmar such as the Karen, Shan,
Mon and Kachin. Sprinkled throughout the cultural mélange were NGO aid workers from
the U.S., U.K., Australia and various regions in Europe. It was quite a cosmopolitan scene for
such a small town and it was not uncommon to hear upwards of four to five languages in a
1

single outing. Upon arrival at the bridge, Nee Puh and I found ourselves amidst a colorful
hive of activity buzzing on the streets and overflowing into the adjacent Rim Moei market.
Dotted beneath the bridge, nestled into the long grass and palm trees on the edges of the
water were migrant settlements, whose makeshift roofs of blue tarpaulin and corrugated
tin popped out amongst their bright green surroundings. As large trucks full of goods
rumbled across the bridge towards the border crossing, steady flows of people crossed in
cars, by foot and inside small wooden riverboats propelled across the coffee colored Moei
with long wooden poles and humming outboard motors. “Busier than the Bangkok airport
today!” Nee Puh remarked as we made our way down to the market.
The Moei River, a 200-mile long tributary of the larger Salween River, forms a
natural border between Southeastern Myanmar and Western Thailand. Once the site of
violent clashes between Myanmar’s Tatmadaw and the armed wing of the Karen National
Union, the region surrounding the Moei now sees more cross-border trade than civil war.
Facilitating this trade is the Thai-Myanmar Friendship Bridge, a 420-meter long raised
concrete highway where exports such as teak and jade from Myanmar cross paths with
Thai shipments of consumer electronics, clothing and cars. The bridge is part of the greater
Asian Highway Network, a sweeping infrastructure project which promises amongst other
things to connect Myanmar to the rest of Southeast Asia. Recent estimates have put the
value of the cross-border trade between Thailand and Myanmar at almost $420 million usd
for the 2018 fiscal year1, which is a sure indication of the tightening relationship between
the neighboring governments.

1

As published in The Global New Light of Myanmar on July 30, 2018. The New Light of Myanmar is a
government-owned newspaper published by the Myanmar Ministry of Information. Figures are provided by the
Myanmar Ministry of Commerce.
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I often think of that trip to the bridge as an unofficial starting point for this project,
as it made the concept of refugee repatriation into something more tangible. Here was the
physical space in which official reentry back into Myanmar would occur; a place that so
many had fled from but also spoken of returning to someday. A little over a year after that
first trip, indeed it was at the friendship bridge in October of 2016, a bus emblazoned with
an IOM logo brought 71 refugees back into Myanmar for the first official voluntary
repatriation effort in over 30 years.

Photo 1- October 28, 2016: At the Mae Sot-Myawaddy border crossing, UNHCR staff based in Thailand
say emotional goodbyes to the refugees returning to Myanmar after decades in exile. Source:
UNHCR/Vivian Tan
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The year directly following that first voluntary repatriation is where my research
begins. I wanted to know how those who had spent years and even decades as refugees in
Thailand felt about the prospect of return. Would they in fact return ‘voluntarily’, as the
program assured? Or would the time they spent in exile, waiting in various states of
uncertainty and limbo, affect their willingness to reenter Myanmar once again? If they
would not return voluntarily, how would acts of resistance manifest themselves in the
confines of a refugee camp? What would be the specific concerns with return as the
prospect of a facilitated repatriation had finally moved from the abstract into reality?
Embedded within these questions were the practical issues of land rights, security and
equitable access to employment, education and health care. Equally important were more
subjective concerns surrounding rebuilding trust, creating autonomy, and renegotiating
identity after years spent in a state of ‘refugeehood’.
The foundations of this dissertation are very much rooted in the time I spent with
resettled refugees in the U.S., many of whom came directly from Mae La Refugee Camp on
the Thai-Myanmar border. For many years before this project was born, I listened to their
stories of resettlement, containing within them memories of Burma and civil war and the
reluctant yet comfortable familiarity with the refugee camps that became their homes.
When the U.S. officially ended the large-scale resettlement program for refugees from
Myanmar in 2014, I wanted to know what would happen to the tens of thousands of
refugees who remained in the camps. Myanmar was in a state of rapid transition and no
one could say with complete certainty how the protracted refugee situation along the
border would end. This dissertation is an attempt to unravel how returning to one’s
country of origin is negotiated by not only the governments who decide, but also by the
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people who must make a choice. Those who have been stuck in the borderlands, confined
to camps while they wait for solutions and hope for peace.
1.2 Mae La
On a sunny day in early June of 2017, almost two years after that first trip to the
Friendship Bridge on the Thai-Myanmar border, I found myself in a dusty pickup truck
barreling towards Mae La Refugee camp. That day was when I first met Saw Htoo Hay, a
slender man in his mid-thirties with longish dark hair and a posture that hinted at the
awkward boyishness that almost certainly characterized his late youth. He had come with
the driver to meet me in town and act as my formal escort into Mae La, a gesture for which I
was profoundly grateful. I would come to note that Saw Htoo Hay often flashed a slightly
crooked smile that revealed his painful shyness and he was prone to offering greetings
while simultaneously looking in the opposite direction of the person he was addressing. His
English was near perfect as a result of several years of postsecondary education at a foreign
seminary and he was well versed in the current geo-political situation unfolding in
Myanmar. I liked Saw Htoo Hay immediately and went about enlisting his help for my
research over the course of our hour-long journey north into camp.
The main road towards Mae La wove a path through alternating patches of
farmland and dense green jungle that was broken up by various checkpoints manned by
armed Thai soldiers. After about an hour of driving north from Mae Sot, I began to catch
glimpses of the camp from the road. I had visited Mae La camp once before during my
preliminary fieldwork in 2015 and was struck by the sheer vastness of it. For more than a
mile along the main road you can see rows of tightly packed homes behind the tall fences
topped with barbed wire. Upon arrival we swerved onto a small dirt road that led us to the
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southern entrance of camp. The road was riddled with the deep ruts and long gullies that
resulted from the many years of heavy tires trying to navigate the muddy lanes during the
relentless rainy season. As we bounced along at a slow pace, crossing a narrow makeshift
bridge over a mostly dry creek bed below, I caught the first glimpse of Mae La that was not
dominated by the packed housing visible from the main road. This section of camp seemed
to sprawl out slightly and offer some space to breathe for those living here. The thatch
roofed homes and small shops were punctuated with small kitchen gardens and the
occasional pigsty or chicken coop spaced sporadically throughout the winding dirt lanes.
The edges of the jungle, which were always hungry to regain their lost territory, inched
around every corner, devouring footpaths with long green vines and tropical plants. We
eventually made our way to the cluster of buildings that comprised the small school and
were warmly greeted by a few students who had prepared a dinner of rice and vegetables
for us. Over the next several months I would get to know them well, spending many days
and nights practicing English, answering questions about Texas and learning to live within
the confines of a refugee camp.
Over the next several months, my research for this dissertation would be
profoundly impacted by my experiences living inside Mae La. The camp itself was a lesson
in contrasts. The towering karst landscape provided a dramatic backdrop and ensured you
never forgot you were indeed deep in the Southeast Asian rainforest. In the mornings, the
limestone cliffs were enveloped in a foggy mist that snaked its way around the tall palms
and thatched roofs that dotted the hillside. When late afternoon arrived, the cliffs were
bathed in a golden sunlight while the distant sound of birds singing punctuated the thick
humid air. By night, the jungle came alive and a chorus erupted from the insects and lizards
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that emerged from their hazy afternoon dormancy. Early in my stay at Mae La, a large
Tokay gecko took up residency somewhere above my bed, taking advantage of the fourinch gap between the wall and the ceiling of my sleeping quarters. Every night around 3
a.m. he initiated his despondent mating call, loudly billowing his two-syllable chorus into
the darkness, hoping to find his true love. One evening, feeling emboldened under the
safety of my mosquito net, I made the very foolish decision to shine a light on the net to see
which insects might be trying to make my acquaintance. A horror show of monstrous-sized
moths and cicadas danced with each other above my head, punctuated by a large spider
who seemed to be there just to complete the trifecta or perhaps mock my boldness.
Eventually I reached an uneasy truce with the creatures that went about their nightly
business, like disinterested roommates on different shifts who can largely ignore one
another.
Aside from the realities of life in the tropics, daily life in Mae La felt
simultaneously familiar and strange. The normal flow of meals and chores mixed with the
typical melodramas that played out amongst the students attending the camp high school.
Teenagers chatted about facebook and the latest youtube video making the rounds while
young mothers tended to toddlers and children chased each other through the schoolyard.
Soccer games and Sunday religious services felt natural until placed against the backdrop
of confinement. The constant presence of armed guards and a population interspersed with
landmine victims and those with traumatic scars not visible to the human eye provided a
sober reminder of the civil war that raged not so long ago near the camp’s Western border.
The monthly line up to receive food rations offered another reminder of the other daily
realities of camp life; that movement was restricted, working in Thailand illegal, and ones
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status as a refugee would continue to dominate the discourse surrounding their future. The
following six chapters of this dissertation are a result of my time in Mae La and the
surrounding region but most importantly, they are the result of the time I spent with the
people I met along the way. This research is about their stories and experiences within the
context of sweeping reform and international refugee policy.
1.3 A Brief History of the Karen
To start, it will be helpful to offer a brief history of the Karen in order to provide
some essential context for the remainder of this dissertation. I would like to add two
caveats before I begin. Firstly the use of the term Karen (or Kayin) to describe a singular
ethnic group in Myanmar, while widely accepted, is a gross generalization. Amongst the
Karen there is a substantial amount of internal ethnic diversity, where religious affiliations,
customs and language can vary considerably according to region and village (Gravers,
2007). The term “Karen” refers primarily to people residing in southern and southeastern
Myanmar and can include a number of individual Sino-Tibetan language-speaking ethnic
groups. As Charles Keyes argued, “The Karen are an invention of the modern world, a
product of Christian missionization, colonial and postcolonial ethnographic research, and
policies regarding ethnic minorities adopted by the governments of independent Burma
and Thailand” (2003:210). In this way, I recognize that using “the Karen” to describe the
people this dissertation centers on has the potential to conceal their internal diversity. This
is not my intent and throughout this work I will make every effort to offer adequate
contextualization as to the Karen’s heterogeneous makeup. Broadly, it can be said that
when the Karen are categorized as a singular ethnic group, they comprise the second
largest ethnic minority in Myanmar, with population estimates varying from 5 to 10
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million, accounting for roughly 7 percent of Myanmar’s total population (Smith, 1991;
South, 2011).
The second caveat I want to note is that I have found no definitive historical
evidence that verifies when or how the Karen came to Myanmar. While oral histories
maintain that the Karen originated from Mongolia, much of their early history has been a
matter of dispute. This is complicated by the fact that much of the available early written
history of the Karen has been filtered through Christian missionaries. While only an
estimated 20 percent of Karen practice Christianity (with 65% practicing Buddhism and
15% practicing Animism) the access to education provided by Christian missionaries
effectively created an upper class of “elite” educated Christian Karen. As a result, much of
early Karen history has been summarized and reproduced by organizations such as the
Karen National Association (KNA), which was formed in 1881 by “Christian Englishspeaking elites heavily influenced by American Baptist Missionaries” (Jolliffe, 2016:9). Thus
I start with the history of the Karen in their own words, but with the note that the following
history is as told by the KNA. I first encountered this reproduced cultural narrative as a
component of a New Year Message by the Chairman of the “New Year Celebration
Committee” tacked on the wall of a Karen bible school. The history reads as follows:
“We, the Karen people, are not an insignificant nationality. Racially, the
Karens belong to the Sino-Thai family of language group, and come under the
Mongoloid stock. According to history, our forefathers started to migrate in
B.C. 2017 from Mongolia, passed through East Takistan and Tibet and
reached the Yunan Province of China in B.C. 1385. Again, our forefathers
started to migrate from Yunan in B.C. 1128 and the first wave reached the
country now known as Burma in B.C. 1125. The second wave of migration left
Yunan in B.C. 741 and reached Burma in B.C. 739. In counting the years of the
Karen Era, that time of arrival was taken as the beginning. The early waves of
migration coming into Burma finally settled down in Playloklo Delta
(Irrawaddy Delta), the Gawloklo River Basin (Sittang River Basin) and the
9

lower part of the Hkoloklo River Basin (Salween River Basin). Some
following the Hkoloklo River went past the estuary and reached as far south
as the southern part of Tenessarim regions and the adjoining areas in
Thailand. Some remained as far north as the southern part of Shan State and
the northern part of Thailand close to the Thai-Burma border. The majority
of the Karen people live in the country known nowadays as Burma and form
about 20% of the entire population of the country.
We, the Karen people, possess all the attributes of a nation. Our population is
more than eight million. We have our own culture, history, tradition and
literature. We have our own national anthem and national flag. Our national
flag bears the rising sun and a bronze drum. Among them is the auspicious
drum played on joyous occasions. The drum on our national flag is such a
drum. It signifies prosperity, unity and cooperation. The rising sun signifies
the rise of the Karen people for progress and dignity. The red colour signifies
courage, the white colour signifies integrity and the blue colour signifies the
honest and royal character of the Karen people.” – Karen New Year Message,
January 9th, 1997
This construction of history is noteworthy in that it situates Karen heritage in the
territorial space of Burma while also constructing the Karen Nation as an “imagined
community” (Anderson, 1983). It also encapsulates two distinct theoretical binaries core to
anthropological inquiry: that of belonging and identity as well as territoriality and
liminality. These are themes that emerge frequently in relation to repatriation and thus the
above history provides an apt starting point in which to understand the modern history of
the Karen.
In contrast to sparse accounts of the origins of Karen migration in Southeast Asia,
the modern history of the Karen has been relatively well documented. During the colonial
era of British rule from 1824-1948, the Karen developed a loyalist relationship with the
British regime. As Kim Jolliffe notes, “the colonial state removed all traditional power
structures and established a rationalized system of government, which favored the Karen
for many military and administrative posts. Meanwhile, the Bamar were deeply
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marginalized, and sometimes subject to violent repression by Karen forces” (2016:9).
During this period, in exchange for favored treatment and increased economic and social
mobility, the Karen assisted the British armies in the Anglo-Burmese wars2. During WWII,
the Karen fought alongside the British against Japanese forces as the British had promised
to help form an independent Karen state in return. However, this promise never
materialized and after the Japanese defeated the British in 1942, “the Japanese and the
puppet regime they installed fostered reprisals against the Karen” (Keyes, 2003:213). The
Karen were largely viewed as collaborators for their alignment with the British and were
essentially ostracized as a result (see Guyot 1976, 1978).
In the aftermath of World War II, the British abandoned Karen nationalist interests
as the Bamar (or Burman) majority began to work toward total independence from Britain.
In February of 1947, leaders from the transitional Burmese government and
representatives from three minority groups in Burma, namely the Chin, Shan, and Kachin,
signed the Panglong Agreement, effectively creating the Union of Burma which became the
first post-colonial government in 1948 (Walton, 2008). Notably missing from this
agreement were signatories from other ethnic groups, most prominently that of the Karen
and Rohingya. In 1947, a group of Karen politicians, lawyers, civil servants, and other
educated Karen nationalists formed the Karen National Union (KNU) in an effort to
advocate for greater autonomy for the Karen people in the context of Burma’s new
independence (Jolliffe, 2016). While the initial aim of the KNU was to obtain independence
for the Karen people, in subsequent years they have instead begun to advocate for a federal

2

There have been three Burmese Wars or Anglo-Burmese Wars: First Anglo-Burmese War (1824); Second AngloBurmese War (1852); Third Anglo-Burmese War (1885). For an exceptional history, see George Bruce (1973) The
Burma Wars, 1824–1886.
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union in Myanmar that includes adequate representation for Karen and regional selfgovernance.3
The Karen’s history of conflict with the central Burmese government essentially
began on January 31, 1949, at the battle of Insein, where the Karen first launched their
armed movement against the Burmese government. Today, the Karen still celebrate this
day as Revolution Day and it has formed an important part of the Karen independence
narrative. That same year, the KNU also officially declared the formation of the Karen Free
State known as “Kawthoolei4”. By 1952, they had secured an 11,600 square mile territory
in the Southeast in what is known today as Kayin (Karen) State. However, less than one
quarter of the Karen population resided within the territory when it was formed, and the
major towns and roads were still controlled by the Burmese government.
Twelve years following the creation of Kawthoolei, the Burmese government was
overthrown in a military coup d’état orchestrated by General Ne Win, who had expanded
the military by nearly 100,000 troops. Jolliffe notes that General Ne Win and subsequent
military regimes “became markedly ethnonationalist in their own character, envisioning a
unified Myanmar based largely around Bamar Buddhist identity” (2016:12). This resulted
in the systematic removal of local governance in ethnic states and the rise of violent conflict
across the country. During this time General Ne Win implemented what is known as the
3

This point has been contested somewhat as Jolliffe (2016:11) points out that within the political context in
which the KNU was formed, there was no choice between secession or unification. Agreeing that the KNU and
its predecessors repeatedly voiced their aspirations for an independent Karen State, he argues it was
consistently envisioned as part of a federation, which would also give them representation in central Burma,
where many Karen people resided.
4 The first reference to the name “Kawthoolei” appears in the Karen history written by Saw Aung Hla,
published in 1939. It can be translated as either ‘a land without darkness’ or alternatively, ‘a land where the
Thoo Lei flower grows’: both translations are normally considered to mean a fertile land. The name has been
adopted as synonymous with a free Karen homeland separated from Burma itself. (Source: College of Asia and
the Pacific, Australian National University)
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“four cuts” strategy, which aimed to cut off the four vital areas of food, finance, intelligence
and recruits from the armed ethnic groups through a campaign of relentless military
harassment. The military declared vast amounts of ethnic land as “free-fire” zones, which
resulted in the internal displacement of entire communities who were forced to relocate
into highly militarized fenced areas. The destruction of thousands of Karen communities
had a profound impact and the KNU was effectively pushed into the Bago Yoma region by
the mid-1970’s.
As the KNU resistance wore on, a new military regime came to power in 1988
known as the State Law and Order-Restoration Council. This led to the 8888 uprising of
student democracy activists, protesters and politicians in central Myanmar who later fled
to KNU controlled areas seeking refuge from the government forces. More than 10,000
students and politicians fled during the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, which significantly
bolstered the KNU’s position as the leading opposition group. During this time, the KNU
operated as a de facto government and quasi state within Southeastern Burma. “The gate
read ‘Welcome to Kawthoolei’ and the KNU comprised its own army, its own schools and
hospitals, as well as its own townships, bureaucracy, and flag” (Horstmann, 2011:263;
Rajah, 1990). However, an increasing division between Buddhist and Christian factions of
the KNU came to a head in December of 1994 over disagreements concerning the
construction of pagodas inside the effective KNU capital of Manerplaw. On December 11th,
1994 the armed wing of the KNU (known as the Karen National Liberation Army or KNLA)
clashed with Buddhist dissidents, which ultimately led to a permanent split in the
organization. Consequently, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) was formed on
December 21st, 1994.

13

The formation of the DKBA was significant in that it represented a substantial
fracture of the KNU’s consolidated power. Ultimately, the KNU capital of Manerplaw was
overtaken by the Burmese military with the help of the DKBA. On January 27th of 1995, in a
battle known as The Fall of Manerplaw, the KNU was effectively defeated leading to the loss
of substantial territory in Myanmar as well as the loss of income they relied on from crossborder trade and local tax revenue. The Fall of Manerplaw also led an estimated 10,000
refugees to seek shelter along the Thai-Myanmar border, which had already begun to form
sanctuary villages and camps for ethnic minorities during the previous ten years of
violence propagated by the Tatmadaw.
In the two decades that have passed since The Fall of Manerplaw, the Karen in
Myanmar have continued to suffer many documented cases of forced migration, forced
labor, extrajudicial executions, land grabs, village destruction as well as rape and other
forms of sexual violence, (KHRG, 2018; Davis et al., 2012; Centre for Peace and Conflict
Studies, 2010; KWO, 2004; 2007; Human Rights Watch, 2005). The KNU and its armed
wing, the KNLA, continue to operate in sections of Karen State, the Thai borderlands and
various outposts in remote jungle camps. Notably in January of 2012, the KNU signed a
ceasefire deal with Myanmar's military-backed civilian government. This step eventually
led to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) of 2015, which was signed by the KNU
and several other ethnic opposition groups. However, peace has been fragile and
approximately 85 percent of the 90,000 refugees still residing in camps along the ThaiMyanmar border are ethnic Karen (see map 3 below).
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MAP: REFUGEE CAMPS ALONG THE THAI-MYANMAR BORDER

Map 3 - A map showing the nine camps on the Thai-Myanmar border plus the Shan IDP
Settlement at Wieng Haeng in the far north. (Source: The Border Consortium 2017)
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1.4 Overview of Theoretical Orientations and Contributions
While anthropologists have long studied the causes and consequences of war as a
component of cultural life, there is a new necessity for anthropologists to engage in
research that addresses current global crises and the protracted refugee situations that
follow. In the early 1980’s as the field of Refugee Studies began to emerge, anthropologists
were collating research surrounding forced migrants in the hopes that such research could
“affect policy and make uprooting and readjustment less traumatic” (Hansen and OliverSmith 1982; Cernea 1985; Cernea and Guggenheim 1993; Morgan and Colson 1987 as cited
in Colson, 2003:12). As ongoing civil wars and intense conflicts continued to expand across
borders and cultures, the resulting mass displacement of people has become a defining
moment in our shared cultural experience. As reported by UNHCR in 2018, there are now
more than 68.5 million people worldwide who are either refugees or internally displaced
persons, over half of whom are children.
In addition to the policy goals echoed in the early work of anthropologists in forced
migration, anthropology is also particularly well suited to address the refugee experience
by situating displacement within theories of time, (im)mobility and migration. In this way,
research has sought to understand how refugees determine migration corridors, navigate
life in refugee camps, manage host country integration and negotiate solutions such as
third country resettlement and repatriation. While these processes are often deeply
complex and nuanced, we can draw on past examples to help understand the current
challenges refugee face in return.
My research is situated between the expansive bodies of literature comprising
refugee studies and the anthropology of time. More specifically, I have drawn on literature
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in forced migration concerning repatriation, protracted refugee situations and policy
development (see chapters 3,5,6) while drawing on the anthropological literature of
temporalities related to waiting, liminality and exile (see chapter 4). Further, I have relied
on literature concerning resistance, which has come from areas of migration, refugee
studies, anthropology, sociology and political economy (see chapters 4, 5 and 6).
In general, this dissertation contributes theoretically to work in the anthropology of
forced migration that is concerned with refugee repatriation and experiences of exile.
More specifically, it analyzes the relationship between resistance and waiting by framing
voluntary repatriation as a globally accepted durable solution to protracted refugee
situations and as such, the preferred outcome of protracted displacement by the
international refugee regime. Building on conceptualizations of waiting as an active
strategy, I add resistance to this concept in the context of protracted refugee situations,
showing how I will further develop this theoretical framework through my own
ethnographic work. Since my contribution to this theoretical trajectory is to make ‘waiting
as resistance’ central to an analysis of the repatriation framework, I will explain how
holistic frameworks of return can guide effective policy implementation (Ch 7).
A common theme among anthropologists who study time and waiting is that the
overabundance of time and unstructured waiting is both a symptom of social exclusion and
a form of precarity. This dissertation adds ethnographic research that builds on these
theorizations by showing that when indefinite waiting is interrupted, in this case by the
emergence of a facilitated voluntary repatriation program, waiting can take on new
meanings. Theoretically I argue that waiting is a multi-faceted experience that is capable of
both encouraging and illustrating agency. Thus, waiting has been a way in which many

17

Karen in Mae La can actively resist repatriation, strategize, and assert agency over their
immediate futures. Therefore, this dissertation expands research concerning the
conceptualization of waiting as being an active state, rather than a passive one, specifically
in the context of a protracted refugee situation. Further, it also expands the
conceptualization of ‘waiting as resistance’ in the context of forced migration and adds
"waiting as strategy" to the myriad of responses associated with displacement. Expanding
the conceptualization of ‘waiting as resistance’ in the context of protracted refugee
situations is vital to both furthering the discourse in refugee studies as well as ensuring the
principles of voluntary repatriation are respected in policy development. This dissertation
also builds on repatriation theory in terms of adding ethnographic evidence as to the
circularity of forced migration and the preference of many refugees to become
economically self-reliant prior to or in lieu of return.
In this dissertation I also offer an applied contribution in the form of a policy
recommendation for Thailand that suggests one avenue of resolution for the protracted
refugee situation along the Thai-Myanmar border. Although the task of translating
anthropological research into a tangible outcome can become complicated as ethical
considerations arise concerning issues of objectivity and the role of advocacy, I argue that
applied anthropology offers a framework to balance the core principle of “Do No Harm”
with the responsibility that many feel to give back to the communities in which they
conduct research. How Thailand resolves the protracted refugee situation along its
Western border with Myanmar will have long lasting implications for global refugee policy.
In fact, Thailand has a unique opportunity to demonstrate the power of transforming a
perceived burden into an economic benefit while also maintaining a commitment to
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humanitarian principles.
In light of Thailand’s growing support for regularizing labor migrants, I argue that it
would be an ideal time to introduce a new solution for refugees who have lived in Thailand
for extended periods of time. Within this vein and building upon the ideas I discuss in
Chapter 6 surrounding self-reliance pending return, I suggest in chapter 7 that a
hypothetical new category of status termed “Protracted Sanctuary Status” (PSS) for those
living as refugees along the border be implemented. The framework for such a status
would be similar to that of a “Temporary Protected Status” (TPS) in the United States. TPS
provides freedom of movement and work rights for foreign nationals already in the United
States from countries experiencing armed conflict, natural disaster, or other extraordinary
circumstances that prevent their safe return. As Jill Wilson (2018: 2) noted in her recent
analysis of TPS for the members of congress, “TPS is a blanket form of humanitarian relief.
It is the statutory embodiment of safe haven for foreign nationals within the United States
who may not meet the legal definition of refugee or asylee but are nonetheless fleeing—or
reluctant to return to—potentially dangerous situations”. There are a few key differences
that I imagine would exist between the TPS model and the proposed PSS model (see table 5
in Chapter 7) primarily in the guarantee of protected status for refugees from Myanmar for
a period of no less than 5 years, which may be renewable. While implementing regularized
labor migration as a component of a durable solution is crucial, so too is ensuring adequate
protection while acknowledging resistance to return. A policy that combines these
elements within a recognizable framework may effectively offer a pathway by which
protracted refugee situations can move from camps to communities.
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1.5 Overview of Chapters
I begin in Chapter Two by offering an overview of the research context for this
project as well as a detailed description of the specific methodology employed to gather
data. The chapter begins by describing the particular moment in time that characterized
the region when research was carried out between the summer of 2015 and the fall of
2017. This includes a description of the recent political changes in Myanmar as well as a
timeline of activity leading up to the commencement of UNHCR’s voluntary repatriation
program. This is followed by a summary of the preliminary research conducted in 2015 as
well as its impact on the overall study. The next section goes on to describe the
commencement of the primary research period beginning in January of 2017 with three
months of archival work at The University of Oxford’s Refugee Studies Centre. This section
also includes a detailed description of the research site, Mae La refugee camp, located on
the Thai-Myanmar border. The second half of the chapter offers a discussion of the
methodology used in this study including descriptions of the project design, research
population, recruitment and data collection, accuracy of data and methods of analysis. In
the final section, a brief commentary is offered in regards to the ethical challenges faced in
the field.
Chapter Three begins with an analysis of how Thailand’s unique history of
diplomacy, nationalism and independence has colored the current political landscape in
regards to labor migration, as well as how it has intersected with current refugee policy.
This is followed by a discussion of how the political and economic reforms happening
within Myanmar are currently shaping diplomatic relations with Thailand and
consequently affecting the fate of refugees residing in camps along the border. The chapter
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then offers a brief commentary on the emergence of special economic zones as a potential
solution to both forced and irregular migration while offering a word of caution about the
risks of development-induced displacement. The final section explores how refugees
waiting in the confines of a camp are especially at risk of forming a new working underclass
known as “the precariat” which may undermine attempts at creating economic security
while derailing efforts towards voluntary repatriation.
Chapter Four begins with an overview of how anthropologists have approached the
issue of time and temporalities in different cultures while also exploring how theoretical
constructions of time intersect with experiences of waiting, liminality, and exile. This is
followed by a discussion of the theoretical frameworks that conceptualize time as a tool of
resistance and argue for its applicability to the protracted refugee situation along the ThaiMyanmar border. The next section focuses on refugee experiences of exile as well as
illustrating how religion has played a role in transforming the exilic experience in the case
of Baptist Karen refugees. In the final section, attention is focused on summarizing the
importance of including experiences of time, waiting and exile within the broader literature
of forced migration as well as why modes of resistance should always be considered in
relation to repatriation design.
Chapter Five begins with a discussion of the internationally accepted protocol for
resolving a protracted refugee crisis in relation to the Thai-Myanmar situation. This is
followed by an explanation of the current voluntary repatriation program being
implemented by UNHCR and an update on its status. The remainder of the chapter focuses
on research outcomes regarding refugee perceptions of return. This includes both reported
barriers to repatriation as described in interviews with refugees as well as other barriers
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identified through qualitative analysis and observation. In concluding remarks, I offer a
summary of the impossible choice many Karen are currently facing in Mae La camp in
relation to return.
Chapter Six begins with a discussion of how durable solutions have evolved in
response to protracted refugee situations as well as an examination of what has recently
been termed the ‘fourth durable solution’. Following this is a brief commentary on the rise
of strategies that seek to promote self-reliance prior to return and how they may aid
sustainable forms of repatriation. In the final section, special consideration is paid to the
notable emergence of a ‘model village’ to house returning refugees and IDPs in Myanmar in
relation to its efficacy as a durable solution.
Chapter Seven concludes with a discussion on the theoretical contributions of this
work to the anthropology of forced migration and the study of temporalities. This is
followed by a discussion of the applied contribution to refugee policy and how we might
imagine a protracted form of protection. Additionally an update on the events that have
transpired on the border following the conclusion of fieldwork is provided as well as
recommended directions for future research.
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Chapter 2
RESEARCH CONTEXT AND METHODOLOGY

2.1 Introduction
In order to provide context for the following chapters, it is important to note the
particular moment in time that characterized the region when research was carried out for
this project between the summer of 2015 and the fall of 2017. Over the past 33 years, in
what has been one of the most protracted refugee situations of global record, the status of
refugees along the Thai-Myanmar border has oscillated between ‘crisis’ to ‘forgotten
tragedy’ to ‘political predicament’ to ‘impending resolution’. As such, these
characterizations often ebb and flow, like a cyclical changing of the tide as various
governments, agreements, programs, and people come and go. The only constants that
have remained are the camps themselves, symbolic spaces of a deteriorating peace process,
and the people who are trapped within them, living in limbo between the revolving blades
of “progress”. It is a paradoxical fate to be both indifferent to change due to a lived
experience of prolonged stasis, but also to experience perpetual anxiety at the uncertainty
of the future. Thus when forced to live for decades confined to a small geographic space
which requires dependency on foreign aid to survive, one becomes consumed with finding
ways to ‘move on’, even if physical movement itself is impossible. It is within these confines
that my research sits, albeit on the crest of one of the more promising waves of change.
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In the summer months of 2015, when the pilot research phase for this project first
begun, change was brewing in Myanmar. The upcoming November general election would
see Aung San Suu Kyi’s party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), win a sweeping
victory and a supermajority of seats in the combined national parliament. Widely regarded
as the first openly contested election since 1990, the fervor of an open Myanmar, and a
leader with a Nobel Peace Prize on her resume, created a palpable wave of hope both
within the country and in the international community. By the end of 2015, sanctions on
the country were being relaxed and global markets welcomed the entrance of a country
rich in both natural resources and a population primed to consume modern commodities.
It was within this sweeping optimism that support grew for attempting to finally
reconcile the protracted refugee situation along the Thai-Myanmar border that had
plagued both governments for more than three decades. Additionally, larger geopolitical
forces, such as a vast refugee crisis unfolding in the Mediterranean Sea and Europe, further
created a vacuum for both international attention and humanitarian funding. The
confluence of a potential political solution with a state of decreased humanitarian funding
for refugees on the Thai-Myanmar border, created both the will and the necessity to launch
a formal repatriation plan. Indeed, all signs were pointing toward repatriation, as it gained
both momentum and formalization with the passage of time (see table 1.1).
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Table 1 -Timeline of Repatriation Activity
Date(s)
Timeline of Repatriation Activity
2012 - 2013
Steady decrease in funding, strict enforcement of camp
regulations restricting day labor work in Thailand, ad hoc
headcounts and military-led verifications fuel rumors of
repatriation
July 2014

Thai Government & UNHCR conduct headcount in Mae La Camp

March 2015 –
August 2015

UNHCR releases two documents titled “Strategic Roadmap for
Voluntary Repatriation” & “Operations Plan for Voluntary
Repatriation”

June 2016

Joint statement released by Thai & Burmese governments
regarding future repatriation plans

July - August 2016

Voluntary Repatriation Centers are established by UNHCR in 7
camps
The first group of 71 refugees are voluntarily repatriated from Nu
Po and Tham Hin camps
Voluntary Repatriation Centers operate in camps as information
hubs and sign up locations. Initial engagement is low.
164 refugees (50 households) repatriated from Mae La,
Umpheim, Ban Don Yang & Ban Mai Nai Soi camps. Returned to
Karen State, Karenni (Kayah) State, Yangon, Bago & Sagai

October 25th & 26th,
2016
January 2017 –
December 2017
May 2018

June 2018

Myanmar government continues to conduct missions to
determine 'pre-nationality verification' in Mae La camp

July 2018 – October
2018

300 refugees now in process of repatriation from Mae La camp,
scheduled for October - November 2018

Table 1 (Source: Developed by author using publicly available information from various news
sources, in addition to reports published by UNHCR, RTG and the Government of Myanmar. Where
possible, precise dates are given)

2.2 Preliminary Research and Feasibility
In the shadow of impending repatriation, in the summer months of 2015, I
commenced preliminary research in both Myanmar and Thailand in order to gauge the
feasibility of this project. I chose to first focus my efforts in Myanmar (Burma) within the
former capital of Yangon (Rangoon), primarily for the access to both a diverse population
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as well as the proximity to an intensive Burmese language study program. In Yangon, I
found myself thoroughly immersed into Burmese culture, having only experienced it
previously through my work with the Burmese5 diaspora of resettled refugees in the
United States.
Myanmar was still relatively new to tourism in 2015, with 2012 truly marking the
increase of visitors to the country. At this time, rumors still swirled on the internet about
the scarce availability of ATMs, credit card terminals and wifi service, while ominous
warnings floated around about government surveillance of foreigners and exceptionally
strict laws all visitors must follow. While there was a degree of truth in some of these
things, in 2015 I found a population awash in smart phones, facebook, and excitement over
the first western chain restaurant to open shop (which to my great dismay was a Kentucky
Fried Chicken, furthering America’s growing role as ambassador of a processed diet).
Fluent English was almost non-existent, save for a few foreigners from Australia or the UK,
or the odd NGO worker or academic around town. More often I was approached with a
hodge-podge of English words, learned from American pop music or film, with the local
Burman sometimes relying on a shy smile or a laugh with a confident “Hello, how are you?”.
More often than not, I was greeted with curiosity and a friendly, “Where you come from?”
sometimes followed up with a cheeky “You need a tour guide?”, which was more of a
friendly attempt at trying the role on for size, rather than the persistent offers I had come
to expect in some other tourist-laden Southeast Asian cities I visited.

“Burmese” is used here in a generalized context to refer to the many different ethnic groups that compose
the diaspora of refugees originating from Myanmar. In my previous research, I have worked with the Karen,
Karenni, Chin, Shan and Rohingya who have been resettled as refugees in Dallas, Texas.
5
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Portions of Yangon had the distinct feeling of stepping back in time, helped along by
the decaying old colonial buildings, popping up like pastel-colored remnants of British
colonial rule. Much of the architecture was now crumbling in the tropical humidity,
seemingly stitched together with power lines and creeper vines in equal measure,
reminders of the enduring battle between modernity and nature. And although this sleepy
façade of historic relics seemed to demand a cold drink in the shade, the streets that
connected the dilapidated government ministries to the filigreed railings of endless
apartment buildings, were chaotic and colorful and afforded no time to stand still. Rather,
change (and the turmoil and excitement that comes with it), was right at the surface,
embodied in traffic jams and street vendors and loud speakers showering the city with
Buddhist chants.
On my first ride into the city in the early summer of 2015, a taxi driver swerved onto
the roundabout that encircled Sule Pagoda in the heart of downtown Yangon. He carefully
pointed out the only synagogue in the city, saying cheerfully “This is where the Jewish go!”,
and I was indeed impressed. He went on to point out the neighboring Mosque, noting, “This
is where the Muslims go.” and then motioned to the golden stupa of Sule Pagoda, saying
“This is where I go.” while I murmured, “ah yes, for Buddhists”. He ensured he had my full
attention before finally pointing to a Christian Baptist church saying happily, “And this is
where you go!”. I smiled and nodded, noting to myself the instantaneous ‘western-whiteAmerican’ otherness that would perpetually color my interactions in this part of the world.
This trip around the roundabout was a fitting foray into the significant demarcation of
religious affiliation that characterizes Burmese society, and it only proved to intensify and
become more relevant as the summer wore on. As such, the following day saw a
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demonstration downtown that concerned the growing anti-Rohingya and anti-Muslim
sentiment in the country. Myanmar nationals and monks carried signs that read, “Bengalis,
go back to Bangladesh where they belong” and “The BBC are doing a mistake, they don’t
know what is really happening here.” The signs seemed to cement the national opinion that
the minority Muslim Rohingya, largely concentrated on the western coast’s Rakhine State,
were not perceived as legitimate citizens of Myanmar, and should thus be deported and
removed from their land immediately. I encountered the anti-Rohingya sentiment multiple
times over the following six weeks in Yangon, which served as a window to observe how
negative public sentiment towards minority groups played out in Myanmar. These
observations were useful in a comparative context of the Karen’s prior marginalization in
Burmese society, and I often noted how easily propaganda made its way into casual
conversation.
Overall, the goals of this first phase of my pilot research undertaken inside Yangon
were not only to get a feeling for life inside Myanmar, but also to improve my language
skills via immersion and intensive study. I also was attempting to answer the following
questions:
1. How have Karen refugees who have returned to Yangon adjusted to repatriation?
2. How do current citizens living within Myanmar (Yangon) feel about Karen refugees
returning to the country? Is the current climate in Yangon a hostile environment or
a welcoming one?
I went about this in two ways. First, I cannot overstate just how valuable participant
observation was at this stage. Trips through the multitudes of markets, my Burmese
language classes, and observations of political demonstrations all provided insights into the
effects of globalization and the arrival of the international media. Additionally, I was able to
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start gauging public perceptions of religion, violence, freedom and nationalism as well as
getting a window into the social hierarchies and gender relations that guide everyday life. I
was also incredibly lucky to be in Yangon during the third edition of the Human Rights
Human Dignity International Film Festival, which brought 65 films to Yangon, both of
national and international origin. Incredibly, all films included either English or Burmese
subtitles depending on the language used, which served to make the films created in
Myanmar rich sources of local information. In particular, films that dealt with national
identity, internal displacement of minority groups due to international development,
women’s and LGBT rights, as well as rights for factory workers and those historically
marginalized, especially stood out amongst the others.
However, to more specifically address the questions posed above, I turned to a
strategy of semi-structured interviews with local residents of Yangon (n=8), foreign
nationals living in Yangon for more than 1 year (n=3) and recently returned Karen
refugees6 in the region (n=2). It was through these initial interviews that a larger story of
resistance to repatriation began to develop, from both the host country community and the
refugees themselves. Throughout interviews with locals in Yangon, all from the majority
Burman group, there were open hostilities voiced concerning the Rohingya ethnic minority,
and sentiments that ranged from indifference to dismissiveness concerning the
approximately 90,000 Karen living as refugees on the Thai border. Many locals noted that
they did not know what the word “refugee” meant, or insisted that the issue with the Karen
was resolved long ago. Also telling was the sheer shortage of any returned Karen in the

6

The individuals interviewed in 2015 were not officially repatriated by UNHCR or the governments of Thailand
and Myanmar. Rather, they spontaneously returned on their own accord and were attempting to live in the outskirts
of the greater Yangon region.
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region to interview. Presumably, the majority of Karen would in fact return to the
southeastern Karen State where they previously lived, rather than Yangon; thus, my
assumption that some would seek out Yangon for economic opportunity was impossible to
verify and most likely false. In the two interviews with returned Karen that I did manage to
arrange in 2015, they both reported not being able to obtain citizenship paperwork from
the Myanmar government, and were currently unemployed and living with relatives. Due
to the fact that they had returned spontaneously, and without official sanction from UNHCR
or the Myanmar government, they had received no monetary or logistical support. This
greatly affected their feelings concerning return and placed them at odds with a highly
bureaucratic system.
The second phase of preliminary research was carried out over 4 weeks in the late
summer of 2015 in Thailand, in and around the border town of Mae Sot, as well as inside
the proposed research site for the project, Mae La refugee camp (see detailed site
description in following section). The goal of this phase was to speak directly to those
facing repatriation and gauge their reaction at the prospect of returning to Myanmar.
Specifically I was interested in the conceptualization of home in the context of this very
protracted refugee situation, where many refugees had lived in camps for decades.
Additionally, I wanted to understand what specific concerns they had with repatriation and
if a “voluntary repatriation” as the UNHCR termed it, was indeed a possibility in the future.
Over the course of these 4 weeks, I conducted 12 interviews with Karen refugees living
either within Mae La camp (n=5) or living illegally in the neighboring town of Mae Sot
(n=7). Additionally, I interviewed 3 representatives from local NGOs who were all
implementing either ESL or economic training programs in Mae Sot for Karen refugees.
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What became abundantly clear during this time was not only the seemingly universal
resistance to return from both the Karen and regional NGO workers, but also the
complexity of the situation. A cacophony of voices from CBOs, EBOs, NGOs, INGOs and
government officials all collided with concerns, complaints, demands, concessions and
refusals concerning the nine camps along the border. There were land rights issues, refugee
vs. migrant status determination issues, issues with land mines, issues with economic
development, and myriad other complexities that made the question of repatriation
anything but straightforward. Rather at one point, a Karen leader I was interviewing mused
dryly, “I’m glad you’re here to sort all this out! Please send us your report when you finish.”
And as happens with much preliminary research, I was left with more questions than
answers, but was confident of both the feasibility and significance of the project.
Overall, during the preliminary research phase in 2015, I conducted 28 interviews
and participated in a variety of activities and daily life in both Myanmar and on the ThaiMyanmar border. Aside from confirming the feasibility of the project, this work proved to
be especially helpful in cultivating strong research relationships with a variety of Karen
community members, including those living in Mae La camp, as well as NGO workers in
Mae Sot, and a handful of foreign academics conducting various research in the region. It
ultimately helped form the foundation for this project, informed lines of inquiry, and
guided thematic research.
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2.3 Returning to the Field
I officially began my fieldwork in January of 2017, spending the first 3 months of the
year completing a visiting study fellowship at the University of Oxford’s Refugee Studies
Centre in the U.K. This fellowship specifically allowed me to immerse myself in the archival
literature concerning the last 30 years of data on the plight of the Karen in Southeast Asia.
The archives at the Refugee Studies Centre are some of the most comprehensive in the
world concerning refugee literature, and include access to physical pieces of grey
literature7 collected over the years by many researchers in the field.
Among the assortment of boxes filled with papers, photos, presentations,
newspaper clippings and unpublished manuscripts, I came across several pieces of original
correspondence from the late 1980’s and early 1990’s that painted a very complex picture
of relations between Thailand and Myanmar concerning their handling of refugees. In my
prior research, I often found Thailand portrayed in a mostly positive, sometimes even
generous or heroic narrative, attributed mostly to their longstanding acceptance of
refugees from Myanmar along their shared border. As is often pointed out by journalists
and academics, Thailand is not a signatory to the UN’s 1951 Refugee Convention, and thus,
seemingly has no obligation to offer refuge or asylum to those seeking it from neighboring
countries. In this way, the fact that camps have existed in Thailand for 30 years seem to be
symbolic of Thailand’s commitment to human rights and generosity of spirit, or so you
might assume after reading much of the recent writing concerning refugees in this region.
Notwithstanding Thailand’s ratification of the 1966 Bangkok Principles on the Status and
Treatment of Refugees (as discussed in greater detail in chapter 3), which lays out
7

Grey Literature can be defined as documents that are produced on all levels of government, academics,
business and industry in print and electronic formats, but which are not controlled by commercial publishers.
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essentially the same sort of protections as the 1951 convention, Thailand has a much more
complicated past of forcefully returning ethnic minorities to Myanmar or subjecting them
to various forms of abuse.
In one press clipping from the May 1990 Issue Brief from the U.S. Committee for
Refugees, several cases of refoulement8 by the Thai government resulting in death were
reported. Quoting a report from Amnesty International, the issue recounts a group of 22
ethnic minority students who were forcibly repatriated to Myanmar after being rounded up
by the Thai Police. As they noted:
“They are said to have repeatedly expressed fears for their safety and to have
petitioned the Thai authorities not to be returned to Burma and eventually
went on hunger strike. They are understood to have been forced to board a
plane from Tak airport on January 6, 1989 by Thai army personnel.”
It went on to say that the U.S. government agreed with the concerns of Amnesty
International and the U.S. State Department subsequently released a press statement
saying:
“We have received credible reports that a number of returned Burmese
students who fled Rangoon after the September 18 military takeover were
subsequently arrested and died while in the military regime’s custody.”
In another letter, addressed to the late Dr. Barbara Harrell-Bond on November 28 of 1991,
a student writes:
“I have just returned from Bangkok where I find the situation even more
pressing on the Burmese refugees. They have until 4 December 1991 to
register with the Ministry of Interior for movement to the proposed “safe
area”. If they do not register, they will become illegal immigrants subject to
arrest and possible deportation to Burma. It seems UNHCR at present has no
8

The principle of non-refoulement was first laid out in 1954 in the UN-Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees, which, in Article 33(1) provides that: "No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion."
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means of protecting these people though most of them have the status of
“persons of concern” to UNHCR. In recent months two students have been
killed allegedly by Thai Police. It is understandable that the Burmese
students do not wish to go to the proposed “safe area” or camp. The border
camps have proven to be long-term situations – some asylum seekers have
lived more than ten years in this confinement. It seems UNHCR and the
international community are not assured of any presence in the proposed
“safe area” and reports on the conditions are inconsistent, and there has been
no written documentation given to the public or to the agencies on this
matter. Without some international presence, protection of the persons and
human rights of the refugees and asylum-seekers will be difficult, even
impossible. The coming seminar may find ways of using “good offices” to
delay the implementation of the “safe area” proposal until there are
guarantees of an international presence, and to negotiate with the Thai
Government to allow proper documentation to be given to those Burmese
recognized as refugees, and to allow UNHCR to carry out its major role of
protection of “persons of concern” and asylum-seekers. Currently there are
some 100 Burmese detained in the Police Academy in Bangkok. Some are
students arrested for trespassing after the protest to draw attention to the
attempted refoulement, sentenced for 60 days on 3 July 1991 and still being
detained.”
In another handwritten correspondence, subsequently dated February 24th, 1992, a
Burmese refugee writes directly to the head office of UNHCR in Switzerland, in what
appears to be an attempt to tell someone – anyone - what is happening. She writes:
“The Thai government has planned, and is proceeding to keep all the
Burmese Refugees in a camp. We don’t want to be kept in a camp, totally
controlled by the Thai Authority. Because we had never been kept like this
before. We, altogether 107, arrived Ranong, Thailand in the evening of 18th
September 1988 after the military took up the power in Burma. They
arrested and camped us in a village called Hut Sun Pan near Ranong. They
kept us in a building that was surrounded by barbed wire. They did not let us
out beyond that. We assumed it was a camp and it was heavily guarded by
Thai police and military personnel. We got food and a few other things
through them. They took some of them. We made the meals by ourselves.
Before we had our meals they often came to take what they wanted to eat.
The guards were fond of drinking. They were drinking the whole day. When
they did not have money to buy drink, they took our rice and exchanged with
drinks in the market. One night before we went to sleep, a guard kicked Ko
Htun Win in the face. Ko Htun Win was unconscious. When we protest about
that, they nailed all the doors closed and aimed the guns at us. We asked the
governor to solve that problem when he came to visit. But he left the problem
unsolved. The leader of the military took our pictures twice. But we never
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saw the pictures. We suspected that he sold the photographs to Burmese
agents. The place we were kept is very much look like the camp the Thai
government is going to. But the present one will be worse. We were barely
kept two months. In that short time, nearly half of our group went back to
Burma because they could not tolerate the behavior of the guards and being
kept under detention. If it were longer then two months, we were not sure to
keep our anger under control. So we do not appreciate and strongly object
the plan to keep all the Burmese Refugees in a camp that is totally under the
control of the Thai Authority. These are the names, UNHCR registration
numbers and signatures of us on the next page.”
Through these letters, field reports and press clippings, a more nuanced history began to
emerge. This history was often tense, predicated on political maneuvering between two
governments, and frequently exacerbated by the presence of international agencies
attempting to intervene. It is also a history of alternating narratives of Thailand as both
savior and tormenter, refuge and snake pit; a complicated history that would ultimately
lend clarity to the complexity of the current state of affairs. Thailand’s complex history with
refugee protection is given additional consideration in chapter 3, especially in relation to
its influence on the current political climate surrounding repatriation.
Upon completion of my time as a visiting study fellow at the Refugee Studies Centre,
I began to prepare for an extended stay in Southeast Asia. In the late spring of 2017, I
returned to the Thai-Myanmar border to begin the ethnographic portion of this research
project. For the first two months I stayed in and around Mae Sot, the closest border town to
my chosen research site, Mae La refugee camp. During this time I was able to reestablish
contact with informants and colleagues from my preliminary research, as well as establish
contact with the local UNHCR field office to update them on my research concerning their
voluntary repatriation program. During this time I was also able to reconfirm entrance into
Mae La camp with the assistance of two colleagues from universities in the U.K. and
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Thailand. Ultimately, I was put in touch with a school operating inside the camp that was
willing to sponsor my stay in exchange for my services as an English teacher.
The research site for this project, Mae La Refugee Camp, is located in the Tha Song
Yang District of the Tak Province in Northern Thailand, approximately 8 km west of the
Myanmar border. Mae La is the largest of the nine camps along the Thai-Myanmar border,
with a population of 36,708 (TBC, 2018). Mae La is also known as ‘Beh Klaw’ or ‘cotton
fields’ in the Karen/Kayin language, which refers to the agricultural activities around which
Karen leaders originally negotiated permission for refugees to cross into the area (TBC,
2014). While official maps of the camp are notoriously rare, the map below displays recent
satellite imagery captured by Google Earth in 2019. Nestled in the shadow of a large karst
limestone cliff sits the sprawl of bamboo and thatch roof homes that make up the camp’s
455 acres, split across four zones (zones A,B,C,D).

Map 4 -Mae La Refugee Camp, Source: Google Earth, 2019
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The camp was originally established following the fall of a Karen National Union
(KNU) base near the Thai village of Mae La on the border in 1984. In January 1995,
numerous camps were attacked in cross-border raids and the Thai authorities began to
consolidate camps along the border to improve security and reduce the risk of shelling.
Mae La was designated as the main consolidation camp in the area and thus in April of
1995, Mae La increased in size from 6,969 to 13,195 due to the closure of five camps to the
north: Mae Ta Waw, Mae Salit, Mae Plu So, Kler Kho and Ka Mawlay Kho and the move of
Huay Heng later in October of the same year (TBC, 2014). Over the next 3 years, the camp
nearly tripled in size as refugees continued to stream across the border and additional
camp closures continued including both Huai Bone and Shoklo camps. Today
approximately 85% of the refugees in Mae La are ethnic Karen (TBC, 2018), most having
fled due to the constant fighting between the Myanmar military and the Karen National
Union’s (KNU) armed wing, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA).
Due to its size, age and visibility, Mae La has become both a place to access
healthcare and education for refugees. The camp’s medical clinic at Mae La is run by the
international NGO Première Urgence-Aide Médicale Internationale (PU-AMI), which trains
health workers and provides healthcare to the refugees. Additionally, there are several
schools in Mae La providing children within the camp access to primary and secondary
education. The schools are also attended by a few thousand students living inside
Myanmar, who do not have access to educational facilities within their villages. These
students are thus registered as temporary inhabitants of the camp.
Over the past two decades, researchers from varying academic and practical
disciplines have conducted a limited number of research projects in the camp. Researchers
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have addressed areas such as alcohol abuse and partner violence (Ezard, 2009),
experiences of LGBT individuals within the camp (Forced Migration Review, Iss. 42, 2013),
dietary assessments (Banjong & Menefee, 2003), HIV prevalence (Plewes & Lee, 2008),
community-based camp management (Thompson, 2008) and human rights abuses and the
protection of children (Chia, 2012). However, there is a dearth of academic research
concerning the lived experiences of the refugees on the border, especially in regards to
living within states of limbo, waiting and biding time. Additionally, how these experiences
affected their acceptance (or non acceptance) of voluntary repatriation programs remained
to be seen. As Mae La refugee camp is both the oldest and most prominent camp along the
border, it served as the most relevant site to carry out this research project.
2.4 Methodological Approaches
The primary focus of this project was to understand how Karen refugees living
inside Mae La coped with the long periods of uncertainty and waiting inherent to living in a
refugee camp for extended periods of time. It also aimed to explore how they negotiated
their agency, resistance and strategic decision-making when faced with impending camp
closures and voluntary repatriation programs. As such, this project addressed the following
three objectives:
Objective 1- To understand which factors may affect the acceptance or nonacceptance of voluntary repatriation programs offered to Karen refugees living in
Mae La camp.
Objective 2- To determine if experiences of indefinite waiting and uncertainty alter
decision making in regards to individual migration strategies.
Objective 3- To identify the specific barriers to voluntary repatriation perceived by
both refugees and governmental stakeholders.
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To achieve the specific objectives above, the project employed a five-phase research design
that included both qualitative and quantitative elements (described in detail below). In
addition to ten weeks of preliminary research carried out in the summer of 2015, I spent
approximately three months conducting archival research at the University of Oxford, three
months conducting research and community-centered interviews with stakeholders within
the Mae Sot region of Thailand, and approximately five months living inside Mae La refugee
camp in order to enable both in-depth interviews as well as participant observation of the
every day life experienced in a refugee camp. This access was facilitated by a small school
within the camp that provided sleeping quarters and daily meals. As such, during this time I
only had access to the same facilities and resources as the refugees themselves, including
limited running water and electricity. In order to mitigate any costs associated with my
stay in the camp, I made monthly donations to cover the cost of food and other expenses.
Additionally, I taught an English class at the school for the duration of my stay.
Project Design
The project’s first phase was centered on community engagement in Mae Sot and
renewing contact with informants and study participants identified in the pilot study,
undertaken in May-June of 2015. During this phase, interview questionnaires were
developed, pre-tested and revised based on informant feedback. In the second phase, I
entered the camp and began teaching English for the school that hosted my stay. This phase
also entailed conducting systematic observations of camp life recorded in detailed field
notes as well as hiring a research assistant. The third phase centered on conducting taped,
semi-structured interviews with a purposive sample of 40 individuals, related to lived
experiences in the camp and feelings regarding returning to Myanmar. Questions posed
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during interviews ranged from inquiries about personal histories (“Can you tell me about
your journey to Mae La camp?”), life in camp (“Can you tell me about your life in Mae La?”
“How do you spend your day?” “What do you do in your free time?” “Do you feel that there is
too much free time, not enough free time, or just enough free time?”), and questions
concerning repatriation (“Have you heard about the voluntary repatriation program?” “How
do you feel about returning to Burma?” “Do you know any friends or family members who
have returned or are planning on returning soon?”). Additionally, I always closed each
interview by asking the participant if they had any questions for me or anything else they
would like to add. This more casual and conversational tone proved to add a valuable
compliment to the semi-formal interview and often gave additional insight into their
previous answers. For reference, a complete copy of the interview guide can be found in
the appendix of this dissertation. The project’s fourth phase entailed two months of on-site
preliminary data analysis in order to improve the validity of study results and share
findings with project partners before leaving the field. During this phase I conducted a
public presentation in camp with my initial findings, which I opened up for a long Q&A
session afterwards. The project’s fifth and final phase involved the full transcription of all
audio files, intensive data analysis through Atlas.ti, a qualitative software program, and
conducting any required follow up interviews with research participants.
Research Population
The population for this study was comprised of Karen refugees, both men and
women, residing in Mae La refugee camp. Respondents were limited to those refugees who
have lived within the camp for more than five years, so as to fully explore questions
concerned with extended periods of time residing within camp walls. In the interest of
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collecting a diverse sampling of data, I interviewed only one person per household.
Additional interviews were conducted with local camp leaders and representatives from
UNHCR, TBC and KRC.
Recruitment
Recruitment of participants was facilitated through both community engagement
and assistance from my local research assistant. Through the preliminary research I
conducted in the summer of 2015, I successfully built a small network of both local and
international NGO employees within Mae La camp who expressed enthusiasm for my
project. This network ultimately helped with several referrals for research participants.
Other recruitment methods included identification of probable informants during
participant observation, daily life in Mae La and the use of a chain-referral sampling
technique. Chain-referral sampling (Goodman, 1961) is best explained as a non-probability
technique where existing study subjects refer potential informants to the researcher from
among their friends and acquaintances.
Data Collection
Data collection was primarily performed through the use of taped semi-structured
person-centered interviews and participant observation. Interviews with refugee
informants took place within Mae La camp while interviews with NGOs were typically
conducted at an arranged site within the Mae Sot area. Semi-structured interviews with
informants were facilitated through the use of prepared interview guides and administered
in person along with my research assistant, who would also act as translator if the need
arose. Each interview lasted approximately 45 minutes to 1 hour. I recorded each interview
with the participant’s consent for future transcription. Due to the research parameters
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agreed upon between myself and the SMU Institutional Review Board, I did not conduct any
interviews with persons under the age of 18.
In each interview session, I verbally explained the need for informed consent while
also explaining the details of the research study, including the purpose, study procedure,
foreseeable risks, and benefits. Prior to conducting the interviews, I allowed the participant
to ask any questions before consenting. In the case of interviews with refugee informants
that did not speak English or Burmese, my research assistant acted as translator for the
S’gaw Karen dialect to explain the informed consent process. On three occasions, a second
translator was made available to translate the Pwo Karen dialects for both the purposes of
consent and interview. As previously agreed upon between myself and the SMU
Institutional Review Board, I requested that written consent be waived in lieu of verbal
consent, as the only record linking the subject and the research would be the consent
document and the principal risk would be potential harm resulting from a breach of
confidentiality.
Myanmar has recently become a democratic country as of 2011, however due to the
history of military and government oppression, there still remains a degree of uneasiness
about being identified as having certain opinions or political beliefs. Previous
anthropologists working in Myanmar have noted their informant's request to destroy any
interview transcripts due to this uneasiness of their name being linked to the information
they have provided (Fink, 1996). Thus the only record of the name or other identifying
information of the subject would be the signed consent form and knowledge of an
individual's participation or information provided could lead to potential social harm. It is
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for this reason that I requested a waiver of signed informed consent and instead obtained
verbal consent.
In addition to the 28 interviews gathered in 2015 during the preliminary phase of
this project, data collected in 2017 included 40 semi-structured person-centered
interviews, 2 community meetings, 3 months of archival research, 8 months of participant
observation and ongoing analysis of local publications, media, art and music related to
repatriation and refugee experiences along the border (see table 2 below for additional
detail).
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Table 2 - Summary of Interview Data Collected (2017)
Gender

Age

M
M
M
NA
F
M
F
M
M
M
F
M
F
M
M
M
M
M
F
F
F
F
F
M
M
F
F
M
M
M
F
F
F
M
M
M
F
M
F
M

35
50
40
NA
24
33
38
46
51
78
52
31
42
38
31
43
28
52
27
47
72
44
48
21
20
50
39
24
39
31
28
18
27
56
42
36
39
18
36
59

Religion

Note

Christian
Camp Leader
Christian
Camp Leader
Christian
Camp Leader
NA
NGO Group Interview
Christian
NGO Staff Member
Christian
NGO Staff Member
NA
NGO Staff Member
NA
NGO Staff Member
Buddhist/Animist
Refugee
Christian
Refugee
Buddhist/Animist
Refugee
Christian
Refugee
Christian
Refugee
Christian
Refugee
Christian
Refugee
Christian
Refugee
Buddhist
Refugee/Monk
Christian
Refugee
Christian
Refugee
Christian
Refugee
Buddhist/Animist
Refugee
Christian
Refugee
Christian
Refugee
Christian
Refugee
Christian
Refugee
Buddhist
Refugee
Christian
Refugee
Christian
Refugee
Buddhist
Refugee
Christian
Refugee
Christian
Refugee
Christian
Refugee
NA
Refugee
Buddhist/Animist
Refugee
Christian
Refugee
Buddhist
Refugee
Buddhist
Refugee
Christian
Refugee
Christian
Refugee
Buddhist
Refugee
Summary Totals and Averages for all Interviews (2017)
M = 23
Avg
Christian = 26
Camp Leader = 3
Age = 39
F = 16
Buddhist = 6
NGO Staff = 4
years old
NA = 1
Buddhist/Animist = 4
NGO Group = 1
NA = 4
Refugee = 31
Refugee/Monk = 1
Summary of Additional Data Collection (2017)
Archival Research
3 months at the University of Oxford, Refugee Studies Centre
Participant Observation
8 months spent living within region (Yangon, Mae Sot and Mae La Camp)
Focus Groups and Community Meetings
2 sessions conducted in Mae La Camp (June 2017 and Oct 2017)
Analysis of local publications, media, art and music related to repatriation and refugee experiences along the border
Ongoing analysis Facebook, Karen News, KRC newsletter, Burmalink, Teacircle
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Length of time
in camp
20
27
19
NA
22
NA
NA
NA
17
32
11
8
9
11
8
12
10
8
10
10
15
10
9
21
20
26
27
24
17
8
25
18
24
19
9
12
14
18
20
17
Avg
Time in Camp =
16 years

Accuracy of Data
The accuracy of data collected from refugee populations can sometimes be
problematic as has often been discussed within the literature of refugee studies. It has been
argued that refugee informants may have an interest in obscuring or falsifying data in
relation to a perceived connection to the success or failure of bids to receive aid or
resettlement (Mulumba, 2007; Dunlop 2011; Satterthwaite & A Rosga, 2008). With
knowledge of the reported challenges of gathering qualitative data from refugee
populations, I felt more equipped to deal with this issue by being more cognizant in this
regard. Further, before each interview I explicitly explained that answers would in no way
affect their personal situation in regards to resettlement or aid distribution. Additionally,
my extended presence in the camp prior to conducting semi-structured interviews helped
alleviate any initial distrust that might have potentially affected the accuracy of any data
collected.
The time spent living in camp also worked to refine and improve the accuracy of
data I collected through participant observation. I generally stuck to a strategy of saying
yes to any invitation extended my way which led to observing a camp-wide soccer
tournament, two funerals, multiple religious ceremonies, many shared meals and a host of
other opportunities to engage with the population. This engagement offered multiple
lenses in which to view the dynamics of daily life and community interaction, furthering
strengthening my analysis. The data I collected during participant observation was also
strengthened tremendously by the input I was able to receive from my research assistant
and fellow teachers inside the camp.
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In regards to the accuracy of data collected while interviewing officials and
representatives from international and community-based organizations, I consciously
made an effort to communicate my neutrality at all times. As the protracted refugee
situation along the Thai-Myanmar border is deeply political, some have argued that
western researchers often present a biased representation that sides with Karen activists
(Horstmann, 2011). With this in mind, before interviews with any organization, I made
every effort to review all public information about their work and any potential biases that
may be present.
Data Analysis
The results from the data collection methodologies described above were analyzed
primarily through the use of Atlas.ti, a professional software application used in the
analysis of qualitative data. Additionally, I drew from the literature on forced migration to
inform my top-down coding methodology in regards to both specific words and themes. All
audio recording from semi-structured interviews was transcribed first into Microsoft
Word, and then uploaded into Atlas.ti. Within Atlas.ti, I created several key words such as
“agency”, “resistance”, “repatriation”, “time” and “waiting” to identify themes and assign
them to related sections of text. Through this coding I was able to see emerging themes in
the data and determine which ideas were predominant among the community. This
strategy of analysis is rooted in grounded theory (Soulliere et al. 2001), which is a way of
conceptualizing data that creates an interplay between data collection, coding and analysis
that involves coding, constant comparison, theoretical sampling and verification.
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2.5 Concluding Remarks about Ethical Challenges in the Field
Working with refugees or other marginalized groups can often present ethical
challenges concerning power dynamics, properly informed consent and culturally
appropriate representation amongst other things. I found all of these challenges present in
my fieldwork although in the context of living inside a refuge camp, some proved more
difficult than others. As a rule, I decided prior to entering the camp that I would not
interview any of the students at the school where I would be living and teaching an English
course, even if they were over the age of 18. In my previous research experience, I have
encountered response bias, where I felt my informant was potentially giving answers that
they assumed I wanted to hear. I was acutely aware of this risk being greater when there
are both an age and cultural difference present, and I felt adding an additional layer of
status (ie teacher v. student) would potentially invalidate any data collected. However,
what I did not anticipate was the ethical challenge inherent in presenting myself
authentically and unbiased, as a researcher and anthropologist, amongst the community I
was living in. To be more specific, the school that agreed to host my stay was religious in
nature with a core curriculum that was heavily reliant on scripture and Christian ideology.
Personally, I do not claim membership in any religion, although I certainly do not disdain
others for theirs. I knew the organization was religious before agreeing to stay and felt I
had alleviated any conflicting interest by noting some concerns up front. I communicated
that I was happy to teach English (which I believed to be a very neutral subject) but noted I
could not teach any religious classes as I would need to interview people in camp from all
religious backgrounds and did not want to be perceived as biased. This was agreed upon
prior to entering the camp, and indeed, I did not need to teach any religious courses over
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the duration of my stay. However, there were several times when I felt it was assumed I
was a practicing Christian and I chose in those instances not to overtly correct the
assumption. At other times I felt it was necessary or polite to participate in a routine
religious activity as an active member of the school staff. Participating in these activities
sometimes felt deceptive or inauthentic, although I often found myself weighing the cost of
othering myself further from a community I was trying to become a part of. Ultimately I
decided that the conflict was not significant enough to warrant concern, as I was not
actively recruiting research participants from the school’s student population. I eventually
resigned myself to minimal participation in any activities that felt disingenuous on my part
and a general avoidance of the topic concerning my personal faith. I would describe this as
an uneasy truce and imperfect solution. I must also mention that at all times the leadership
and fellow teachers at the school were incredibly gracious and respectful to me, and I am
eternally grateful for their kindness.
Upon reflection, I felt it was important to discuss this experience in the context of
research challenges, as there are often many obstacles no amount of graduate courses can
prepare us for in the field. According to Goffman’s theory in The Presentation of Self in
Everyday Life (1959), the social actor may take on an already established role, with preexisting fronts and props with the main goal to keep coherent and adjust to the different
settings offered him. In this way, I felt the role of visiting westerner had previously been
played to the “audience” in camp by a missionary or religious leader. Thus, they assumed I
would also fulfill that role which made it easier to slip into due to a desire to fit in. In this
sense I would offer a word of advice to future researchers should they follow a similar path
into fieldwork: Taking conscious inventory of the ways in which your identity may
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intersect with your research population is an important step in preparing for the field.
While we often discuss cultural relativism as anthropologists, we are sometimes lacking in
asking how we will negotiate our own faith, gender identities, sexual preferences or even
political leanings until we are confronted with presenting ourselves in the field. The
personal dimensions of our lives, and which ones we choose to share, can have implications
to our integrity as researchers. Finding a balance that feels right is sometimes as
challenging as it is personal.
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Chapter 3
POLITICS AND THE PRECARIAT

“The Thai people, I think they look down on us. You know because we are just
refugees, we can’t do anything. My life here, it’s like the bird or the pig, just living in
the garden, in a cage. It’s like a prison. No job, no place to earn money or stand and
walk by myself. But there is no place for Karen people to go and live peacefully.
There is no security, no life to return to. So we are stuck.”
~ Saw Htoo Hay, 31, Mae La Camp

3.1 Introduction
On a hot day in mid-September, I found myself tagging along for a trip out of the
refugee camp and into the border town of Mae Sot. One of the teachers from the school, Poe
Taw, a refugee himself who had grown up in Mae La, invited me to come along for the hourlong journey full of bumpy roads, Thai talk radio and stunning views of the surrounding
jungle. This was an opportunity I happily jumped at, relishing the chance to find a store in
town where I might pick up some bread or chocolate- rare commodities in camp. We piled
into a pick-up truck, one of the vehicles used for official school business, and set off
excitedly for this unexpected day trip into town to buy some supplies and medicine. The
school hosting my stay had over the years reached a sort of informal agreement with the
armed Thai guards who stood constant watch over the entry and exit points of the camp.
When we arrived at the gate, Poe Taw presented them with a typed letter, signed by both
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the school’s dean and the section camp leader; they glanced at it and waved us on our way.
“They know us, it’s ok.” Poe Taw explained, passing me the letter so I could get a better
look. The letter listed the names of the three teachers leaving camp that day, with a brief
paragraph noting that they were acting as official representatives of the school and asked
that the Thai government please grant them permission to travel to Mae Sot for the day.
What the letter didn’t mention, was the mutual understanding that upon our return, we
might happen to bring the guards a bit of lunch or another small token to show our
appreciation for their generosity.
It struck me at this point how abnormal this process of asking for permission to
leave actually was, while at the same time being entirely routine for my travel companions.
Early in my stay at the camp, I wrote in my field notes about how easy it was to forget
sometimes that this was a refugee camp rather than a crowded village. There were 40,000
people living across the 454 acres that comprised the four sections of Mae La, and it was
possible to wander around for the entire day without seeing a fence or barbed wire. What I
failed to grasp however was just how deeply engrained the knowledge becomes that your
freedom of movement is restricted. You may not see the fence but you know it is there. You
may not see the guards, but they are watching. And you may even be able to leave for the
day, but it is a temporary departure. Those who have dared to leave the camp unofficially,
sneaking under fences to seek out day labor jobs in order to supplement meager food
rations, risk fines, arrest, imprisonment and even possible deportation. Thus the lack of
legal status for the Karen to live in Thailand outside of a camp has put them at an extreme
disadvantage, both socially and economically. Their confinement and subsequent inability
to work legally in Thailand has perpetuated a culture of aid dependency while also
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encouraging an illegal labor market prone to exploitation. Figures from 2017 estimate
there are nearly 2 million irregular migrants from Myanmar working in Thailand (IOM,
2017) with many refugees and migrants employed on the western border in factories,
construction sites and agricultural zones. These are jobs that rely heavily on migrant labor
because most Thais are unwilling to fill them. Due to the Karen’s precarious legal status,
they are often paid less than minimum wage and have no recourse should they be injured
or taken advantage of. Still, the numbers of migrants and refugees unofficially crossing the
border into Thailand continues to rise, and more than half of the refugees I interviewed9
noted that staying in the country was indeed a preferred option to formal repatriation back
into Myanmar. In that vein, it’s worth exploring here what impact the emergence of this
illegal working class may ultimately have on how Thailand deals with refugees from
Myanmar, as well as its effect on attempted voluntary repatriation efforts.
In this chapter, I will start with a discussion of how Thailand’s unique history of
diplomacy, nationalism and independence has colored the current political landscape in
regards to labor migration, as well as how it has intersected with current refugee policy.
This is followed by an analysis of how the political and economic reforms happening within
Myanmar are currently shaping diplomatic relations with Thailand and consequently
affecting the fate of refugees residing in camps along the border. Additionally, I will offer a
brief commentary on the emergence of special economic zones as a potential solution to
both forced and irregular migration while offering a word of caution about the risks of
development-induced displacement. In closing I will discuss how refugees waiting in the

9

Qualitative analysis of semi-structured interviews conducted with refugees living in Mae La Camp produced
n = 21 respondents who listed “remain in Thailand”, “find work in Mae Sot” or “stay with relatives in
Thailand” as the answer to the question, “What would you do if Mae La camp closed in the near future?”
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confines of a camp are especially at risk of forming a new working underclass known as
“the precariat10” which may actually work against creating economic security while
derailing any attempts as sustained voluntary repatriation.

3.2 From Siam to Thailand
Thailand, known as Siam until 1939, has always been somewhat of an outlier in
Southeast Asia, most notably in its status as the only country to never officially be colonized
by European powers. Although it could be argued that forced land concessions to the
French in the late 19th century effectively amounted to foreign invasion, Siam never
completely lost autonomy as a nation. Siamese kings quickly realized that actions such as
mapping fixed borders, consolidating power to a geographic center such as Bangkok, and
promoting a homogenous Siamese culture gave them a much better position from which to
negotiate. In doing this, they effectively emulated a typical European nation-state, which
created a way for their governing system to be familiar to outsiders, thus reinforcing the
validity of their claim to sovereignty. In the late 19th century, when Siam’s territory was
being encroached upon by the British from the west and the French from the east, the
Siamese kings were able to effectively sustain their independence by leveraging the less
than friendly relations between the British and French. In an important diplomatic feat, the
Siamese Ambassador to Europe at the time, a member of the ruling Chakri dynasty, was
able to quietly appeal to the British and their desire for a “buffer zone”, or neutral space
between their colonized territory of Burma and the French occupied Laos and Cambodia.
10

“The precariat” is a term first coined in 2011 by British economist Guy Standing. A combination of the
words “proletariat” and “precarious”, it describes an emerging class of people facing insecurity by means of
precarious work. The precariat is often characterized by social exclusion, irregular or temporary migrant
work and participation in informal economies.
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The closed door meetings that took place ultimately led to the Anglo-French Declaration of
January 1896, which effectively guaranteed that neither the British nor the French would
move to colonize Siam (Jeshurun, 1970). This cemented Siam’s autonomy and ensured the
Chakri dynasty remained in power for the next three decades as the ruling house of the
Kingdom of Siam.
Map 5 - Southeast Asia during the high colonial age, 1870 - 1914

Source - Adapted from Philip's Atlas of World History (1999)

By 1927 however, a Siamese army officer by the name of Phibun had established the
radical People’s Party, which would go on to lead a coup against the ruling Chakri dynasty.
In 1932, they were successful and a western-style parliamentary democracy was created.
By 1938 Phibun had taken charge as a dictator, with an agenda of modernization and
nationalism. He changed the country’s name to Thailand in an effort both to highlight Thai
culture as unique and to modernize the country’s image. His slogan, “Thailand for the Thai”
was largely seen as anti-Chinese, as there was a substantial population of Chinese in the
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country, many of whom owned prosperous businesses. Phibun drastically decreased the
level of legal immigration from China and instead redirected funding toward governmentbacked Thai businesses. Additionally, he promoted the widespread use of the Thai
language, especially in ethnic minority regions, and demanded that Mandarin in Chinese
schools only be spoken for a maximum of two hours a week.
Phibun’s idea of nationalism culminated in a plan he called “Ratthaniyom” (loosely
translated as “state convention”) which he rolled out between 1939 and 1942. The idea
behind Ratthaniyom was to compel the people of Thailand to adopt the behavior, dress and
etiquette of “civilized people” through a series of twelve cultural mandates11. These
included how often people should eat (no more than four times daily), which products they
should consume (always make an effort to buy Thai goods) as well as what to wear in
public (inappropriate dress includes wearing only underpants, wearing no shirt, or
wearing a wraparound cloth). More importantly however, were the cultural mandates that
aimed to unite the country as one unit. For example, Mandate 2.2 stated, “Thai people must
never reveal anything to foreigners that might damage the nation. These actions are a
betrayal of the nation." Mandate 3 specifically targets the practice of referring to fellow
Thais as ‘Northern Thai’ or ‘Muslim Thai’ reading, “Cease referring to Thai people
inconsistently with the name of the nationality, or according to the preference of the group.
Use the name 'Thai' to refer to all Thai people, without subdividing them." In March of 1940,
perhaps the most strongly worded mandate (#7) was issued, which explicitly urged the
Thai people to help build the nation. This Mandate states, “Every Thai person must help
build the nation. Every able-bodied person must work at a stable career. Any person without a
11

Each of the twelve cultural mandates were published in The Royal Gazette, volumes 56-59 between June of
1939 and February of 1942. Archives are readily available online at ratchakitcha.soc.go.th
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career is unhelpful to the nation and is not deserving of respect from the Thai people."
Collectively, these mandates not only solidified the importance of individual contributions
to nation building but also effectively created an in-group mentality for Thais.

Figure 1. An illustration highlighting the cultural mandates of Phibun's Ratthaniyom. Note the father is removing
a picture of a European landscape, while the son is holding a battle scene typical of the military engagements of
the Ayutthaya period and the mother is holding a portrait of Phibun. The father is saying, "It's about time we had
this picture removed. Thailand is now able to produce decorations for the home that are as good as those
produced overseas. Any houseguest should always be reminded to buy only Thai goods. As for the Leader's
portrait... any home that lacks one should be ashamed." (Source - P. Klykoom, Nation-building and the Pursuit of
Nationalism under Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram, 2004)

The impact of the twelve cultural mandates has been profound and greatly shaped
life and political discourse in Thailand. You can see their legacy as recently as 2018, when
the Thai government launched a campaign called “Thai Niyom” (or “Thai-ism”). This
campaign, aimed at reinforcing the idea of “Thai exceptionalism”, includes twelve core
values, which echo many of the ideas present in the original mandates. In this way, a strong
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sense of nationalism and diplomacy has not only been a way of life for the Thais, but rather
a means of pride that is deeply embedded in their identity. They are skilled negotiators,
adept at foreign relations, and project the confidence of a nation with both a loyal
population and a proficient army. However, it is this relationship with nationalism and
quiet diplomacy that often makes policy decisions confusing or less than transparent to
foreign onlookers.
In the years that followed Phibun’s takeover, Thailand became an ally of the United
States and joined in anti-communist measures including participation in the Vietnam War.
At the same time, internal conflict regarding economic instability plagued the Thai
government and led to several uprisings and resulting coups. After a coup d'état in 2014,
Thailand’s constitutional monarchy was overturned and Thailand has been under the rule
of a military organization called the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) ever
since. Over these last four years, Thailand’s stance on immigration has shifted somewhat
as a result.
Directly after the coup, the general consensus along the Thai-Myanmar border was
that restrictions were tightening and the military would begin cracking down on anyone
living or working illegally in Thailand. Additionally, employers caught hiring an
undocumented foreign worker could also face hefty fines. Internal negotiations between
Thailand and its three largest migrant sending nations (Myanmar, Lao and Cambodia)
resulted in the 2017 announcement of a new Royal Decree on Managing the Work of Aliens,
which purportedly aimed to register and give legal status to all 3.8 million migrant workers
in Thailand. However, the policy effectively excluded all those who lacked proper national
identity documentation, such as many stateless Karen. In contrast to the push to officially
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register all economic migrants, the policy on refugees remained ad hoc and offered no
suggestion of a plan to regularize their status or provide a path to obtaining work rights.
Rather, refugee policy continued to be vague and risk of refoulement often overshadowed
any sustained efforts at improving protections. As a 2017 report from Amnesty
International noted:
“Thailand has paid lip service to improving protections for refugees, but this
has not translated into real actions. Authorities continue to do foreign
governments’ bidding and send refugees back to countries where they could
face torture and other human rights violations. These callous actions fly in
the face of Thailand’s international obligations and must be stopped
immediately.” (A. Gaughran, 2017)
Complicating the matter is that Thailand is not a signatory to the 1951 UN Refugee
Convention and thus has not agreed in this way to uphold international standards of
protection. Indeed, Thailand has no domestic laws governing refugees and their policies
regarding treatment over the years have often been inconsistent and concealed from
international scrutiny. However, it is fair to say that Thailand has in fact been offering some
degree of refugee protection for decades and has spent significant time considering the
impact of housing large populations of refugees along their shared borders. Certainly the
international visibility of the protracted refugee situation along the Thai-Myanmar border
has created pressure for Thailand to accede to the 1951 convention. However, Thailand has
thus far rejected signing the convention and perhaps unsurprisingly, has preferred to
address the refugee situation as an internal issue, free from the input of western
governments.
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3.3 Negotiating Refugee Status in Thailand and the Case of the Missing Bangkok
Principles
While much of the world was focused on the widespread refugee crisis unfolding in
the Mediterranean in 2015, the protracted refugee situation on the Southeastern border of
Myanmar and Thailand surpassed its third decade in existence. It has remained a point of
contention for the Thai government, which has signaled multiple times over the years that
it does not wish to be an indefinite host for the persecuted minorities crossing the border
since 1984. Over the course of my fieldwork in 2017, I occasionally would spend a few days
in the border town of Mae Sot to chat with local NGOs or the regional UNHCR field staff. On
these days I found myself having conversations about the role of the Thai government in
the fate of the nine camps along the border and mulling over both Thailand’s cultural
obligations and political exposure. Time and again, the fact that Thailand is not a signatory
to the 1951 UN Convention came up as a sort of boilerplate explanation for their
ambivalence towards protecting refugee human rights to an international standard. This
was disconcerting though, as I and a few of the practitioners in the region did indeed recall
reading at some point about The Bangkok Principles of 1966, which generally laid out
similar guidelines to the UN Convention for the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers. I
recalled that these principles, created in collaboration with the Asian-African Legal
Consultative Organization (AALCO), were a sort of affront to adopting a westernized
approach to forced migration. Instead, they argued that guidelines for the region should be
imagined and realized by the countries themselves, a concept that truly nods to the power
of self-governance in developing nations. However, over coffee in Mae Sot with regional
NGO staff, the details seemed foggy and we agreed that they were seldom mentioned in any
formal talks concerning Thailand’s refugee policy. Was this historic regional coordination
59

concerning the treatment of refugees an imagined occurrence? Or why had the literature
on forced migration so thoroughly ignored it as to make their mention seem an obscure bit
of trivia? I made a note to do some additional digging and headed back to camp.
The ‘Bangkok Principles’12 were originally created in 1966 by the Asian-African
Legal Consultative Organization (AALCO), an international governmental body based in
New Delhi. Among the 47 member states of the AALCO are several South and Southeast
Asian countries that are not signatories to the 1951 UN Convention, including: Myanmar,
Bangladesh, Brunei, India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.
Many of these countries refrained from ratifying the 1951 UN Convention out of a
perception that it was a Cold War instrument which privileged political refugees over
others in need of protection. Further, it would give UN agencies excessive license to
interfere in their internal affairs while also shifting the economic burden to developing
countries (Abrar, 2001). After decades of debate by the member states concerning regional
obligations and the specific definitions assigned to ‘asylum’, ‘refugee’ and ‘forced
migration’, the final text of the AALCO’s 1966 “Bangkok Principles on the Status and
Treatment of Refugees” was officially adopted on June 24th, 2001 at the AALCO’s 40th
session in New Delhi. Within these finalized documents, we find the definition of a refugee
very much in line with the UN 1951 convention and described as:
“A person who, owing to persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution
for reasons of race, colour, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, gender,
political opinion or membership of a particular social group:

12

AALCO’S 1966 Bangkok Principles on Status and Treatment of Refugees” as adopted on 24 June 2001 at the
AALCO’s 40th Session, New Delhi
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(a) leaves the State of which he is a national, or the Country of his
nationality, or, if he has no nationality, the State or Country of which
he is a habitual resident; or,
(b) being outside of such a State or Country, is unable or unwilling to
return to it or to avail himself of its protection;
The term “refugee” shall also apply to every person, who, owing to external
aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing
public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality,
is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in
another place outside his country of origin or nationality”
Further of note are mutually agreed upon terms of asylum, guidelines for non-refoulement,
minimum standards of treatment, discussions of international burden sharing and even the
right to compensation from the State when refugees are forced to flee.
Such a comprehensive agreement negotiated and agreed upon by both sending and
receiving countries of refugees in Southeast Asia (i.e. Myanmar and Thailand) highlights
the question of why the international refugee regime continues to push for accedence with
the 1951 UN convention while disregarding the Bangkok Principles entirely. Perhaps it was
the long period of time where the document sat in limbo, being debated and pushed back
and forth that caused its relevance to wane. Or perhaps it is the lack of support from
wealthier, more developed nations. Backing such a regional initiative may be antithetical to
other agendas that support the advancement of programs administered by global
humanitarian aid organizations, and subsequently the financial funding that comes with
them. While much of the literature concerning refugee policy for South and Southeast Asia
does often suggest that there should be regional collaboration to create formal structures
for refugee protection (Abrar, 2001; Davies, 2007; Sharma, 2015;), there is no significant
recognition of existing frameworks, such as the Bangkok Principles, as viable solutions.
Rather, in an age of proposed new ideas delivered via viral TED talk, it seems far easier to
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suggest a new idea rather than revisit an old solution. This leads to incoherent policy
advice while also sending the message that the countries of the Global South cannot be
trusted to achieve their own frameworks for dealing with refugee flows.
While it is aptly pointed out that the Bangkok Principles carry no actual weight as
being legally binding, (they are ‘declaratory and non-binding in character’ and aim inter
alia at inspiring Member States to enact national legislation regarding the status and
treatment of refugees) the same can be said for the 1951 UN Convention. While the
convention is technically legally binding, there is no monitoring body to oversee
compliance, nor a mechanism to report violations. It is essentially just a social contract.
Alas, neither the 1966 Bangkok Principles nor the 1951 UN Convention has had much
impact on how Thailand shapes its refugee policy.
Thailand’s treatment of refugees has been largely inconsistent over the years and is
often influenced by the current state of geopolitical relations. A recent example can be seen
in the 2015 deportation of 109 asylum-seeking Uighurs back to China. The Uighurs, a
Turkic-speaking, Muslim ethnic group of approximately 10 million, have been subject to
widespread persecution for decades in their region of northwestern China. When Thai
authorities transferred custody of the 109 Uighurs to Chinese authorities in 2015, rather
than allowing them to travel on to Turkey, they faced intense international backlash. The
response from Thai President Prayuth Chan-O-Cha seemed to sum up the role politics
played in the decision, telling journalists:
“It is not like all of a sudden China asks for Uighurs and we just give them
back. China asked for all Uighur Muslims in Thailand to be sent back but we
said we could not do it… Thailand and Turkey are not rivals and we do not
want to destroy trade and commerce with Turkey. At the same time, we do
not want to destroy the relationship between China and Thailand.” (Reuters,
10 July 2015)
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While Thailand has been host to the nine refugee camps along the Thai-Myanmar border
for more than thirty years, and certainly have shown a commitment to protection by doing
so, they have also often violated international standards such as the principle of nonrefoulement13. In 1979, in perhaps one of the lowest points of Thailand’s treatment of
refugees, Thai soldiers forced approximately 42,000 Cambodian refugees at gunpoint
through an active minefield in the mountainous region of Phnom-Dong-Raik. This forced
movement back across the Thai-Cambodian border resulted in their subsequent capture by
the Vietnamese soldiers waiting there (Chan, 2004). Throughout the years, reports have
also surfaced regarding the forcible return of Vietnamese, Lao Hmong, and multiple ethnic
minorities and political asylum seekers from Myanmar. Thailand also has a welldocumented and long-standing practice of using naval forces to repel boats carrying
thousands of Rohingya refugees and Bangladeshis seeking asylum, as well as other
documented forcible returns of refugees and asylum-seekers to China, Turkey and Pakistan
(Amnesty, 2017). The forcible return of these individuals to places where they risk torture
or death amounts to a serious breach of international standards and severe human rights
violations.
In light of these violations, and the subsequent backlash from UNHCR, Amnesty
International and international media, Thailand’s ruling NCPO has recently committed to
implementing new laws and policies to protect refugees. Notably, in January of 2017,
Thailand’s Cabinet passed a resolution authorizing the development of a system for
13

The principle of non-refoulement was first laid out in 1954 in the UN-Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees, which, in Article 33(1) provides that: "No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion."
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screening refugees and irregular migrants. If successful in implementing a screening
mechanism that is both fair and in accordance with international law, the NCPO will have
made a major step forward in the protection of refugee rights.
However, the situation on the Thai-Myanmar border and Thailand’s handling of the
refugees who reside there, has become much more complex as political and economic
reforms in Myanmar are shaping diplomatic relations. As Myanmar’s economy has begun
grow, so has their embarrassment at the unresolved refugee situation along the border
with one of their largest trading partners. Complicating the issue however, is how
Myanmar conceptualizes a successful return of ethnic nationals. In the past they have taken
the position that they can only accept returns from ‘Myanmar citizens’, a category generally
denied those of ethnic origin. They have largely been unwilling to acknowledge
responsibility for the refugees encamped along the Thai border (Lang, 2001). However, the
refugees along the border have now become a visible political reminder of Myanmar’s
failure to provide security for those born within its borders. Just as Thailand did in the late
19th century, Myanmar is actively trying to nation build. This means securing their borders,
homogenizing language and culture, and regaining control over ethnic conflicts.
3.4 A New Myanmar, a New Outlook on Refugees?
“My brother and his wife left the camp last year to find work in Thailand. They
worked at this farm about one hour away from here. But the man they worked
for was not good. One day he said he would not pay them, and they had no
choice but to leave because they were afraid he might just kill them or report
them if they complained. They had heard rumors of this happening before. So
they had to leave and now are looking for work.”
~ Poe Baw Ku, 25, Mae La Camp
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The economic reforms taking place in Myanmar over the past six years, such as the
revamping of the foreign investment law in 2012, have had a profound effect on the
nation’s monetary growth and international standing. Subsequently, its attitude towards
repatriating the thousands of ethnic minorities that have sought refuge in neighboring
countries has softened somewhat. Improving diplomatic relations with neighboring states,
supplying a profitable workforce for industries along the border and ensuring sanction-free
international investment are all strong incentives to resolve the country’s longstanding
ethnic conflicts. However, the path to democracy and economic security in Myanmar has
been anything but smooth since 2012. Human rights abuses carried out by the government
coupled with a lack of transparency and accountability has colored much of the coverage
surrounding Myanmar. The following section will look at what has transpired both
economically and socially since 2012, and how these changes may ultimately impact the
return of refugees along the border.
In the wake of the foreign investment law change of 2012, Myanmar found itself
awash in new visitors and potential projects. The country’s former capital, Yangon, and its
northern archaeological gem, Bagan, began to appear on top ten travel lists everywhere.
The Telegraph touted Myanmar as “The Trip of a Lifetime!” and in late 2012, Forbes urged
readers to “Consider Myanmar” for investment. Indeed, after a record 8.43% growth in
2013, Myanmar’s GDP has hovered between a 5% - 7% growth rate, making Myanmar one
of the fastest growing economies in Southeast Asia.
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Figure 2: Myanmar GDP Growth 2012-2022 (est) source: IMF 2018

Foreign investors began flocking to Myanmar in 2012 due to its natural resources,
relatively young workforce and the positive changes to laws concerning business and
investment. Foreign-funded projects from China, Korea, Thailand and the U.S. ranged from
energy production to retail and served to start modernizing a country that was largely
isolated for decades. However, the question of how Myanmar will ultimately adapt and
develop future policy within these new economic realities still remains to be seen, as does
whether Myanmar’s growth can be sustained. A substantial portion of Myanmar’s
population still live in staggering poverty while human rights violations against ethnic
minorities have continued both on the eastern and western borders. The success of
Myanmar’s economy may ultimately hinge on addressing the growing political and social
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concerns, as the European Union and the U.S. are currently debating new trade sanctions in
relation to the Rohingya crisis, potentially stripping the country of tariff-free access to the
world’s largest trading bloc (Reuters, 2018).
The complex relationship between Myanmar and Thailand, and their future policies
concerning refugees, is deeply entwined with the economic success of the region. Myanmar
must resolve the protracted refugee situation along the border with Thailand, maintain
ceasefire agreements with ethnic groups across the country, and address the growing
Rohingya crisis. So far, none of these areas have been particularly successful, and there is
speculation that Myanmar’s trajectory could mirror that of the failed democratic policies of
post-communist Cambodia.
Myanmar and Cambodia share many historical and political similarities, and it
would be fair to say Myanmar could look to Cambodia as a cautionary tale in its own
transition to democracy. Among their most obvious commonalities are state managed
transition plans to capitalism and democracy as well as having natural resources and rice
production at the center of their economies (Jones, 2014). In the 1980s, Cambodia was
similarly sanctioned and isolated by the West. In response to aid cuts in 1986, the
government pursued a state managed transition to capitalism. This transition meant
privatizing state assets into the hands of various state sponsored groups and their allies,
and the patronage networks thereby established became the basis for the Cambodian
People’s Party (CPP) (Hughes 2003). Today, the CPP is largely regarded as responsible for
perpetuating a one-party state, rife with nepotism and corruption. The question will
ultimately be how Myanmar will be able to differentiate its political and economic
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transition from that of Cambodia, given their similar low levels of development, Chinese
economic influence and ongoing human rights violations.
Prior to the Myanmar elections of 2015, most analysts drew strong comparisons
between the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) and Myanmar’s Union Solidarity and
Development Party (USDP), which as a result of rigged elections in 2010, was the dominant
party in both chambers of Myanmar’s national parliament and all but one of the regional
assemblies. The USDP had strong military support, given its large ex-military membership
and thus was able to combine political, state and business power to harness its control of
the economic interests in the country. Like the CPP, the USDP secured voters in rural areas
through promises of local development projects.
However, in 2012 as part of the ongoing reforms in Myanmar, by-elections were
held to fill 48 vacant parliamentary seats. As a result, Aung San Suu Kyi’s recently reregistered party, The National League for Democracy (NLD), won 43 of the 44 seats they
contested which ultimately began the process of easing Western sanctions on Myanmar. As
noted by former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2012:
“The results of the April 1st parliamentary by-elections represents a
dramatic demonstration of popular will that brings a new generation of
reformers into government. This is an important step in the country’s
transformation, which in recent months has seen the unprecedented release
of political prisoners, new legislation broadening the rights of political and
civic association, and fledgling process in internal dialogue between the
government and ethnic minority groups.”
Following the by-elections, the focus on sustainable economic reforms in Myanmar
took center stage in the government’s Framework for Economic and Social Reform (FESR)
that was presented to the international donor community in early 2013. The framework
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emphasized ten priorities in the government’s economic strategy: fiscal and tax reforms,
infrastructure, private sector development, monetary and financial sector reforms,
liberalization of trade and investment, health and education, food security and agricultural
growth, governance and transparency, mobile phones and internet access, and effective
and efficient government.
While all of the areas listed above were indeed critical to the future development of
Myanmar, examples from Cambodia and other developing countries showed that figuring
out what needs to be done is far easier than determining how to do it. Thus, achieving
transformative change in Myanmar will require not only strong leadership to overcome
vested interests, but also the balancing of competing objectives, and ensuring the
appropriate sequencing of policy change (Nehru, 2015).
The landmark elections in 2015 were perhaps the most promising sign that
Myanmar was forging a new path to democracy and true economic growth. In November of
2015, Aung San Suu Kyi’s party, The National League for Democracy (NLD) won a landslide
election victory gaining enough seats to control the next parliament and choose the next
president, ending decades of military-backed rule. However, in what the military termed
“Disciplined Democracy”, the military-drafted constitution still guaranteed that unelected
military representatives would occupy 25% of the seats while also holding the power to
exercise a veto over any constitutional change. Nonetheless, the overwhelming defeat of
the USDP, and more so their acceptance of defeat, sent an important message to the
international community that Myanmar was making meaningful progress.
Complicating the path to success for the NLD however, has been a failure to
continue progress on policy reforms as well as a fall from grace for their leader, Aung San
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Suu Kyi. The NLD previously enjoyed tremendous popularity among the people and often
was touted as a symbol for change and freedom in Myanmar. In the years leading up to the
2015 elections, the NLD often made large sweeping statements about the need for change,
without offering a solid plan to achieve such goals. Thus a political commentator noted in
2014, “…by constraining itself to statements of principle, the NLD continues largely as a
symbolic, elite opposition party – albeit one with a popular figurehead, rather than the
vanguard of a counter-hegemonic bloc driving a new agenda” (Jones, 2014).
In the long transition period after winning the 2015 elections, indeed Suu Kyi and
the NLD failed to offer specific policy details, beyond a broad manifesto. Faced with serious
economic challenges that desperately needed tangible solutions in addition to staggering
rates of poverty, in early 2016 the NLD turned to the development of three special
economic zones 14(SEZs) in Arakan State and Rangoon divisions. Special economic zones,
which have been linked to both positive economic development as well as problems related
to land confiscation, forced relocation and the internal displacement of people, seemed to
offer a potential solution. Under the premise of promoting economic growth, the NLD
worked to encourage the development of special economic zones, as well as the resulting
increased industrialization, by inviting direct foreign investment into the country. In recent
months, there has been worry that negotiations on future SEZs will stall, as Aung San Suu
Kyi’s international reputation has plummeted due to her complicity in a state-sponsored
14

The Special Economic Zone Law was enacted in 2014, and its Implementing Rules were published in
2015. The law has paved the way for Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in Myanmar. Special Economic Zones
consist of Free Zones and Promotion Zones, which carry various tax benefits. Under Chapter 1, section 3 of
SEZs Law 2014, Free Zone shall be deemed to be situated outside the country. A Free Zone is primarily
focused on export-oriented markets and includes manufacturing, transportation, and wholesale areas that are
entitled to custom duty and other taxes exemption relating to the goods in the SEZs and the goods imported
to this Zone. Promotion Zones are primarily based on the domestic market and the market in SEZs. In this
zone, investment can be made in manufacturing, housing, departmental stores, banking, insurance, schools,
hospitals and recreational places.
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campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya. However, the international interest,
especially that of Singapore, China and South Korea, of creating special economic zones
both within Myanmar and on its borders continues to drive conversations about
Myanmar’s future.
This path to economic growth is problematic for Myanmar, as the government must
be able to find the balance between foreign investment and sustainable economic
development. Further, the emergence of special economic zones as a potential solution for
securing legal status and employment for refugees and migrants along the border may lead
to further marginalization and exploitation. Looking to the past experiences of both
Cambodia and Thailand, there are many examples of communities suffering the negative
impacts of rapid industrial development and the promotion of economic growth via foreign
investment, by governments that ignore both local livelihoods and the protection of the
ecological system (Snaing, 2016).
In Thailand for example, rapid industrialization has led to lead and cadmium
contamination of agricultural areas such as paddy fields and grazing land, deeply impacting
the economy and health of local populations (Parkpian, 2003). In Cambodia, foreign
investment has led to the unmitigated development of four coastal provinces
(Sihanoukville, Kep, Kampot and Koh Kong), which has caused serious environmental
pollution along the coast. Faced with these challenges, Myanmar must swiftly develop
policies that promote sustainable solutions for economic growth that also protect workers
and the environment.
In 2016, at a public seminar in Yangon entitled “Myanmar’s Special Economic Zones
(SEZs): Opportunities or Threats to Local Communities”, a plan was laid out by regional
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development specialists to encourage the NLD to embrace sustainable solutions.
Overwhelmingly, the most often cited component offered for future policy development
was the suggestion that the NLD should encourage the people’s participation in conjunction
with promoting economic investment.
“It is very important, because the outcome of economic development [affects]
the livelihoods, the happiness and the security of the nation and the people.
So the Myanmar government should not make its own decisions without the
people’s participation. If the government is open to this, they will reduce
conflicts in the country in the long term.” - Penchom Saetang, Director of
Ecological Alert and Recovery Thailand, 2016
Further, regional development specialists cautioned that the NLD should enact laws
that protect the environment, control pollution, and ensure the people’s health before
rapidly promoting economic and industrial growth. As seen in Cambodia and Thailand,
foreign investors, especially from large industrial companies, are primarily concerned with
earning the highest profits possible, not ensuring quality of life for the local people. Along
this same vein, regional development specialists suggested that sustainable development
should at all costs be transparent, and within a democratic system (Snaing, 2016).
As such, creating trust in a population that has historically held very low confidence
in its government is critical for the country to move forward. One factor that has the
potential to bolster confidence among the people is the injection of foreign money aimed at
sustainable development. In March of 2016, the government of Finland signed a 4 million
Euro fund agreement with The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to
support the agency’s work in Myanmar in the areas of democratic governance, local
development and environmental sustainability. Among other things, this funding
recognizes the economic impact of rural women involved in agricultural work through the
formation of the Rural Women’s Network. If Myanmar is able to embrace these types of
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foreign partnerships with transparency and fair democratic governance, they will be in a
much stronger position to advocate for the return of refugees and demonstrate a
commitment to human rights. If they fail, and resort to only policies concerning the
expansion of foreign investment, it may well lead to the further marginalization of irregular
migrants and refugees.
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and other policies aimed at economic development
have recently been posited as potential solutions for protracted refugee situations. Most
notably in 2016, the Jordan Compact was signed which gave Syrian refugees in Jordan the
right to work while promising to turn a crisis into a development opportunity. More
specifically, the Jordan Compact is a ten-year deal that employs SEZs as a mechanism for
attracting direct foreign investments. It allows Jordan to access the EU’s market tariff-free,
as long as the products being exported are produced within the SEZs by a labor force that is
at least 25 percent Syrian by 2019 (Mellinger & Berlo, 2016). Thus the idea (originally put
forth by Paul Collier and Alexander Betts out of the University of Oxford), is that Jordan
would gain economically by foreign investment and entrance into the EU market, while
Syrian refugees would be able to become self-sufficient through acquisition of legal work
rights. While the agreement seemed like a win-win on the surface, in practice the results
were mixed.
In 2018 the Overseas Development Institute released their findings on the impact of
the Jordan Compact. Among other positive outcomes, they noted that, “by building on
existing political capital between donor governments, international organisations and host
governments, as well as economic and political incentives such as trade deals, a restrictive
policy environment can be opened up and funds can be mobilised in a short space of time.”
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However, they also pointed out that while progress was made on the number of work
permits issued, critical sectors and self-employment remained closed to refugees.
Subsequently, they found that the Compact’s design “did not integrate refugee perspectives
at the outset; as such, it has been slow to improve their daily lives.” In this way, the
Compact failed miserably and many Syrians remained unemployed with no significant
improvement in their situation.
As early as 2014, talks about creating SEZs along the Thai-Myanmar border began
between the Thai Chamber of Commerce (TCC) and the Union of Myanmar Federation of
Chambers of Commerce and Industry (UMFCCI). In August of 2018, Thai Deputy Prime
Minister Somkid Jatusripitak confirmed that government agencies were drafting plans to
develop border regions. These plans have promised to both increase exports and provide
jobs that would narrow the urban-rural inequality gap. What has not been addressed,
however, are the stateless refugees and irregular migrants along the border who often
make up the workforce, but are unable to obtain legal status as migrants. Without
possession of identity documents from Myanmar, it is impossible to register legally in
Thailand. Thus, a new precarious working class will emerge to meet the new labor
demands, one that is made up primarily of ethnic minorities from Myanmar. When faced
with little to no alternative options, stateless refugees will be drawn to an exploitative
labor market that will employ them in the shadows, forced into informal economies and
rampant wage discrimination.
Some of the earliest commentary on how we conceptualize precariousness in
relation to labor came from Rodgers and Rodgers (1989) who developed four dimensions
of precarious jobs for the International Labour Organization (ILO): (1) uncertainty over the
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continuity of employment; (2) a lack of individual and collective control over wages and
conditions; (3) low or no levels of social protection against unemployment, discrimination,
etc.; and (4) insufficient income or economic vulnerability. Not included here are those
individuals working without legal status who also face the threat of deportation back to
abusive regimes. Standing (2011) argues that this additional layer of precarity in addition
to exclusion from a more structured labor market will ultimately lead to an underclass
termed ‘the precariat’. Along the same vein, Clement et al. (2009) have noted that systems
that exclude particular groups of migrants from the right to work or access to social
services create vulnerability to both precarious employment and unemployment. Further, a
combination of these factors may push them into the informal (and thus unregulated)
economy to find an income (Community Links and Refugee Council, 2011). These are
substantial risks to weigh as both Thailand and Myanmar work to increase trade, and the
subsequent labor market, across their shared border. Creating a mechanism to give legal
status to those without documentation from Myanmar will be the first step in achieving a
sustainable, human-rights centered approach to economic development.

3.5 Conclusion
While refugee movements are often initially the result of civil war, they ultimately
become protracted due to a confluence of factors from both ones country of origin and ones
country of asylum. Ongoing violence, political impasses, policies restricting employment
and freedom of movement all work against the long-term resolution of a protracted refugee
situation. In this way, Thailand’s unique history of independence and fierce nationalism has
colored its approach to regularizing labor migration as well as limiting its policies towards
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refugees. Similarly, economic growth in Myanmar and a desire to increase development
along the border has incentivized improving diplomatic relations with Thailand. Whether
this will incentivize a sustainable resolution for refugees or lead them instead to join a
precarious working class remains to be seen. What remains clear, however, is that
understanding the sociopolitical and economic environments of both sending and receiving
countries will provide an important context for imagining solutions.
In the next two chapters, I begin to look at how resistance to repatriation has started
to develop through strategies of waiting, shared cultural narratives and experiences of
exile. Additionally, I will give an overview of the internationally accepted protocol for
resolving a protracted refugee crisis in relation to the Thai-Myanmar situation as well as an
explanation of the current voluntary repatriation program being implemented by UNHCR.
The second half of chapter five focuses on research outcomes regarding refugee
perceptions of return, including both reported barriers to repatriation as described in
interviews with refugees as well as other barriers identified through qualitative analysis
and observation. In concluding remarks, I offer a summary of the impossible choice many
Karen are currently facing in Mae La camp in relation to return.
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Chapter 4
WAITING: Experiences of Exile and Protractedness

4.1 Introduction

“Sometimes it feels like my mind can never have a rest. Everyday we do the same things.
Cooking food, cleaning the house, sometimes I see my friends and play soccer. Once a
month we go to get the rations, the charcoal and rice, and bring it back to the house. But
I am always thinking about the next day. So always we live like this. Just waiting.” – Cho
Htway, 24, Mae La Camp

On a hot July afternoon, I quickly trudged down a sandy dirt path towards a sea of
thatched roofs that made up a particularly dense section of housing in camp. Armed with
only a few basic directions and running late for my scheduled interview, I felt the familiar
flush of agitation spread over my cheeks. I hated being late. The arrangement of homes felt
like part of an impossible labyrinth and I finally resorted to calling my research assistant
for help. “Hi Htoo, sorry to bother you again! I went left at the small shop but I didn’t see
the path that goes towards the river. Am I in the right place?” I quickly blurted out in equal
parts exasperation and embarrassment. Htoo, who had kindly offered to escort me to the
home of my interview participant that day, even though he had soccer practice, laughed
good-naturedly at my navigational defeat. “Yes Thramu, keep going. The path will be to the
right just before the small farm. The house is the second one there with the blue sign. I told
you I would go with you!” After insisting earlier that day that I could manage on my own, I
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had clearly overestimated my general sense of direction. “Ok, thanks Htoo. I think I see it. I
hope they are still there! I’m late now.” I said. “It’s no problem,” he replied assuredly, “of
course they will be there”.
Finally locating the home, I called out a greeting and waved to the faces peering
down at me from the bamboo platform above. After motioning for me to come in, I slipped
off my dusty rubber sandals and inched my way up the short wooden ladder. Seven
members of the Khun family resided here, including three generations of women and two
adult sons. No one seemed overly concerned that I had arrived ten minutes after our
agreed upon time and I felt a wave of relief at the relaxed atmosphere. After a quick
exchange of greetings, the eldest daughter sat back down in the corner and continued to
grind a piece of thanaka wood into a creamy yellowish paste while her grandmother filled a
kettle with water. “I’m sorry I’m late.” I exhaled, still feeling flustered while unpacking my
notebook and settling in on the floor. “It’s no problem, you’re not late” one of the adult sons
absentmindedly reassured me while making faces to a smiling baby girl on his lap.
I still hadn’t quite adjusted to the pace of life in camp and often had to remind
myself to relax. The unhurried pace made me feel restless, as if somehow I was wasting
time and the lack of an overly scheduled calendar made me feel idle. While I knew my
anxiety was irrational, it was difficult to feel at ease when I was used to so thoroughly
conflating my personal contentment with being productive, or at least busy. I came to
understand that time moved slower in Mae La and its passage was more often counted by
the rhythmic changing of the seasons than by the strict daily scheduling of meetings or
engagements. I also came to understand that for refugees living in Mae La, this slowness of
time mixed with an uncertain future created a different sort of anxiety--an anxiety that has
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been described by Griffiths as the result of the “instability and precarity created by living
with a dual uncertainty of time, one that is simultaneously endless but that can also bring
change at any moment” (2004:1991)
The study of time in relation to various cultures is not a new concept in
anthropological research (see Adam, 1994; Brown, 1998; Fabian, 1983; Munn, 1992). How
different cultures experience time has periodically been explored especially in the context
of small-scale and static societies (Mauss, 1950). However, there is a paucity of research
that asks how one experiences time in the context of forced migration, exile or transience.
This chapter aims to first provide an overview of how anthropologists have approached the
issue of time and temporalities while also exploring how theoretical constructions of time
intersect with experiences of waiting, liminality, and exile. This is followed by a discussion
of the theoretical frameworks that conceptualize time as a tool of both strategy and
resistance and argue for its applicability to the protracted refugee situation along the ThaiMyanmar border. Further, the chapter will also focus on refugee experiences of exile as
well as illustrating how religion has played a role in transforming the exilic experience in
the case of Baptist Karen refugees. In concluding remarks, attention will be focused on
summarizing the importance of including experiences of time, waiting and exile within the
broader literature of forced migration as well as why modes of resistance should always be
considered in relation to repatriation design.

4.2 Time, Waiting and (Im)mobility
In perhaps one of the most comprehensive and admirable attempts to summarize
the breadth of anthropological research related to time, Nancy Munn (1992) compared the
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task to Borges's infinite "Book of Sand": as one opens the book, pages keep growing from it.
It has no beginning or end. As she aptly points out, “the topic of time frequently fragments
into all the other dimensions and topics anthropologists deal with in the social world” (pg.
93). In this way, time is both universal and subjective in its relevance to specific areas of
inquiry and should be approached thoughtfully in regards to its multidimensionality. Munn
points out that the challenges of conceptualizing time in anthropology have been related to
how our theoretical understandings of temporality “hinge on the way we conceptualize its
connections to space, action, and actor” (p.116). Thus without a thorough theoretical
examination of the basic sociocultural processes which create temporality, time often
becomes oversimplified and loses part of its qualitative and social nature, or perhaps what
Wagner (1986) would describe as losing the ‘presence of time’. Munn proposes this could
be resolved by using a lens of “temporalization” (pg, 104), where time is understood as a
symbolic process continually being produced in multiple forms within everyday practices.
Additionally she argues that temporalizations will allow for the recognition of time’s
simultaneous embodiment of the past, present, and future, meaning that the way in which
we operate in the present is always infused with both the past and an imagined future.
Laura Bear (2016) has built on Munn’s ‘temporalizations’ by arguing that
anthropological research has recently taken a more significant temporal turn and should be
conceptualized within the framework of timescapes. Similar to Munn’s temporalizations in
their embodiment of the past, present and future, she describes timescapes as
incorporating techniques, knowledges, and ethics of time as being both ‘in’ and ‘of’ time.
She points out that this temporal turn within our discipline is largely the result of
anthropologists in their field sites who have increasingly encountered temporal insecurity
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or conflicts in time as a crucial element of experiences of inequality (Comaroff & Comaroff
2001, Mains 2007, Vigh 2008, Auyero 2012). Bear argues that, “this social reality gives
urgency to the temporal turn in anthropology. By paying attention to time, we can critique
and measure inequality in new ways. A focus on the varying ability to plan a life across
classes, genders, and racial groups has much potential” (p. 488-489). Thus, Bear’s assertion
that anthropological research on time has created another lens in which to view
experiences of inequality further strengthens its applicability to understanding refugee
experiences of exile and protractedness. However, in order to effectively relate
anthropological conceptualizations of time to refugee experiences, it is helpful to first offer
some historical context of the discipline’s engagement with the subject.
To offer a brief overview of how anthropologists have approached the issue of time
and temporalities, I begin with Emile Durkheim, who was the first to conceive of a “social
time” and argued in 1912 that time was a fundamental category of human thought. For
Durkheim and his colleagues, time centered on “social diversity, qualitative heterogeneity,
and a conceptual segmentation that nonetheless remained connected to activity or motion”
(as quoted in Munn, 1992:94-95). Durkheim viewed time as a “collective representation” or
“categories” which used a system of symbols with a commonly shared meaning within
members of a social group or society. These categorical divisions allowed Durkheim to
imagine time in qualitative and diverse ways. Durkheim believed that society ultimately
created the categories in which he could understand time, and that people understood time
differently because they were products of different types of societies. He justified this
position in the basic argument that different people use different measures of time. In this
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way he rejected Kant’s transcendentalism by noting that “the categories of understanding
are never fixed; they change according to place and time” (1912; 1960:21).
Malinowski (1927) introduced a functionalist approach to time by introducing “time
reckoning” among the Trobriands which he described as a practical necessity in every
culture to coordinate activities, plan dates in the future, place events in the past and
measure time spans (p. 203). Munn (1992) colorfully summed up Malinowski’s rather
boring conceptualization of time as putting on “mundane, empiricist clothing, instead of the
"qualitative, myth-ritual dress of Durkheimian representations” (p. 96). Evans-Pritchard
(1940) built on Malinowski’s time reckoning with his account of the Nuer, and the presence
of what he describes as a microcosmic ‘oecological time’ (p. 94-101). Evans-Pritchard ‘s
notion of ‘oecological time’ centers on how environmental circumstances create ‘timeconceptualizations’ and understanding how societies adapt to them. He gives an example of
Nuer society as revolving around what he termed the “cattle clock”, which meant that daily
tasks such as cattle herding, and milking the cows served to order the way they
experienced and understood time.
Edmund Leach (1961) went on to describe “cyclical and linear” processes of time, in
which he theorized that the concept of time combines two “basic experiences” of human
life. The first experience he noted as being “that certain phenomena of nature repeat
themselves” and the second as understanding that “life change is irreversible”(p 125-127).
As such, he argued that the experiences of cyclical and linear processes are at odds in that
there cannot be repetition and irreversible change at the same time. The only circumstance
in which cyclical and linear time can co-exist, is within the context of religion, where one
believes death is only a phase of life.

82

While early theorizations of time were essential to building the framework for
future anthropological inquiry, they were also problematic to two key areas that relate to
understanding time in the context of forced migration. First, early theorizations did little to
recognize and explain personal experiences of time. Through collective representations
and functionalist frameworks, individual experience was largely neglected. To rectify this,
anthropological research began to reflect a temporal turn towards micro-geographies and
individuals. This was essentially the result of the growing trend towards a more politically
engaged anthropology, which began to explore notions of how time intersected with
personal experiences of inequality. As Bear (2016) noted, “research begin to provide subtle
accounts of how people ethically engaged with the concrete inequalities of spatiotemporal
relations and attempted to rebuild senses of agency” (p. 494) (Mole, 2010, Auyero 2012,
Bolt 2013, Millar 2014, Nielsen 2014, Kwon 2015).
The second way in which early theorizations of time were problematic was the way
in which their conceptions of time were based on perceiving societies as static and thus
reflecting what Malkki later termed, a “sedentarist bias” (1995:508). In this way, early
theorizations of time needed to be developed and built upon to allow for both societies and
individuals who were dynamic and mobile actors. As the field of migration studies within
anthropology began to expand in the 1970’s, “…anthropologists progressively rejected the
idea of cultures as discretely bounded, territorialized, relatively unchanging, and
homogeneous units” (Brettell, 2014:148). As such, theorizations of time also developed to
accommodate the temporalities inherent in migration such as life course trajectories and
longitudinal studies. Among the early attempts to theorize time in relation to migration
was the work of geographer Torsten Hägerstrand (1982), who introduced the concept of
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‘Time Geography’, noting that, “we need to rise up from the flat map with its static patterns
and think in terms of a world on the move, a world of incessant permutations” (p. 323).
By the 1990’s as the field of migration studies continued to expand and levels of
mobility increased across the globe, more scholars and practitioners in fields such as
sociology, anthropology, geography and economics began placing a higher degree of
importance on the impact of the movement of people. In anthropology, this “mobilities
turn” (Adey et al 2012; Cresswell 2006; Greenblatt 2009; Harvey 2000; Kaplan 1996; Urry
2007) led to incorporating new ways of theorizing how mobilities were “at the center of
constellations of power, the creation of identities and the microgeographies of everyday
life" (Cresswell, 2011: p.551). Subsequently, as anthropologists wrote about how the world
was transformed by the movement of people, so too they recognized the importance of
understanding the impact when this movement was restricted. Thus the concept of
immobility (Adey 2006, Urry 2007, and Sheller, 2008) emerged as its own unique
framework. As priority is often given to mobility in much of the contemporary
anthropological research on migration and transnationalism (Hannam et al 2006; Salazar
2012), the recognition of immobility has created an important bridge between
anthropology and refugee studies by offering a lens with which to view experiences of
forced migration and exile. In this context, immobility can relate to one’s geographic
confinement in a refugee camp or country of asylum as well as to feelings of being “stuck”
or living in a state of in-betweenness. Anthropology can offer new, ethnographicallygrounded theorizations of how time and waiting are experienced by refugees in exile, while
also speaking to the overall impact of protracted refugee situations on people and places.
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Some of the earliest research to specifically highlight the experience of time and
waiting in refugee camps came from studies of the Vietnamese in Hong Kong from the mid
1970’s to the late 1990’s (Bousquet 1987; Hitchcox 1990, 1993). Bousquet describes a state
of “limbo” and periods of endless waiting as characteristic of the way Vietnamese refugees
viewed their lives in camp. As she wrote:
“Their lives revolved around waiting: for interviews, for news of their
families in Vietnam or relatives already resettled in another country, to see
the list of boat people arriving in Hong Kong, and for word that they had been
approved for immigration”(pg. 47).
Bousquet drew on the work of Victor Turner to help her frame the experiences in refugee
camps, noting that camp life resembled what Turner called liminal periods, which are
inherent to many rites of passage (1969). Turner argued that individuals undergoing a rite
of passage are “divorced from their past under conditions which break old patterns of
behavior so that they may reenter their communities in new roles” (pg. 34). What Turner
did not consider, however, was what would be the outcome of residing in a liminal space
for an extended and often indefinite period of time.
Other early descriptions of refugee camps as places of liminality or limbo have come
from research with refugee women in Hungary (Huseby-Darvas, 1994) and Vietnamese
refugees in camps along the Thai-Kampuchean (Cambodian) border (Reynell 1989).
Additionally, Peteet’s ongoing research with Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon (1991,
1995, 2005, 2015) addresses the impact of perhaps the most protracted of all refugee
situations. The Palestinians, who have been spatially constrained in a liminal state for
upwards of six decades, have had to live within a constructed environment that ‘bears the
hallmarks of permanency’ (pg. 216). In this way, the notion of temporariness has become
distorted. As Peteet explains:
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“To equate camps with Auge’s depiction of ‘non-places’ (1995: 78) as the
‘fleeting, the temporary and ephemeral’ exemplified by spaces of hypermobility such as the airport, is belied by the sheer longevity of these camps
and the enclaves’ indeterminacy. People pass through Auge’s non-places.
People live in camps and enclaves. With no end in sight, the camps and
enclaves may be permanently temporary.” (2015: p. 216)
A similar context of ‘permanent temporariness’ is illustrated by Mansouri and Cauchi
(2007) in their research with asylum seekers in Australia. They show that increased levels
of depression and trauma are linked with the indefinite and yet temporary nature of the
asylum process15. They argue that Australia’s temporary visa regime has created a
“uniquely liminal state, which keeps refugees in a space of ambiguity, marginalization, and
transition” (pg. 127).
In recent literature, experiences of time and waiting have more often been explored
in relation to broader categories of marginalized people—prisoners, economic migrants,
the unemployed or underemployed, the homeless-- rather than refugees specifically. For
example, research on transnational migrant workers has centered on themes of
uprootedness and liminality while also addressing the immobility of family members that
migrant workers leave behind. In Brettell’s (1986) work in the Portuguese village of
Lanheses, she found that as many men left the village to seek out work in Spain, Brazil or
Southern Portugal, they often left behind waiting fiancés and wives. While the intent of
their economic migration was initially temporary, in practice they were often gone for
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A similar situation is currently unfolding along the U.S. and Mexico border, as asylum seekers are being
held indefinitely at detention centers in the U.S. The Trump administration announced in December of 2018
that it would make asylum seekers wait in Mexico while their court cases are resolved in the United States,
further exacerbating the problem. Many have called the move a clear violation of the standard international
protocol of non-refoulement, as well as an unnecessary political tactic. The human cost has continued to rise
as on December 8, a 7-year-old Guatemalan girl named Jakelin Amei Rosmery Caal Maquin died of
dehydration in U.S. Border Patrol custody after she and her father were picked up in a group of 163 migrants
who'd crossed illegally near Antelope Wells, New Mexico, a particularly remote stretch of the border.
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extended periods of time or in many cases, they never returned at all. In these instances she
describes the women essentially becoming “widows of the living” (p. 193) as they were
unable to remarry and their husband’s deaths were never recorded in the local parish. In a
similar theme, Kwon’s (2015:481) ethnography of the spouses of Korean Chinese
transnational migrant workers suggests that waiting is an “immaterial, but nonetheless
important, form of unwaged, profit-producing labor”. As spouses wait years or sometimes
decades for their partners to return, their loyalty and commitment to waiting ensures they
receive remittances, thus securing some form of economic stability.
Another common theme among contemporary researchers of time and waiting is
that the overabundance of time and unstructured waiting is both a symptom of social
exclusion and a form of precarity (Kwon 2015). Griffiths (2013) has referred to these
phenomena as “enforced idleness” (pg. 22) and argues that the negative impact of
prohibiting work for asylum seekers is profound. A relevant example of this can also be
found in Mains’ work (2007) with young men in urban Ethiopia who are dealing with
unemployment rates as high as 50 percent. As he describes, Ethiopian youth with too much
unstructured time report having introspective thoughts about their futures and lack of
ability to progress in life. This has become a source of both unease and distress leading to
depression, boredom and shame. Another example of enforced idleness related to
unemployment is found in Jeffrey’s work (2008; 2010) with educated young men in India
who are forced to wait indefinitely to find employment. Jeffrey uses the term “timepass” to
describe the sense of having nothing to do other than waste time. In some instances, this
‘wasted time’ or the experience of time passing slowly has been linked with emotional
suffering (Flaherty et al., 2005). Additionally, O’ Neill (2014) has noted in his work with
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underemployed Romanians that they have suffered from “a brutal kind of boredom” (pg. 9)
without any social security net. He argues that boredom is a persistent form of social
suffering largely as the result of the economic downturn in post-Communist Bucharest.
While research concerning experiences of time and waiting are often focused on the
negative social consequences, some have argued that the act of waiting may also produce
positive economic and social outcomes. As described previously, Kwon’s research with
Korean Chinese transnational migrant workers led to an assessment that waiting can
actually be a form of profit-producing labor. In this way, Kwon notes that “waiting is not a
completely passive, powerless, and unproductive condition, or a mere consequence of
structural violence” (pg. 492). Rather as Jeffery (2010) argues, the act of waiting can
sometimes be appreciated as an acquired skill and source of knowledge. With an
abundance of free time in the city, young, educated but unemployed males became
knowledgeable on the particulars of urban life. This allowed them to act as social
intermediaries and interpreters for rural friends and colleagues. In this way, “Timepass
was not a passive activity: It offered an opportunity to convey a youthful adaptability to
circumstances” (g. 474)
In summary, there is a diverse array of literature that grapples with how time is
embedded in the social processes of movement, immobility and migration. In an
increasingly technology-driven world, speed has become fetishized while stillness and
passivity are often perceived negatively (Bissell and Fuller 2011). Individual experiences of
time have shown that living in liminal spaces or having too much time can lead to mental
distress, social exclusion or boredom. Alternatively, research has also shown the ability of
people to transform periods of waiting or stasis into opportunities for social and economic
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growth. However, there is a need for a more comprehensive understanding of how time is
conceptualized in relation to refugees and those living in protracted states of exile. While
work concerning the experiences of Palestinian refugees has many direct correlations to
other protracted refugee situations, the case of refugees along the Thai-Myanmar border
presents a unique context. The recent act of UNHCR facilitating voluntary return has
publicly demonstrated a degree of mobility in a previously immobile space, thus adding an
additional layer of complexity that alters individual relationships with waiting. While
waiting in a refugee camp with no viable option for return may have previously been
associated with ‘feelings of powerlessness, helplessness, and vulnerability’ (Crapanzano,
1985), the introduction of facilitated returns may transform the act of waiting into an
active form of strategic planning or resistance16.

4.3 Waiting for Change: resistance in its many forms

“I look around here and I don’t believe they will ever close this place. We have
heard this word ‘repatriation’ many times before but it is just a rumor, you
know? For us, we cannot go back to Burma. So if they close the camp, I will
decide then what we will do. But for now, I will just wait and see what
happens.” – Saw Blu Ma, 39, Mae La Camp
The construction of the Voluntary Repatriation Center (VRC) in the late summer of
2016 created somewhat of a watershed moment for many Karen living in Mae La camp.
Prior to the erection of this physical embodiment of the promise for a safe and orderly
return to Myanmar, the idea of repatriation had existed mostly as a rumor. Easily dismissed
It is important to note that resistance in this context does not necessarily employ the same meaning as
more western-centric notions of resistance as heroic narratives regarding speaking truth to power. While it
may certainly take on that meaning at different times, resistance as applied to the Karen choosing not to
repatriate is more closely aligned with active and strategic decision-making.
16
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or simply forgotten, the phrase “facilitated voluntary repatriation” sounded like the hollow
words often batted around by politicians or international aid workers for many years prior.
Early in my stay at Mae La, I interviewed a man in his late sixties who had lived in the camp
for more than twenty years. Lounging back against the bamboo wall in his home while he
prepared some betel nut, he had stated to me rather matter-of-factly, “This camp will never
close, even if all of you leave, we will still be here.” The Karen had grown used to hearing
vague threats about the camp closing and had become somewhat desensitized to its
possibility. The events leading up to the construction of the VRC had largely been
approached with skepticism rather than as signals of the progress being made towards
finally ending one the world’s longest running refugee situations. The steady decreases in
funding, ad-hoc head counts and finally the official statements released by UNHCR, the
Royal Thai Government and the Government of Myanmar all signaled that something was
different this time. Ultimately, the presence of the building right in the center of the camp’s
‘C zone’ provided irrefutable proof that this time, something might actually change. Signs
displaying the familiar UNHCR logo were hung outside, as well as informational sheets that
gave basic details about the program. The condition of voluntariness was heavily
emphasized with the goal of allaying fears about a forced return or triggering a widespread
panic about the camp closing. In the early months of the VRC’s arrival, only a handful of
people visited during its opening hours17, often choosing instead to satisfy their curiosity
by stopping by at night to glance over the information tacked outside. To bridge the gap,
various workshops, focus groups and community information sessions were held at the
17

In a recorded interview with UNHCR staff in Mae Sot, they roughly estimated 14-15 visitors per week to
the VRC in Mae La during the initial months after construction. Additionally, they estimated over 30
informational sessions and focus groups were held with camp residents. The interview was conducted on
August 25th, 2017.
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VRC to discuss the details of the program and encourage people to visit. By October of that
same year, the first group of 71 refugees from the Nupo and Tham Hin camps officially
repatriated to Myanmar.
When I arrived in Mae La camp in the early summer of 2017, the VRC had been in
operation for less than a year. Already there was a growing resistance to its presence, or at
least what it had come to represent. The chorus of voices warning that the time was not
right to return to Myanmar had intensified in recent months and outlets such as Radio Free
Asia, Karen News, The Irrawaddy and Burma Link circulated heavily shared videos and
articles reporting on the lack of security and resources currently available in Karen State.
In October of 2017, which also marked the same month the first facilitated return was
carried out, the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) published an extensive 291-page
report detailing the past 25 years of reported human rights violations, militarization and
village agency in southeast Myanmar. The report, titled “Foundation of Fear: 25 years of
villagers' voices from southeast Myanmar”, detailed the multiple concerns IDPs and refugees
currently had with the notion of return.
The increased output of narratives against repatriation clearly highlighted a type of
resistance strategy being employed by some Karen living along the border and within
camps. Interestingly, it was reasonable to equate the relative success of this messaging to
the assistance of several international humanitarian organizations either through the
amplification of audience reach or financial assistance. In his extensive research along the
Thai-Myanmar border, Horstmann (2014) noted how the Karen have previously been
successful in mobilizing international humanitarian support to further their cause. As he
describes, the Karen have worked to operationalize KNU controlled space on the border
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and establish access corridors into Myanmar through partnerships with groups such as the
Free Burma Rangers and the Back Pack Health Workers. These access corridors have
enabled resistance in Karen State by facilitating the “consecutive re-entering of the conflict
zone in Burma to establish civil society structures and to politically organize people,
villages, and schools in a space that remains inaccessible for international NGOs” (pg. 59).
Other forms of political resistance have been described from within refugee camps along
the Thai-Myanmar border, namely in relation to an assortment of ‘formal and informal
activities that aim to shape the conditions of camp life or achieve more long-term goals
such as elections, protests, and engagement in community-based organizations (CBOs)’
(Olivius, 2017:292).
Indeed many scholars have noted similar forms of resistance in situations where
one group has substantially less power than another (Adas, 1981; Mullen, 1972; Scott
1976, 1979, 1985; Wolf, 1969). Most notably, James Scott (1985) focused on “everyday
resistance” such as foot-dragging, non-compliance, slandering, etc. rather than outright
revolution. Similar tactics were reported in the early 2000’s concerning life inside a heavily
militarized Burma. Tax evasion, the leaking of information or rumors to outside agencies,
and the slandering of junta leaders (Fink 2001, Skidmore 2004) all served to undermine
the Burmese military regime. In one particularly poignant narrative, Malseed (2009)
describes how elderly women, who have often been appointed as village heads in contested
regions of Myanmar, have been able to exploit the reverence for mother-figures in Burmese
cultures.
“…they scold or challenge the young military officers who give the orders,
and whose sense of power and authority becomes confused in their presence.
In written orders it is very common for Tatmadaw officers to address village
headwomen as ‘Mother’ and refer to themselves as ‘Son’ (KHRG 2002, 2003).
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In late 2005, a village headwoman in Papun district confronted an officer
who had ordered her to send villagers as ‘guides’ for a military patrol. She
told him, ‘You know I cannot ask my villagers to walk in front of your troops
to step on mines’. He replied, ‘It is my duty and these are orders from above,
you will have to do it or your village will be punished’. She said, ‘Then take
me instead. I will go. But on one condition. I’m afraid of mines, and I’m sure
you’re afraid of mines too. So let’s walk in front together, hand in hand. If I
step on a mine or you step on a mine, we’ll both die together. I can be content
with that’. The officer eventually responded, ‘I’ll think about it, go home
Mother and I’ll tell you my decision later’. The demand didn’t come again. She
knew that the officer had impunity to kill her on the spot or detain her
indefinitely without charge, yet she was confident enough in her maternal
authority to gamble against this possibility (Malseed, 2009: 375-376).
To understand strategies of resistance, many scholars have turned to theoretical
frameworks that center on the impact of power relationships. Malseed (2009) and Olivius
(2017) have both remarked on the relevance of a Foucauldian perspective in relation to
understanding how resistance is developed and performed by refugees on the ThaiMyanmar border. Understanding that, “where there is power, there is resistance”
(Foucault, 1990:95) has framed the actions of the Karen not as particularly anomalous, but
rather a natural response to marginalization or oppression. Malseed makes the salient
point that “reports on Burma often document repression and suffering without exploring
civilians’ responses, but a growing literature has shown in other contexts that recognising
and acknowledging responses and the agency behind them is crucial if people are to have a
role in negotiating their own political, social, and economic future”(pg. 373). In this way,
his argument can be built upon to include a reckoning of how resistance is employed in
response to repatriation specifically. While the growing output of narratives from the
Karen against repatriation may represent one form of resistance, I argue that the act of
waiting itself represents another.
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There is a substantial difference between being forced to wait for something and
transforming waiting into an expression of resistance. The latter requires the recognition of
agency as an inherent characteristic of all people, regardless of their race, class, gender or
present condition as an oppressed person or refugee. Additionally, the context surrounding
why one waits offers a lens in which to understand how passive forms of waiting may be
transformed into active ones. For example, Appadurai (2013) has argued that in the
context of marginalization, hope can be seen as ‘‘the force that converts the passive
condition of ‘waiting for’ to the active condition of ‘waiting to’’’ (pg. 126). In this way, the
hope of resettlement or a job opportunity elsewhere transformed the experience of waiting
in Mae La into something more positive. One male respondent in his mid 60’s described his
aspirations of resettlement as “I will wait to go join my daughter and her husband in
Australia when it’s possible, but it takes a long time. We have a lot of family there now and I
also have a new granddaughter.” Or in another interview a young man of 19 said, “We are
waiting to see if the rations stop. If there is no more rations or money I will just go to live in
Mae Sot. There is a school there and my friend is a teacher so he will get a job for me.” This
builds on the argument previously put forth by Corcoran (1989) which noted that the act of
waiting “…suggests strong and purposive action: to keep watch, to lie in wait, to stalk a
prey, to take by surprise”(pg. 517). Lakha (2009) took this idea forward by applying the
metaphor of hunting to Indian migrants who were waiting to return home and noted that
migrants were following opportunities that emerged in their homeland like hunters who
stalk ‘prey’. He argued that opportunities such as policy changes in the Indian government
that would allow for dual citizenship sparked considerable activity rather than passivity.
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A good example of how waiting has been operationalized as a resistance strategy
can be found in Harms’ (2013) research with residents of an urban neighborhood in Ho Chi
Minh City. Under the context of development-induced displacement, he describes how
residents have been left to choose between accepting government relocation compensation
or living surrounded by the rubble of demolished houses while waiting for the long process
of eviction to begin. In describing the residents who refused relocation, Harms notes:
“Subjected to enforced waiting by project authorities, they respond by doing
nothing, asserting themselves without exerting themselves, by simply being.
Their “weapon” is a cool indifference to time that redirects the disruptive
effects of waiting back onto project planners themselves. This indifference
threatens project authorities because the Thu Thiem project must pay four
billion dong (about $200,000) in interest on loan obligations each day.”
(Harms, 2013:357)
Much like the residents described in Ho Chi Minh City, the Karen in Mae La can assert
themselves simply by staying put. As one man in his late seventies explained, “I have been
here in Thailand for thirty years. They cannot make me go back. I will stay here for the rest
of my life”. Their position has been bolstered by both a sizable population as well as the
international visibility afforded through the involvement of UNHCR, and its corresponding
mandate to never forcibly repatriate refugees. For the Karen, the act of waiting is a
rejection of repatriation. It is a rejection of the notion that a ‘safe and dignified’ return is
currently possible and it is a rejection of the narrative that they are merely passive
recipients of aid. Rather it is a non-confrontational strategy to exert agency over their
immediate futures and provide space to weigh all available options.
There were many times that I observed forms of agency that played out under the
context of camp confinement in Mae La. The periodic bribing of guards or other Thai
authorities acted to usurp formal power structures and open additional opportunities for
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mobility and access to resources. Additionally, the proliferation of inexpensive smart
phones and sim cards facilitated increasing interconnectedness among the younger
generation of Karen and I can attest to witnessing more than a few new romances budding
by way of Facebook or LINE. Anecdotally, I heard stories from the days of the mass
resettlement programs about refugees trading names and registration cards between
families, often joking about how western aid workers couldn’t tell the difference between
male and female names. There were many times when the economics of camp life were laid
bare to me and a thriving real estate market was described where one could “purchase” a
property in Mae La for close to the same price as in a neighboring Thai village. Agency was
everywhere, as it often is when dealing with human beings. During an interview one
morning with a 26-year-old Karen man in Mae La, he explained to me, “It’s a waiting game
right now. We have to wait and see what the government in Burma will do. If they really
want a ceasefire, we will see.” And in this way his natural agency transformed the condition
of waiting into something more active: a waiting game. It implied the active monitoring of a
situation and then determining ones counter move. It implied both self-determination and
strategic positioning. In a word, it implied choice.
In summary, waiting has been a way in which many Karen can actively resist
repatriation and assert agency over their immediate futures. While waiting has often been
transformed into something more positive, such as waiting for family reunification or a job
opportunity, it still may represent a hardship. These are not mutually exclusive, as often
people recognize something as being difficult or unpleasant but still actively engage with it
due to the perceived potential outcome. In these situations, coping mechanisms have
become a way in which the burden of waiting is eased while one strategically waits for a
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more positive option. For many Christian Karen in Mae La, the church has provided this
outlet. In the following section, I ask how coping through religious expression might have
an impact on resistance to repatriation and how time in exile is ultimately understood.

4.4 Refugee Experiences of Exile

Lord Hear Our Weak and Humble Prayer
~
Music and Lyrics by:
Dr. Wado, Mae La Camp, 2017

Father in Heaven
Sing this song in the foreign land
We are displaced and homeless, not wanted in Thailand
Unwelcomed in Burma, where do we go?
Over 30 years we are praying and the answer is No
And where do we go?
Oh Lord, we pray for freedom
Lord we pray for hope
Please remember us, deliver us
Set us free from this exile
Give us a better desirable future
Oh Lord we pray, Oh Lord we pray
Oh Lord, hear our weak and humble prayer
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Upon the first few weeks of arriving at Mae La Camp, I began getting to know the
small school that was to be my home for the next several months. Operating primarily as a
Baptist seminary, the school was largely made up of staff and students who were both
Christian and from the Karen (Kayin) ethnic group. Aside from the core theological
curriculum there were many other activities and events that spoke to the deeply religious
nature of the space. These included morning devotionals, Sunday sermons and the
occasional visiting missionary who might give a guest lecture or sermon. In exchange for
my services as an English teacher, I was graciously provided with room, board and a neverending supply of choral hymns that wafted around campus like a divine soundtrack.
Although entirely pleasant, I often felt the ubiquitous singing provided somewhat of an odd
backdrop for the realities of life in a refugee camp. On days when the temperature soared
and electricity, water and patience were all on short supply, the cheerful chorus had a way
of making it all seem surreal. “How on earth can anyone be so cheerful right now?” I would
say to myself while dripping in sweat and wallowing in my own self-pity. What I would
later come to consider were that these expressions of faith and joyfulness in the context of
confinement were actually a powerful tool for coping. I observed that they had the distinct
ability to boost both morale and self-confidence within the community. Coping was
important because indulging in self-pity or anger inside the camp was akin to letting a
wound fester and the consequences of doing such could be severe. Depression, alcoholism
and substance abuse were all well documented problems, and in 2017 the International
Organization for Migration released a report stating the number of suicides in Mae La was
more than three times the global rate. In an interview with a young man who had lived in
Mae La since birth, he recalled the recent tragedy of a young couple that committed suicide
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together. “You know they just drank the poison, it’s like pesticide. She was pregnant and
her husband’s mother would not accept her. So they drank the poison and died. It’s very
sad for the family.”
In the face of accelerated rates of depression and suicide, Christian faith has become
a way in which many Karen refugees in Mae La are able to cope and make sense of their
circumstances. Visiting missionaries and pastors who give guest sermons often find biblical
analogies to help explain the suffering the Karen have endured. On more than one occasion
during my fieldwork I was told how the plight of the Karen mirrored that of the Israelites.
In one interview, a young woman recounted a conversation she had with a western
missionary who visited the camp several years earlier: “One of the women who came to
stay here thought the Karen people were the lost tribes of Israel. Many people think like
this.” Through this comparison, a narrative developed that suggests the Karen will
ultimately be rewarded for their suffering in exile with eternal life in the ‘promised land’ if
they remain faithful. Aside from this ideological motivation, there are also more practical
reasons why many Karen in exile have turned to the Baptist church. As Horstmann (2011)
argues:
“In a hostile environment, and harassed by the state, unable to return home
in Burma, the Baptist church provides a key location for mobilizing the
resources for a better life, solidarity with other refugees and a vision. Far
from being passive recipients of humanitarian aid, refugees make careers in
the church and emphasize their aspirations by actively participating in
evangelical efforts.” (pg. 270)
In this way, membership in the Baptist church has allowed the Karen to strategize about
their future while also connecting them to a global community. These sorts of connections
have led to increased mobility and have the potential to greatly affect the decision making
surrounding repatriation. In the following sections I will focus on refugee experiences of
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exile as well as discussing how religion has played a role in transforming exilic experiences
in the case of Baptist Karen refugees.
Conceptualizing experiences of exile within the social sciences can largely be traced
back to the wave of intellectual scholars who fled to the United States in the 1930’s
escaping persecution by the Nazi regime. The New School for Social Research in New York
(also known as the University in Exile) became the academic home for great European
intellectuals such as Hannah Arendt, Franz Boas, Emil Lederer, Erich Fromm and Leo
Strauss. This new academic base significantly increased publishing on topics of social,
political and intellectual exile by way of the New School’s journal, Social Research, as well as
many subsequent books and articles. However, Camurri (2014: 2-3) has noted that many of
the works on exile published after 1945 focused on the “refugee scholars,” which was a
concept promoted by the institutions engaged in their rescue (as cited in Duggan-Dry,
1948). As such, these experiences of exile focused more on assimilation and the
“appeasement of American public opinion, showing the high level of integration and rapid
Americanization of the refugees” (p.3). In subsequent decades, refugee experiences of exile
have mostly been subsumed into the broader field of “refugee studies”, which began to
grow in the 1970’s and 80’s as its own area of academic inquiry. Malkki (1995) has rightly
criticized the inclination of researchers to generalize the “refugee experience” and has
argued for the importance of differentiating exile in refugee studies from other literary
forms of exile. As she reasoned:
“Into the contrast between "refugees" and those "in exile" is built a whole
history of differences, not only of race, class, world region, and historical era
but of different people's very different entanglements with the state and
international bureaucracies that characterize the national order of things.
[…] "Exile" connotes a readily aestheticizable realm, whereas the label
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"refugees" connotes a bureaucratic and international humanitarian realm. “
(1995: 513)
In the two decades that have followed Malkki’s argument, scholars of refugee studies have
at least in some part attempted to incorporate a more nuanced and contextualized
understanding of exile. This has been achieved largely through recognition of the
intersectionality of Malkki’s aesthetic and bureaucratic realms of exile in spaces such as
refugee camps. In a refugee camp, individual exilic experiences are accompanied by
prolonged periods of confinement that have been perpetuated by bureaucratic and
international humanitarian regimes. In this way, the legality of one’s status as a refugee,
and the subsequent loss of work rights or freedom of mobility, has the power to shape the
experience of exile into something quite different than traditional interpretations of exile
as simply banishment or expulsion. Norum et al. (2016) have linked individual experiences
of exile to experiences of time and uniquely noted that, “…it is possible to focus on exilic
temporal experiences as processes of becoming and unfolding, rather than periods of
stagnancy, stasis and being ‘‘caught in time.’’” (p.74). More commonly however, periods of
exile experienced by refugees have been linked to experiencing time slowly or the
experience of a ‘fracture, displacement from the motherland, or alienation lived as a loss’
(Camurri, 2014). Additionally, exilic narratives where time is experienced as standing still
or stopping entirely have been explained as a suspension of the typical life stage
progression. When confined in a refugee camp, activities or rites of passage associated with
becoming an adult, such as going to college, getting a job, getting married or having
children, can become reordered or impossible to achieve. Castree (2009) has argued that a
feeling of time being stopped in exile is related to the inability to produce goods or labor
and engage with the market economy. Moreover, refugee experiences of exile have also led
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to a loss of social status (Jansen, 2008) or a reconceptualization of manhood and
masculinity in in the context of refugeehood (Suerbaum, 2018).
For the purpose of this work, I argue that it is important to understand Karen
refugee experiences of exile within their own unique spatiotemporal contexts. Throughout
the course of three decades in exile, many Karen have started new families or cultivated
new identities and communities of belonging. For many Christian Karen, exile has been as
much a process of ‘becoming and unfolding’ (Norum et al., 2016) as it has been a space for
reconstituting national identity (Horstmann, 2015). Specifically in the case of Baptist Karen
refugees, the exilic experience has been transformed to unite ethnic Karen through a
narrative of shared suffering while enhancing political mobilization within the KNU and
redefining the terms for voluntary return.

4.5 Christianity and the Karen
It has been nearly 200 years since Baptist missionaries first introduced Christianity
to Myanmar. Beginning as far back as 1830, missionaries were successfully converting
many Karen and building large religious networks in the Southeast. While there are an
estimated twenty different subgroups of Karen, the majority of people come from two main
groups. These are the Sgaw Karen, who have a prominent Christian representation and
mainly inhabit the hill areas; and the Pwo Karen who are predominantly Buddhist and
reside in the lowlands. Gravers (2007) points out that it is important to contextualize the
process of Christian conversion and see it from a Karen point of view. He argues that
Christian conversation is not seen as a change of culture or custom, but rather a new ritual
practice. In this way, Christianity has been converted into a genuine Karen tradition,
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replacing former rituals and prayers (pg. 232). While only an estimated 20% of Karen
practice Christianity (the majority of Karen are Theravada Buddhists who also practice
animism), Karen Christians have generally achieved higher levels of both income and
education. This is due in large part to their connections with other international Christian
organizations that have sent both financial and material support. Additionally, both the
Baptists and Seventh-day Adventists have established a strong presence within the camps
along the Thai-Myanmar border and have helped to open several schools. While the
refugee camps rely heavily on international humanitarian aid, they also utilize an internal
management system run by the Karen Refugee Committee (formerly the Karen Christian
Relief Committee), a primarily Christian-led organization with strong ties to the KNU. As
such, power held within the Karen refugee community has largely been consolidated within
Christian networks and camps have become centers for proselytization (Dudley, 2007;
Gravers, 2007; Horstmann, 2011).
The impact of Christianity on the Karen refugee community cannot be overstated
and its influence can be measured both economically and socially. Throughout the course
of my fieldwork in 2017, three key areas in which Christianity affected repatriation began
to surface. Firstly, I noted that Christian leaders have played a pivotal role in the messaging
surrounding repatriation in the Karen Refugee community. As such, pastors and camp
leaders have constructed visions of ‘Kawthoolei’ as both a ‘promised land’ and independent
state. Thus, Christian leaders in the KNU and KRC have been loud proponents for obtaining
inherent sovereignty and self-rule in Karen State as a condition for return. This has
historical roots as Gravers (2007) noted:
“In 1946, being a Christian Karen, in their own self-identification, signified
that the ethnic group had reached a level of civilization qualifying them as a
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nation in their own right with the right to claim their own state. Christianity
became part of an ethnic opposition and confrontation with the Burmese.”
(pg. 227)
However, the requirement of sovereignty in Karen State may present a challenge in
negotiating conditions for a voluntary repatriation.18
The second area in which Christianity affected repatriation was in that it legitimized
the creation of a shared narrative of suffering and exile. In addition to comparisons of the
Karen to Israelites in exile, Horstmann (2011) also notes metaphors of refugees being
‘saved on Noah’s ark’, or part of ‘God’s mysterious plan’ being extensively used by Christian
leaders to encourage each other. During my fieldwork I was introduced to a song that was
widely circulated at the Baptist church in camp, written by a late Karen pastor. The lyrics
stated: “I am not ashamed to be a refugee. For I know my Lord my Master my Savior was a
refugee long, long before me… I am glad to be a refugee for I am always reminded that my
eternal home is in heaven and not on the earth. But I know that for the time being, Satan is
trying to enslave me.” Further, to “read the Bible through Karen eyes” (pg. 263) is to
facilitate this shared narrative of suffering by suggesting the Karen’s fate is biblically tied to
exile. Ultimately this narrative promises the Karen will be rewarded for their suffering with
eternal life in the Promised Land if they remain faithful. Thus, rejecting repatriation can
coincide with accepting a fate of exile.
Finally, the third area concerns how membership in the church has increased
opportunities for mobility and education through access to a global community. Mobility
has been increased by way of private visa sponsorship programs, which are administered

18

For a more detailed discussion on this topic, see Chapter 5 in relation to the incongruence of stipulations
between the Karen and the Myanmar Government as a barrier to repatriation.
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by religious organizations in foreign countries such as Canada and Australia. Additionally,
the participation in Christian missionary networks has the potential to open up theological
educational opportunities through access to a global community. Many of the young adult
Karen I met who spoke English had been educated in foreign theological schools. Managing
without official identity paperwork, many Christian Karen students make their way over
land borders into India or Thailand to study in religious schools. As one young man
explained to me in an interview, “I don’t have the Burmese passport, but it is not a problem.
I went to Nagaland by bus to study in seminary school. This is like a sponsorship program,
it was a very good opportunity. I stayed there for three years. So now I have come back and
I try to give back to my community and share what I learned”. As Horstmann (2011) also
noted, “…refugees make careers in the church and emphasize their aspirations by actively
participating in evangelical efforts” (pg. 270). In this way, repatriation is resisted in lieu of
strategically working towards a better option for ones future.

4.6 Conclusion
In summary, understanding experiences of time, waiting and exile in relation to
repatriation and resistance allows us to examine the issue from multiple vantage points.
Conceptualizing how waiting can be transformed from something passive into something
active illuminates the power of agency inherent in all humans. However, protracted refugee
situations must be understood within their own unique cultural and spatiotemporal
contexts. In the case of the Karen living in refugee camps along the Thai-Myanmar border,
additional attention must be given to aspects of time, confinement, governmental power,
religion, and international interventions. While all of these areas have the potential to
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significantly impact voluntary repatriation, a final area should be noted. The creation of a
Christian-centric identity in the Karen refugee community suppresses the internal ethnic
diversity of the Karen in Myanmar, where religious affiliations, customs and language vary
substantially according to region and village (e.g. Gravers, 2007). Said (2003) has argued
that, “exiles feel an urgent need to reconstitute their broken lives, usually by choosing to
see themselves as part of a triumphant ideology or a restored people” (pg. 47-64). Perhaps
those who write about groups in exile also have an inclination to create binaries between
the righteous and the ruthless. Western researchers have had a noted tendency to both
generalize the Karen as Christian and well as produce arguably biased work that leans
toward the policy goals of the KNU (Horstmann, 2011; Rogers, 2004). In order to truly
understand how repatriation can ever be voluntary, both a comprehensive and honest
assessment must be delivered. One that acknowledges both the power and hardship
contained within a heterogeneous Karen refugee community.
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Chapter 5
NEGOTIATING RETURN: Strategies, Compromise and Barriers

5.1 Introduction

“Many things need to change before we would consider returning. We need our
own land to farm and we also need security. The Tatmadaw are still in the
mountains around Karen State and the military can never be trusted. They
never do what they say. So we worry about our security if we go back there
because we don’t know the truth. We cannot see someone’s heart, we can only
see their face.” ~ Saw Doh Moo, 56, Mae La Camp

On a cool and cloudy day in late September I decided to wander down to the small
sports field that was neatly tucked away between the school’s rear entrance and the bank
of a small river that ran though the center of camp. It had been raining nonstop for the past
several days and the dirt lanes that snaked their way through the bamboo and thatch
roofed buildings had turned into a series of treacherous mud puddles. I carefully made my
way down the path to the field, all the while grasping at tree branches and sheepishly
smiling at the group of women who were watching nearby in amusement as I tried not to
fall. By now the rainy season was well upon us and any break in the torrential downpour
was a welcome opportunity to spend a bit of time outdoors. I settled in on one of the small
cement stoops in the periphery of the field and unpacked a bit of fruit and a book I had
stashed in my bag. Across the way a group of boys were hitting a small rattan ball back and
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forth over a volleyball net using everything but their hands. They played barefoot while
wearing shorts and each time they hit the ball it delivered a satisfying hollow thud. While I
watched them one of the students I recognized from another school in camp came to sit
with me. Saw Bu Reh was Karenni and had grown up in Ban Mai Nai Soi refugee camp,
which was located several hours north of Mae La with a population of approximately
10,000. Like many young people in Mae La, he had come here specifically to attend school.
“Hey Bu Reh, how are your studies going?” I asked. Always eager to practice English,
although ignoring my original question, he replied happily, “Thramu, you like this game?
This is called chinlone.” I laughed and said yes, pointing out how impressive it was that
they could keep the ball off the ground for so long without using their hands. ‘Thramu’, a
term used for a female teacher, had come to replace my given name almost immediately
after I arrived. I liked the familiarity it seemed to bring to conversations and always smiled
at its use, even though it was a thoroughly generic term. We chatted for a while about
sports and school and eventually landed on the topic of what Bu Reh wanted to do after he
finished his studies that year. “Will you go back to Ban Nai Soi to be with your family?” I
asked gently, knowing the question might be a difficult one. He thought for a moment and
replied, “No, I don’t think so. Maybe I will stay here. Or maybe I can go to Canada…” his
voice trailing off. The answer was one that I was familiar with. Bu Reh had limited options
to weigh and what he wanted to do was not necessarily what was possible. It was an
answer full of frustration and uncertainty but also hopefulness. I looked at Bu Reh and
nodded in agreement, “Yes, maybe.”
The mixture of frustration, hope and uncertainty colored many conversations I had
with refugees in Mae La about the prospect of returning to Myanmar. People noted several
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factors that needed to be considered or options weighed before concrete plans could be
made. Often, the barriers preventing return seemed so insurmountable that people ruled
out repatriation entirely. In these instances I considered how difficult it might be to
describe the absolute paradox people faced when confronted with the words: “voluntary
repatriation”. Each interview seemed to capture only a brief moment in a continually
evolving mental negotiation. Strategies changed with the ebb and flow of information
coming from Karen State, the KNU, or friends and family. What someone planned to do if
Mae La closed today might be completely different next month if there were rumors of a
new resettlement program or work visa. The environment felt both idle and in constant
flux at the same time.
More than 15 years ago Colson argued that if anthropology continued to rely on
ethnography it would have to focus on “people in transition, who are uneasy about
themselves in a world that ignores their desire and need for continuity. It will have to deal
with responses to processes of displacement and arrival. Ethnographic time horizons will
change: the one-shot time exposure will have to be supplemented by longitudinal research”
(2003). I asked myself what might be gained from research that captured only a brief
moment in time with strategies that were mostly contingent on continuously changing
factors? Would the data be outdated and useless by the time I left the field? Or could the
information be seen as the micro-level threads that form the fabric for longer-term social
change on the Thai-Myanmar border? The challenge would be to define how strategic
decision-making under conditions of constant flux could actually underpin the social
change inherent in a mass repatriation should it come to pass. Barbara Harrell-Bond
famously championed the use of anthropology in studying refugees in that it “offers the
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chance to record the processes of social change, not merely as a process of transition
within a cultural enclave, but in the dramatic context of uprootedness where a people's
quest for survival becomes a model of social change.” (Harrell-Bond and E. Voutira , 1992).
In this way it became important for my research to be situated in the context of the
Karen’s transitional existence as refugees, and how not only strategic decision-making, but
also the related experiences of exile can help form cultural narratives that drive change; or
resistance to it. Additionally, situating the Karen displacement within anthropological
theories of time, mobility and migration (see Ch. 4) help to understand how strategies for
migration corridors develop, resistance strategies are employed and solutions such as third
country resettlement and repatriation are decided. In this chapter I will focus on the latter,
looking specifically at the current program of voluntary repatriation being offered to
refugees along the Thai-Myanmar border. First, I discuss the internationally accepted
protocol for resolving a protracted refugee crisis in relation to the Thai-Myanmar situation.
This will be followed by an explanation of the current voluntary repatriation program
being implemented by UNHCR and an update on its status. The remainder of the chapter
will focus on research outcomes regarding refugee perceptions of return. This includes
both reported barriers to repatriation as described in interviews with refugees as well as
other barriers identified through qualitative analysis and observation. To conclude, I will
offer a summary of the choice many Karen are currently facing in Mae La camp as well as
introduce the potential solutions to be discussed in the next chapter.
5.2 Durable Solutions
The goal of refugee protection is ultimately to find a long-term solution for
displacement that allows refugees to live their lives free from persecution in peace and
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dignity. The universally accepted standard to achieve this goal is the protocol developed by
UNHCR for resolving refugee situations. This protocol entails three primary options known
as ‘durable solutions’ which include: (1) integration into the country of first asylum, (2)
third-country resettlement, and (3) voluntary repatriation. It is worth taking a moment to
discuss each of these individually in regards to their history, efficacy and how they relate to
the situation on the Thai-Myanmar border. While the enactment of durable solutions are
often deeply complex and rooted in their own geo-political contexts, past examples often
provide the best lens to understand the current challenges refugees face in return. By no
means is this an exhaustive review of the role that durable solutions play in global refugee
policy19. Rather it is a brief overview to help explain both the framework of available
options as well as their relevance to resolving the protracted refugee situation along the
Thai-Myanmar border.
(1) Integration into the country of first asylum:
The first durable solution proposed by UNHCR is local integration into the host
country where a refugee first sought asylum. As refugee situations become more
protracted and camps linger for decades across international borders, this option often
becomes increasingly desirable. Displaced groups naturally become more emplaced in their
geographic location with the passage of time, often getting married, giving birth to children
and raising families on foreign soil. In the anthropological literature, Feld and Basso (1996)
have defined emplacement as ‘the way in which people encounter places, and invest them
with significance’ while Jacka (2005) notes emplacement as ‘a process in which people re-

19

For a more comprehensive discussion of durable solutions see (1) Chimni, B. S., 2004 (2) Crisp, Jeff, 2004. (3)
Gottwald, Martin, 2012 (4) Weiner, Myron,1998
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embed social relations that have been “distanciated” and “disembedded” by disruptions,
dislocations and deterritorializations’. In this way, refugees who have spent decades in
foreign camps, villages or urban centers have become rooted in their host countries by the
creation of new families, communities and conceptualizations of home. This rootedness
makes legal integration desirable in its ability to ensure security and economic opportunity
while also helping to shed the last vestiges of being a “temporary” outsider. However, legal
integration is a complex process that is often riddled with political complications and
economic barriers. As Wernke (2007) has argued, emplacement is also a process of
negotiation between citizens and the state. For refugees, obtaining citizenship in a
neighboring country is often not an option and many countries of first asylum lack the
political will or economic resources to support a mass integration. An estimated 84% of
refugees are currently hosted in developing countries (see figure 5.1), which can also make
integration problematic by way of refugees competing for resources with their host
communities. As such, UNHCR estimates that over the past decade, only 1.1 million
refugees around the world became citizens in their country of asylum. This is a staggeringly
small number in comparison to the 68.5 million people who were living as refugees or
internally displaced persons in 2017.
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Major Refugee Hosting Countries 2015-2016

Figure 3: Major refugee-Hosting Countries 2015-2016. (Source: UNHCR, June 2017)

However, the 1951 Convention does provide a legal framework for the integration
of refugees and its relevance as a solution is increasing as the popularity of special
economic zones and their corresponding labor markets grow. Additionally, some host
countries have adopted an incremental approach to local integration by granting residency
or work permits that gradually lead to a wider range of rights and entitlements. For
example, in 2008 Panama enacted the Regularization Law and Public Awareness
Programme to offer a solution for refugees who fled conflicts in Nicaragua and El Salvador
during the 1980s. The law allowed refugees who had held refugee status in Panama for 10
or more years to apply for permanent residency status. In Panama, permanent residents
have the right to apply for naturalization after five years (or after three years if they have
Panamanian children). Prior to the enactment of the law, refugees and their families only
had temporary status, which greatly impeded their local integration. Tanzania, Iran,
Belarus, Moldovia and the Ukraine have all also enacted similar programs. Most recently,
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Thailand also moved to regularize status for the estimated 3.8 million irregular migrant
workers in the country by way of a Royal Ordinance in 2017. While the registration of
migrant workers is a positive step forward in that it ensures protection under Thai labor
laws, it is not without flaws. Most notably, due to agreements between the Thai Royal
Government and the Governments of Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos, a migrant cannot
register without the proper identification issued from their country of origin. This
requirement effectively excludes the tens of thousands of refugees in Thailand from
registration, as many do not possess national identification and cannot enter their home
country to obtain it out of a fear for their safety, issues of time, lack of permission to leave
or the prohibitive cost of travel to obtain such documents20. While local integration may
indeed be the preferred option of many refugees along the Thai-Myanmar border, there is
not yet a legal framework in place to accommodate their inclusion in legal migration.
Further complicating the potential of local integration in Thailand are both social
and political barriers. In 2004, Human Rights Watch noted a “growing populist-nationalist
sentiment that illegal migrant workers were taking Thai jobs and causing economic,
security, and public health problems” (HRW, 2004:17) Brees (2010) has also argued that
the Thai government and the local population perceive refugees from Myanmar as a threat
to security and social order. She notes that the media has often furthered xenophobic
rhetoric that implies Thailand is being overwhelmed by foreigners and habitually portrays
refugees as troublemakers. Additionally, Thailand’s growing economic and political ties to
the Myanmar government has resulted in a hardline stance against refugees observed to be
As noted by A. Kaun from UNHCR in a personal correspondence from 2019, it is also worth mentioning here
that even if refugees had these documents in their possession, in theory they would not be able to leave the
camp unless they obtained prior permission from MOI given the encampment policy for displaced persons
from Myanmar, which is in contrast to urban asylum seekers.
20
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activists or outspoken critics of the Myanmar government (HRW, 2004:24). While research
has shown that refugees from Myanmar positively contribute to the Thai economy (Brees,
2010), many social and political factors must be addressed for local integration to be
successful.
(2) Third-country resettlement:
For refugees who cannot return home due to persecution or on-going conflicts, third
country resettlement is sometimes an option for a long-term solution. As UNHCR notes,
resettlement can also be an ‘effective mechanism for burden sharing and international
cooperation, providing options to assist first countries of asylum consistent with the
principle of international solidarity’. Since 1975, the U.S. has resettled over 3 million
refugees, the most of any nation, with annual admission figures ranging from a high of
207,000 in 1980 to a recent low of 22,491 in 2018. However, resettlement to a third
country is not only rare (less than 1% of refugees are resettled) but can also be problematic
in both procedure and outcome. For example, in Tanzania, Thomson (2012) argues that the
resettlement approval process for Congolese refugees is confusing and opaque, which can
further exacerbate the stress of displacement. This theme of disempowerment by overly
complex and restrictive policies has also emerged from research with refugees on the ThaiMyanmar border attempting to resettle to the U.S. (see Mathews, 2012). Thomson notes
that a successful resettlement bid is premised almost entirely upon proving one’s own
trustworthiness, which often involves producing official documents to back up claims of
identity or proof of persecution. What Thomson describes in Tanzania is particularly
applicable for many Karen in Thailand, as attempts to acquire formal documentation are
often stymied by the bureaucratic processes that surround obtaining birth certificates or
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national identity cards. In both scenarios, dismantling the bureaucratic process in a way
that demystifies where decisions are made would make the system more accessible for
refugees.
For many Karen along the border, Canada, and to a lesser extent, Australia, have
effectively become the last bastions of real hope for third-country resettlement. The U.S.
officially ended its Myanmar resettlement program in 2014, although thousands of
applicants remained in the system and have slowly been granted admission over the past
four years (see figure 4). Currently, the U.S. will still accept applications from family
members who wish to be reunited with relatives who have previously been resettled and
cases with extenuating circumstances that are specifically referred by UNHCR21. Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, Finland and Norway continue to admit a small number of refugees
from Myanmar, although only Canada (and very recently Australia) operates what are
known as special humanitarian programs, which allow for private individuals or
organizations to sponsor a specific person or family. This is how many Karen have made
their way into Canada as groups such as The United Church of Canada and the Canadian
Baptists of Ontario and Quebec have sponsored hundreds of families through affiliated
networks in the camps. Still, the numbers are low in comparison to the amount of people
who still remain on the border and third-country resettlement remains an unlikely option.

21

As noted by P. Trotter in a personal correspondence from 2019, there still remains some possibility of
resettlement not dependent on refugee status by way of the “visa 93” programme which is still active
although subject to nationality bans that are currently being challenged in court. For more information on the
Visa 93 program visit: https://tr.usembassy.gov/visas/immigrant-visas/immigrant-visa-additional_info/
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Figure 4: Resettlement of Myanmar Refugees from Temporary Shelters in Thailand 2005-2018;
(Source: UNHCR 2018)

(3) Voluntary repatriation:
Out of the three options, UNHCR promotes voluntary repatriation to the country of
origin as the most ideal solution. Voluntary repatriation is often regarded as the hallmark
signal of a conflict’s conclusion as well as a significant phase of the post-conflict peacebuilding process (Black & Gent 2006; Crisp 2000). It is also generally seen as the most costeffective, logistically efficient and logical conclusion to a mass displacement of people.
Voluntary repatriation programs are supported by the fact that the right to return to one’s
country of origin has become accepted as a fundamental human right. This has been
explicitly stated in article 13 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as noting
that everyone has the right to “leave any country, including his own, and to return to his
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country.” While the Declaration is not legally binding, it has been tremendously influential
in the shaping of national and international laws, treaties, and constitutions for more than
70 years and continues to do so for the Thai-Myanmar border. Most notably this influence
can be seen in UNHCR’s direct involvement with local refugee policy and the recent
implementation of a voluntary repatriation program inside the nine camps along the ThaiMyanmar border.
UNHCR’s role in voluntary repatriation can be traced back to its inception, when in
December of 1949, the United Nations General Assembly established a High
Commissioner’s Office for Refugees. Thus the Statute of the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees 22 was adopted by the General Assembly on December 14th,
1950, to be effective as of January 1st, 1951. Among the other duties assigned to UNHCR, the
Statute outlined the conditions for return and called upon governments to cooperate by
"assisting the High Commissioner in (her) efforts to promote the voluntary repatriation of
refugees" (par. 1). The initial directives outlined in the Statute for UNHCR are significant in
that they laid the groundwork for the guiding principles of future repatriation policy. These
include the tenets that (1) repatriation should always be voluntary; (2) UNHCR,
governments and private organizations (NGOs) all have a joint role to play; and (3)
voluntary repatriation should be both facilitated and promoted to ensure the safety and
security of refugees.

22

UN General Assembly, Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 14
December 1950, A/RES/428(V), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f0715c.html
Adopted at the 325th plenary meeting, 14 Dec. 1950. "Annex: Statute of the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees". In: Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during its 5th session, Volume
I, 19 September-15 December 1950. - A/1775. - 1951. - p. 46-48. - (GAOR, 5th sess., Suppl. no. 20).
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Over the past several decades UNHCR’s role in voluntary repatriation has expanded
significantly. As seen in their current mandate (see table 3), a much more comprehensive
effort has been put forth to ensure all stages of repatriation allow refugees to return in
safety and dignity. UNHCR also plays a more pivotal role in the coordination of States and
other partners to promote and facilitate voluntary repatriation programs. In this regard
they have slowly adopted a more inclusive approach in hopes of bringing refugee voices to
high-level policy discussions. For example, UNHCR has initiated several tripartite
commissions that can be ‘useful mechanisms for the official recognition of refugee
priorities and barriers to return, as well as ensuring refugee participation in planning and
peace processes’23. These have led to several signed tripartite agreements between host
country governments and UNHCR for the voluntary repatriation of refugees such as
Nigerian refugees in Cameroon (2017), Sudanese refugees in Chad (2017) and Afghan
refugees in Pakistan (2016). This is indeed the goal for the Thai-Myanmar border situation
as described by UNHCR in their 2015 report titled Strategic Roadmap for Voluntary
Repatriation of Refugees from Myanmar in Thailand. Within the report UNHCR lists several
benchmarks, which must be met prior to either the facilitation or promotion of repatriation
along the Thai-Myanmar border. In addition to benchmarks concerning signed ceasefire
agreements and mine-risk awareness training, is the requirement for a tripartite
agreement for promoted return, which confirms national protection of returning refugees.
Progress has been slow on this front, although in late March of 2017, a bilateral meeting
between Myanmar and Thailand resulted in an informal agreement to facilitate returns

23

As stated in the 66th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Executive Committee of the High
Commissioner’s Programme, Update on voluntary repatriation, Geneva, 21-24 June 2016 .
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twice a year. As of the end of 2018, two facilitated returns have occurred with a third in
process, although the total number of people repatriated was less than 200, falling well
below projected figures (see discussion in next section).
While voluntary repatriation has indeed been the most common and preferred
durable solution, it has not always been successful. Lubkemann (2013) argues that recent
scholarship has debunked the notion that return is the most ‘natural’ or self-evident post
conflict outcome for refugees. Instead proposing that prolonged wars dramatically alter the
social, economic and political landscapes of the country they fled, essentially making the
‘home’ they knew a very different place. Additionally, the new social and economic
connections made over many years in exile can tie refugees to their areas of war-time
resettlement and lead to reluctance or outright refusal to return. In the Great Lakes Region
of Africa, which includes Burundi, the DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda, the
repatriation of large refugee populations has ‘often incited violent conflict, contributing to
an ongoing cycle of war, exile, and repatriation’ (Baregu 2006b).
The case to refute repatriation as the most natural solution to displacement is
further strengthened by literature that offers a critical analysis of existing systems of
return. Of particular relevance to the refugees on the Thai-Myanmar border is research
concerning the intersectionality of protractedness in relation to conceptualizations of
home. Hammond (1999) describes a “discourse of repatriation” prevalent in humanitarian
policy that often uses terms such as ‘reintegration’ and ‘rehabilitation’. This is problematic
as the concept of ‘return’ and ‘returnee’ imply that by entering one’s native country a
person is returning to something familiar. The terms above are “riddled with value
judgments that reflect a segmentary, sedentary idea of how people ought to live, what their
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relation to their homeland should be, and ultimately how they should go about
constructing their lives once the period of exile ends”(pg. 230). In essence, it implies that
refugees should go backwards in time and find life as it used to be before becoming a
refugee. As many Karen were born in exile, this is an impossible task. Along this same vein,
Malkki (1995) has argued that assumptions of refugees often imply that they lose their
national identity when they flee, but this way of thinking fails to consider refugees’ capacity
to develop new social identities and life strategies. For Karen refugees, their
protractedness has come to define a key component of their lived experience. Their social
identities have become inextricably linked to their lives in Thailand and the communities
they have formed in exile. Repatriation assumes that the connection to one’s homeland (or
a parent’s homeland) will supersede the bonds formed in exile, which is quite clearly, not
always the case.
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Summary of the Current UNHCR Mandate for Voluntary Repatriation
i. Verify the voluntary character of refugee repatriation
Promote the creation of conditions that are conducive to voluntary return in safety
ii.
and with dignity
Promote the voluntary repatriation of refugees once conditions are conducive to
iii.
return
Facilitate the voluntary return of refugees when it is taking place spontaneously,
iv.
even if conditions are not conducive to return
Organize, in cooperation with NGOs and other agencies, the transportation and
v. reception of returnees, provided that such arrangements are necessary to protect
their interests and well-being
Monitor the status of returnees in their country of origin and intervene on their
vi.
behalf if necessary
Undertake activities in support of national legal and judicial capacity-building to
vii.
help states address causes of refugee movements
Raise funds from the donor community in order to assist governments by
viii.
providing active support to repatriation and reintegration programmes
Act as a catalyst for medium and long term rehabilitation assistance provided by
ix.
NGOs, specialized development agencies and bilateral donors
Source: UNHCR Handbook for Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection (1996:1.6)
Table 3: Summary of Current UNHCR Mandate for Voluntary Repatriation (Source: UNHCR 1996)

5.3 The Current State of Voluntary Repatriation on the Thai-Myanmar Border
“Someday we will return to Kawthoolei and it will be ours. We will be free to
farm our land and live in peace. I believe this. The Karen people will not
disappear until we have been returned to our land. Thay gan ma-yuk, thet mapyauk (It is our fate)” – Poe Thaw Lay, 42, Mae La Camp
The notion of return has long been a point of contention for many Karen living along
the Thai-Myanmar border. References to ‘Kawthoolei’, the S’gaw Karen word for Karen
State, invoke deep emotional connections to ancestral lands and dreams of independence.
The story of Kawthoolei has become the narrative of a homeland that is “constructed,
imagined, and contested in the context of displacement and political exile in the margin of
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two other nations” (Horstmann, 2011:86). It has become, in its current idealized iteration,
the only place to which many Karen want to return. However, the physical space that
Kawthoolei occupies within Myanmar is riddled with land mines, patrolled by the Burmese
military and has little chance of achieving status as an independent nation. Thus the
collision of idealism and pragmatism has created a deep uncertainty about when, how and
why one might return.
Further exacerbating the uncertainty surrounding repatriation are recent cuts in
humanitarian funding and declining international support for maintaining the camps along
the Thai-Myanmar border. “With the war in Syria and the refugee crisis in Europe, it has
become increasingly difficult to secure humanitarian funding for long-lasting refugee
situations” explained Iain Hall, a senior coordinator for UNHCR. As such, refugees have
reported feeling pressured to return due to reductions in food rations and declining living
standards in the camps. This has often been seen as an unofficial agency strategy and a way
to push people out. As one refugee in Mae La explained:
“They want us to leave. They don’t want to let us live here anymore. So they
have taken away the rations to force us to go. They have figured out that this
is the way they can do it and not have to say they don’t care about us
refugees. I don’t know what we will do.” Taw Po, 36
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Figure 5: INGO Repatriation Strategy Political Cartoon (Source: Karen News)

There are currently three modes of return that are used to describe the status of
voluntary repatriation on the Thai-Myanmar border. These are: (1) spontaneous returns,
which are organized by individual refugees themselves without UNHCR’s direct
engagement or support before or during the movement (2) facilitated returns, which
involve UNHCR’s active engagement including protection counseling, informational
sessions prior to departure, travel arrangements and financial assistance for initial
reintegration (note that UNHCR’s engagement in facilitating voluntary return is contingent
upon an assessment of the conditions in a specific location and key benchmarks being met)
and (3) promoted returns, which occur within a formalized framework between the
country of origin, country of asylum and UNHCR when the overall conditions throughout
Southeast Myanmar are conducive to return for the vast majority of refugees.
From 2012 until today, a rough estimation of approximately 18,000 refugees are
believed to have spontaneously returned to their homes in southeastern Myanmar without
government assistance, according to The Border Consortium (TBC, 2018). The exact figures
124

are difficult to ascertain, as many people do not report their departures in fear that they
will lose their status as a registered refugee in camp (thus also losing the access to food
rations and housing). Further, many refugees have returned on what have been termed
“go-and-see” visits to assess the situation for themselves. While these trips are encouraged
and sometimes even funded by UNHCR, many are done informally between community
networks. The occurrence of informal spontaneous return is noteworthy in that it speaks to
the much broader issue of decision-making and autonomy on the part of the refugee. By
returning through their own informal networks, they disrupt the existing hegemonic power
structures that have governed their ‘refugeehood’. In this way, refugees reclaim control
over their lives while shedding an identity that was interrelated with dependency on
foreign aid. Spontaneous return may therefore be the most natural form of return with the
best rates of success. Unfortunately, these types of returns are difficult to track, can often
be circular in nature and ultimately have not been significant enough to impact the overall
population numbers in the Thai camps. However, during the course of my fieldwork I
noted both a favorable view of spontaneous return as well as its current dismissal as an
option. In nearly a quarter of my interviews with Karen refugees living in Mae La camp
(n=9), I recorded sentiments that can be summarized as: ‘if things in Karen State improved
significantly, refugees would go back on their own with no need for assistance’. For
example, one Karen man in his mid-thirties stated firmly:
“If the Tatmadaw left Brigade 7 and stopped the fighting with KNLA, we
would not have a problem with going back. You wouldn’t even need to tell us,
we will go back tomorrow on our own. We don’t need help. But there are
more and more soldiers everyday and we don’t have any guarantee.”
However, the probability of a complete military withdrawal from Karen state remains
unlikely and strong stances such as these would have little chance of being tested anytime
125

soon. In nearly every interview I conducted with refugees inside Mae La camp,
spontaneous return was never mentioned as an actual planned solution (n=36). Rather, if
faced with an imminent camp closure, the most common answer was the desire to attempt
to stay in Thailand (n=29). A small number of refugees mentioned the possibility of
applying for third country resettlement if the camp were to close (n=4) and most stated
that they would only consider repatriation if there were no other options and certain
conditions were met (n=31).
There is a clear majority of opinion amongst the Karen concerning the lack of a
desire to repatriate into Myanmar anytime soon. This position is often reinforced by
statements from the Karen National Union (KNU) and other ethnic based organizations
(EBOs) in the area. As one woman, a mother in her late twenties put it:
“We don’t know the truth about what happens in Burma. Our leaders need to
decide whether to make a deal with the government there or not. So we will
wait and see when the KNU says it is ok to go back. But right now, they do not
say it is safe.”
In addition to the influence held by the KNU, groups such as the Karen Refugee Committee
(KRC) and the Karen Student Network Group (KSNG) have released formal positions on
voluntary repatriation. The KSNG, an independent student group made up of over 15,000
members, is active in most of the camps along the border. In December of 2016, KSNG
reportedly organized a meeting inside Ma La Oon camp that included approximately 120
representatives from community-based organizations, camp leadership and local human
rights groups. The result was a position paper with 19 stipulations for return. It was
divided into two main positions: (1) pre-departure of refugees and (2) post-departure and
reintegration of refugees. (see table 4)

126

Karen Student Network Group (KSNG)
Position Paper on Refugee Return to Burma
June 20, 2017
1.KSNG’s Position on Pre-departure Refugees
1.1
Refugee Education should be recognized by the government and refugee students should
have the right to continue their higher education.
1.2
Refugee Students should have the right to continue their further studies outside the camps
in Thai universities as well as in Asia and all over the world.
1.3
Karen students and youth should have their right to freedom of forming organizations,
freedom of expression and freedom to act independently for community development while
in the refugee camp.
1.4
Karen student and youth should have the freedom to travel without restriction in order to
build relationships with students learning outside the refugee camps including inside the
country.
1.5
Karen student and youth should have the right to participate in political reform processes
and should be empowered to get actively involved in peace building processes.
1.6
Organization providing services in the refugee camps should continue supporting the
refugees until they can return home.
1.7
Organizations providing services in the refugee camps should support Karen students and
youth to lead communities in a democratic way with ethnic’s equality and help prepare
them to build federal democracy in Burma.
1.8
Refugees should return only after war stops in the whole country and all the ethnic armed
groups have signed the countrywide Ceasefire Agreement.
1.9
All the Burmese military camps should be relocated not close to the villages and localities
and landmines must have been clear.
2. KSNG’s Position on Post-departure and Reintegration of Refugees
2.1
Adequate land should be provided by the government for internally displaced person (IDPs)
and refugees who have lost their land in line with the UN’s Pinheiro Principles and with full
guarantee for livelihood activities.
2.2
Return should take place only after political dialogue is successful in forming a federal
democracy.
2.3
The curricula of Karen Education Department (KED) should be recognized and supported by
the government.
2.4
Karen national flag should be allowed to be raised in front of Karen national schools without
any hindrance.
2.5
Karen students should have the right to learn Karen curriculum which includes Karen
history, culture and tradition and Karen language produced by the KED.
2.6
Karen students and youth should be provided with national identification cards identifying
them as citizens with equality and without any discrimination.
2.7
Humanitarian assistance provided by supporting organization should be provided for the
returning refugees until they can be self-reliant.
2.8
Karen youth should be provided with job opportunities for their livelihood and be free from
any form of slavery.
2.9
Karen students and youth organizations should have the right to freedom of formation of
organizations, expressing opinion and freedom to act independently in community
development.
2.10
Karen students and youth organizations should have the right to build network with other
ethnic groups in Burma and all over the world.
Table 4: KSNG Position Paper on Refugee Return to Burma (Source: Karen Student Network Group, June 2017)
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The formal position paper released by KSNG was largely in response to the
commencement of UNHCR’s voluntary repatriation program, which began in August of
2016. During this time UNHCR began to build and operate voluntary repatriation centers in
all 9 camps along the Thai-Myanmar border. The Voluntary Repatriation Centers (VRCs)
were billed as facilities where repatriation-related activities would be conducted for
refugees who were interested in returning home. This included protection counseling on
the voluntariness of return as well as mine risk education sessions to learn how to
recognize landmines and prevent related accidents. The centers also acted as information
hubs for any issues related to conditions in the areas of return, such as livelihood
opportunities, education and health services or obtaining civil documentation. In addition
to these services, refugees could sign up at the centers to voluntarily repatriate and learn
about the specific assistance packages available to them. The voluntary repatriation
support as outlined by UNHCR can be described as:
1. Ensuring that refugees have access to protection counseling, where the
voluntariness of return is verified, any questions or concerns related to the area of
return and expectations regarding assistance can be clarified, and any special needs
of the individual(s) can be identified and support options discussed.
2. All refugees undergo a mine-risk awareness session organized by Handicap
International
3. All refugees receive mosquito nets and WASH kits
4. Organized transport from the temporary shelters to the transit location across the
border will be arranged
5. Cash assistance in 4 components will be given on the day of departure to include:
5.1. Transport grant to support travel from the Thai border to the return location in
Myanmar (THB 1,800 per person)
5.2. Reintegration grant (THB 1,800 per person)
5.3. Household support grant (THB 3,600 per adult and THB 1,800 per child)
5.4. Food support for 3 months (THB 1,10024 per person supported by World Food
Program)
This amount has increased to THB 2,100 (from 3 months to 6 months of support) as of the second return in
May 2018
24
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Once a refugee has volunteered to repatriate, the actual process of return is a
somewhat complex coordination between UNHCR, the Royal Thai Government (RTG), the
Thai Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the Government of Myanmar (see full booklet for
Process of Facilitated Voluntary Repatriation- 2016 in appendix). If return is requested after
the initial counseling and information sessions, each returning household must first sign a
Voluntary Repatriation Form (VRF) to confirm their voluntariness to return. Once this
document is signed, UNHCR sends a list of basic bio-data to both governments (such as
name, sex, DOB, and location returning to) to the Government of Myanmar for a “green
light”. The family or individual’s information will be shared with the RTG, UNHCR Myanmar
and the Government of Myanmar to check local conditions. UNHCR will be informed when
the “green light” (clearance) is received and the Government of Myanmar may issue a
travel document to help facilitate the return process at this time. Once the green light is
received, UNHCR will reconfirm with the family or individual of the voluntary decision to
return and set a departure date. Following this confirmation, UNHCR and the RTG will
inform all applicable partners such as Camp Committees or NGOs for preparations for
return. Prior to the day of departure every returning individual must visit the Voluntary
Repatriation Center to update their internal camp documents such as their VE registration
card and Household Registration Document (HHRD). They must also undergo a “fit to
travel” medical check by IOM, an overview on RTG immigration procedures, and collect
non-food items such as mosquito nets and sanitary kits for women. On the day of
departure, UNHCR issues 5 copies of the Voluntary Repatriation Form (VRF): 1 for the
refugee to travel with; 2 for UNHCR; 1 for IOM, and 1 for the RTG. IOM then takes a copy of
the VRF and provides the family or individual with the cash assistance package. The RTG
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also takes a copy of the VRF and confirms departure from the camp. After departure, each
individual is de-registered from the UNHCR-MOI database and effectively forfeits their
refugee status. For a visual summary of the facilitated voluntary repatriation process, refer
to the FVR flowchart found in the appendix.
In a review of all existing literature provided by UNHCR concerning the VRCs on the
Thai-Myanmar border, I noted that UNHCR continually stressed that return to Myanmar
was an individual decision and they would only support repatriation that was voluntary,
safe and dignified. Vivian Tan, the UNHCR spokesperson for the region at the time stated,
“There is no specific time frame for voluntary return, though we stand ready to facilitate it
as and when the refugees tell us they would like to go.” In October of 2016, the first
voluntary repatriation of 71 refugees was initiated from Nu Po and Tham Hin camps back
into Myanmar. Subsequently in May of 2018, 93 more refugees from the Mae La, Umpiem,
Nu Po, Ban Mae Nai Soi and Ban Don Yang refugee camps also voluntarily repatriated. Most
recently, 565 refugees who signed up for voluntary repatriation officially returned in
February of 2019. In total, these returns account for less than 1% of the current population
of refugees living along the Thai-Myanmar border. Although Myanmar has made drastic
changes over the last several years including a democratic election and a landmark national
ceasefire agreement, much more remains to be done in order to overcome the barriers that
have prevented return for the past three decades.
5.4 Barriers to Return
Several reasons emerged for opposing voluntary repatriation throughout the course
of this fieldwork, all of which were deeply intertwined with the various motivations
individuals had for fleeing in the first place. Many of the barriers identified by refugees I
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interviewed in Mae La were similar to those that had been widely circulated within the
greater Karen community beginning around 2012. Outlets such as Karen News, Burma
link, and the Karen Human Rights Group published interviews and articles that focused on
the instability in Myanmar, the lack of available land and resources in Karen State and a
general sense of unease with the Myanmar government.
In this way, a narrative of resistance developed within the community that
synthesized the most common and pressing concerns of many displaced Karen. The
construction of this overarching narrative was significant in that it allowed for ‘the
innovation of multiple small stories, or voices, while still preserving the possibility of a
stable community, making it possible to construe resistance as a positive, continuous,
recursive force of social reproduction’ (Myrsiades, 1993). At times I noted the inclination of
informants to default to resistance narratives when questioned about repatriation,
regardless of their personal experience. For example, some respondents who had been
born in the camp or relocated at a very young age would note a fear of the military as a
reason they would not return to Myanmar, even though they had never personally
encountered a soldier. This was by no means an attempt at being deceitful, but rather the
reproduction of a very real fear that had been passed along both culturally and
generationally.
In light of this, I found it helpful to make a distinction in my analysis between what I
came to call the ‘reported’ and ‘observed’ barriers to voluntary repatriation: ‘Reported’
meaning those barriers which were verbalized often and reproduced in the cultural
discourse, and ‘observed’ as the non-verbalized barriers identified through a more
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thorough observational analysis. Among the most reported reasons for opposing
repatriation among refugees in Mae La camp were:
1. Fear of the security situation in one’s home village and/or the presence of
Tatmadaw (Burmese military) (n=27)
2. Dispute over land rights or lack of available space for building a home and/or
farming (n=17)
3. Lack of economic livelihood opportunities in Burma (n= 16)
4. Distrust of Burmese government (n=14)
5. Lack of KNU involvement in repatriation planning (n=10)
6. Lack of educational or health resources in Burma (n=9)
All of the reported barriers spoke to conditions that would need to be met to ensure
sustainable reintegration, which UNHCR defines as, “a process which enables formerly
displaced people and other members of their community to enjoy a progressively greater
degree of physical, social, legal and material security” (UNHCR 2012). Through the
communication of these reported barriers, refugees in Mae La clearly refuted the pillars of
sustainable reintegration by focusing on specific areas of insecurity. For example, the
presence of the Burmese military creates physical insecurity whereas distrust in the
government or a lack of control from local leaders such as the KNU creates a social and
psychological insecurity. Further, lack of identity paperwork or the right to own land
breeds legal insecurity, while lack of economic resources or education causes material
insecurity. While the importance of these barriers and their potential solutions cannot be
overstated, their identification has been fairly widespread among academics and
practitioners (Lang, 2002; Brees, 2010; South, 2011; Moretti, 2015). My discussion of them
here is by no means groundbreaking and in fact mirrors much of the reporting that has
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summarized these insecurities for the last several years25. Rather, what I found to be more
useful was a careful analysis of the more obscure barriers that were preventing return
along the Thai-Myanmar border.
One of the first things that struck me as an impediment to return was the fact that
the population in Mae La camp was a mixture of long-time residents, people fleeing from
war or environmental disasters, as well as those who were clearly economic migrants or
others who would not meet the standards for international refugee protection. Thus simply
ending a civil war in Myanmar would not be enough motivation for many of the residents in
Mae La to return to their country. This mixed population is related to the fact that the push
factors from Myanmar have shifted somewhat over time and many refugees who
experienced violence first-hand no longer reside in the camps, having already resettled to a
third country. Conversely, some refugees who came to the camps more recently seeking
economic or educational opportunities are now unable to return due to increased
militarization or fighting in their home region. For example, the recent deployment of
Tatmadaw troops in Karen State’s Papun district over the rebuilding of a road, resulted in
fighting between the military and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), which
displaced some 2,000 locals.
From a historical perspective, at the height of the refugee influx to Thailand in 2005,
the refugee population living within the camps on the Thai-Myanmar border peaked at
approximately 150,000 people (TBC, 2018). That year also marked the beginning of several
third country resettlement programs to countries such as the United States, Australia and
25

For a recent example, see Chandran’s January 2019 article in Reuters: Too scared to return home, Myanmar
refugees in Thai camps face an uncertain future
http://news.trust.org//item/20190114005252-xqkkj/
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Canada. A significant number of refugees were resettled by UNHCR, which reported
107,909 departures between 2005 and2018. However, as of October 2018, the total
verified refugee population remained at 97,395. The refugee camps seemed to be filling up
almost as fast as they were being emptied by resettlement. These new arrivals have to
some degree altered the makeup of the camp in regards to motivations for leaving
Myanmar. As explained to me by Saw Eh Paw, a camp leader and refugee who had lived in
Mae La for nearly 20 years:
“The way I see it there are really three categories of people coming here as
refugees. First are those people really affected by civil war, like me, and some
other Karen people living in Karen territory. I say that because they (the
Karen) are brutally persecuted and tortured by the Burmese military, its like
genocide. Everywhere there is land relocation, forced labor and portering. So
it is very dangerous to live in Karen state. That’s the first group, the ones very
affected by the civil war that takes place in their territory so they cannot live
on their land anymore. Their land was taken away by the government, who
took everything away and destroyed it. The second group, are like farmers or
people with no job and no economic security. The economy in Burma is not
good and there is no education, so most of the parents are coming to refugee
camp looking for a better life, especially for the parents looking for education
for their children. The third one is people just purely looking for a chance or
an opportunity. Or they think ‘oh if I come to a refugee camp I can get
opportunity to go to the 3rd country’, that’s how they think. There are so
many groups of people who come like that. That’s why the first group of the
refugees, they went to resettle in third country, but the newcomers, keep on
coming, based on the 3 reasons. “
The distinctions described by Saw Eh Paw as to who is a refugee, economic migrant or
purely an opportunist were characterizations I often heard echoed by both NGO staff and
other refugees in the region. These informal assessments as to who was or was not an
actual “refugee”, as defined by the UN’s definition26, seemed to indicate the supposed level
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The primary and universal definition of a refugee that applies to states is contained in Article 1(A)(2) of
the 1951 Convention, as amended by its 1967 Protocol, defining a refugee as someone who: "owing to wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
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of deservingness for an individual to receive international protection. It also precluded
their ability to resettle to a third country.
The confusion surrounding official status can be traced back to the refusal of the
Thai government to allow UNHCR to conduct standard refugee status determination (RSD)
after January of 2004. Prior to 2004, the camp population was registered and considered
similar to a typical prima facie status. Instead, the Thais introduced a camp-based
government-led procedure to assess the status of “persons fleeing fighting” and “persons
fleeing political persecution” through the provision of Provincial Admission Boards (PABs).
The PABs ultimately failed at creating a comprehensive screening mechanism and in 2005,
UNHCR were allowed to resume registration, but only to register people who had already
entered the camps prior to 2005. In the subsequent years, the government has failed to
screen or register the majority of new arrivals, which the TBC (2018) estimates have left
over a third of camp residents in a precarious legal state. While UNHCR and the RTG have
been able to record individuals and families as residents of the camp, they have generally
not granted the type of refugee status that would permit a third country resettlement or
guarantee international protection.
At this point, it would be both difficult and time consuming to determine with
complete certainty, which camp residents fit the legal definition of a refugee. Rather, lines
have become blurred, circumstances have changed and individual motivations for leaving
Myanmar have varied considerably from one person to the next. Thus the camp population
in Mae La is a mixture of people fleeing persecution, looking for work, pursuing educational
opportunities or simply seeking a better life, none of which are mutually exclusive.
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside
the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”
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An outcome of the camp’s blended population is that creating a consensus among
camp residents regarding the terms under which people would return to Myanmar
becomes increasingly complex. It also creates a situation in which the conditions of return
stipulated by camp representatives may exceed the standard of protections historically
offered for refugees who voluntarily repatriate. For example, the position paper released
by KSNG in June of 2017 contained 19 points to address before an agreement to repatriate
could be made. However, the 19 points covered a broad range of topics, not all of which are
internationally accepted as compulsory actions to be undertaken by the state in order to
ensure refugee protection in return. For instance, the requirement that ‘refugee students
have the right to continue their further studies in Thai universities as well as in Asia and all
over the world’ (table 4, section 2.1) is presented in a way that is untenable. Certainly the
denial of a student visa does not justify refugee protection, thus its inclusion, however well
meaning, may actually impede negotiations. In this way, some of the most difficult barriers
to overcome for a mixed population have to do with untangling what constitutes a human
rights violation versus what may just be an unfavorable or unfair reality of life in Myanmar.
In the absence of violence, racism, discrimination and other structural inequalities
do not typically justify international interventions or support claims of asylum. Nor does a
lack of economic or educational opportunities in one’s home country warrant refugee
status protection. Thus if refugees won’t voluntarily repatriate unless stipulations are met
concerning items not directly related to a well-founded fear of persecution, and Myanmar
refuses to implement those demands, a stalemate may continue to define life on the border.
As one woman explained to me during an interview, “I can’t go back to Burma because my
husband died and now there is nothing for us there. We don’t have any land or a home, so
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we must stay here so we can live.” Unfortunately, what may eventually break the impasse is
known as the “fundamental change of circumstances” clause of the UN Convention. The
Refugee Convention states that refugee status may end in situations where “the
circumstances in connection with which [a person] has been recognized as a refugee have
ceased to exist”, in which case the refugee could be repatriated to their country without
their consent. What complicates this matter significantly is the lack of formal refugee status
determination for residents in Mae La as well as Thailand’s policy of deporting illegal
migrants. However, if the situation in Myanmar in regards to the treatment of the Rohingya
continues to deteriorate, it is unlikely the UN would deem Myanmar as having met the
standards of a “fundamental change of circumstances” to justify repatriation on the
Southeastern border. Nevertheless, the presence of a mixed population of refugees and
migrants in Mae La creates a barrier in terms of overreach regarding conditions of return.
The second obstacle to repatriation I observed was the lack of a mechanism for
sustained and accurate information reporting for the residents of Mae La. The most
common answer I received when asking where one acquired information, was that they
heard news or rumors from a friend or relative. As one mother recalled, “Sometimes my
son will tell me what he heard on facebook or at school. But I know what is going on here
because my neighbor speaks to the camp leader.” However, there was a distinct lack of
engagement with the local or international news which created a silo effect on the
population, notwithstanding their unfettered access to the internet. To many residents in
Mae La, Facebook was the internet, and its ability to spread inaccurate information quickly
worked against more formal information campaigns from the government or international
organizations. Without a clear picture of all available facts concerning the evolving peace
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process in Myanmar, Thailand’s stance on legalizing migrant workers or the status of
humanitarian funding for the camps, people relied heavily on their social networks to form
opinions concerning repatriation. More often than not, the social networks amongst the
Karen perpetuated the reported barriers to repatriation and rarely offered any nuanced
debate surrounding negotiations, the reasons why funding was decreasing or how the
community might leverage existing laws or policies to achieve common goals. Rather,
rallying the population around the common themes of persecution and deservingness of
humanitarian aid overshadowed any attempts at discourses aimed at practical solutions. In
one of the most surprising conversations I had in Mae La, a refugee in her late twenties told
me, “I remember being so surprised that we weren’t the only refugees in the world. A
Cambodian woman came to speak to us once at the school about her experience as a
refugee, and I had never heard of these things before.” Or in another conversation with a
refugee in his mid-twenties, I was taken aback at his complete lack of awareness
concerning the recent crisis in Syria, the influx of refugees in the Middle East and Europe
and its effect on international humanitarian funding. Although he had access to the internet
via smartphone, this news had never breached his silo of the camp. Subsequently, he had
no basis to understand why international funding had been decreasing in Southeast Asia: “I
don’t know why they have forgotten about us. I think they just don’t care about us Karen
people anymore and don’t want to give us anymore money.”
Closely related to this reliance on social networks to inform decision-making was
the third barrier I observed which was as an adoption of resistance narratives as a
component of cultural and social identity. With a lack of the information required to form
an independent opinion, people often align with the interests and perspectives of social
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groups they identify with. In early social identity theory, it is argued that any perceived lack
of conformity to group norms is seen as a threat to the legitimacy of the group (Hogg and
Turner, 1987). In this manner, not only is participation in a resistance narrative key to
maintaining ones social identity as a Karen refugee in exile, but openly accepting
repatriation may be seen as delegitimizing the greater effort of the Karen community to
advocate for a safe and dignified return. Additionally, in chapter four I discussed how the
introduction of Christianity to the Karen impacted cultural narratives of exile and
persecution (see pages 93-94 in relation to descriptions of the Karen as Israelites),
sometimes going as far as linking the Karen fate to refugeehood. In this way, voluntarily
repatriating would also disrupt a key component of one’s cultural identity as being
oppressed. In the confines of Mae La camp, these cultural identities of oppression and
persecution were constructed and made visible in such a permanent way that their
dismantling would require the creation of an entirely new identity.
The final barrier to repatriation I observed was simply that the experience of living
in a protracted refugee situation informed people’s perception on the reality of the camp
actually closing. As one man in his late fifties explained, “Every couple years we hear this
word ‘repatriation’ and they say that Thailand will close the camps. But it never happens.
So I don’t pay much attention to these things.” Indeed, in the year since my fieldwork
concluded, the situation in Myanmar has declined and the optimism has faded from the
announcements concerning UNHCR’s voluntary repatriation program. While funding
continues to decrease, it is becoming clearer that a combined approach to implementing
durable solutions must be undertaken.
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5.5 Conclusion – An Impossible Choice
Colson (2003) wrote that in the last several decades anthropologists have created
an ethnographic base large enough that we ought to be able to generalize about likely
consequences of forced uprooting and resettlement, while recognizing that human beings
are creative and can come up with surprising, never before imagined, solutions. And indeed
there is much literature that deals with many of the challenges faced by the Karen and the
subsequent consequences for their persecution and protracted situation in exile.
Furthermore, over the past three decades myriad solutions and their various components
have been discussed ad nauseam by international actors, western academics and wellmeaning policy analysts who possess no actual framework for implementation. Rather the
stasis felt by the refugees trapped in Mae La is mirrored by the political inertia that
precludes its solution. But this motionlessness is confined within the barbed wire fences of
the camp while the rapidly changing world outside has begun to exert pressure on its
existence. Many Karen are facing a future where there is not enough international funding
to support their survival in camp but there is also not enough international pressure to
enact the changes needed in Myanmar for a safe return. Further, the challenges involved in
advocating for legal status in Thailand are riddled with the bureaucratic and geo-political
landmines that could derail future positive economic outcomes in the borderlands. The
solutions will ultimately have to come from those who have been disenfranchised and their
willingness to negotiate, leverage and compromise on a way forward. A passive voice will
need to be replaced with an active one and the long process of redefining the story of the
Karen must begin.
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Chapter 6
BEYOND DURABLE SOLUTIONS: Rethinking Repatriation

"We feel at home on our land, and we want to go back. But based on the
current situation, it is not possible. It is not easy, we can't just go back to our
enemy and surrender ourselves, surrender our everything. If we go back, there
will be fighting. And if we win, we can reoccupy our land. But there are only 2
options, win or lose" ~ Naw Hser Bo, 27

6.1 Introduction
The goal of refugee protection is quite simply to ensure the human rights of
individuals are met when their state has failed them in this most basic of responsibilities.
Thus, the notion of returning to one’s country of origin after the bond between citizen and
state has been so thoroughly broken is fraught with years of social, emotional and political
turmoil. Hannah Arendt (1973) notably questioned in her reflections on totalitarianism
how the universal rights of man could ever truly be upheld within the sovereignty of
individual nation states. Those who work to resolve protracted refugee situations still
struggle with this question as ensuring adequate protection in return is often impossible
without legal mechanisms of enforcement. Thus the impetus to find new or alternative
solutions for refugees who have spent decades in exile is growing as long-term
encampment becomes more untenable.
In the previous chapter, UNHCR’s three primary durable solutions were discussed in
relation to the protracted refugee situation along the Thai-Myanmar border (see pg. 105141

116). This chapter will offer a discussion of how durable solutions have evolved in
response to protracted refugee situations as well as an examination of what has recently
been termed the ‘fourth durable solution’. Additionally, this chapter will offer a brief
commentary on the rise of strategies that seek to promote self-reliance prior to return and
how they may aid sustainable forms of repatriation. Finally, special consideration is paid to
the notable emergence of a ‘model village’ to house returning refugees and IDPs in
Myanmar in relation to its efficacy as a durable solution.

6.2 Moving Beyond Three Durable Solutions
In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the exodus of hundreds of thousands of
Indochinese refugees and Vietnamese “boat people” inundated the Southeast Asian
countries of British Hong Kong, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore and
Thailand. As a result, in July of 1979, the United Nations convened an international
conference in Geneva confirming that "a grave crisis exists in Southeast Asia for hundreds
of thousands of refugees"27. The outcome of the conference was an agreement that
receiving countries would continue to provide temporary asylum, while Western countries
would accelerate resettlement initiatives and Vietnam would move to a system of orderly
departures rather than the ad hoc departures of “boat people”. However, by the late 1980’s,
North America, Australia and Europe grew reluctant to maintain resettlement agreements
and there was substantial pressure from the countries of first asylum to stop the flow of
refugees. As such, in 1989 UNHCR enacted what is known as the Comprehensive Plan of
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Quote attributed to High Commissioner Poul Hartling via UNHCR, ‘Note by the High Commissioner for the
Meeting on Refugees and Displaced Persons in Southeast Asia’, 9 July 1979
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Action for Indochinese Refugees (CPA), which effectively marked one of the first attempts
at offering a multi-dimensional approach to solving a protracted refugee crisis.
The CPA endeavored to reaffirm a commitment to the principle of first asylum,
ensure the protection of refugees, and stop the outflow of persons leaving for reasons
unrelated to the UN refugee definition. Notably, it also recognized that an important
component for a comprehensive approach would be to include the active involvement of
the country of origin (the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in this case) in order to address the
root causes of refugee movements (Bronee, 1993). The CPA effectively halted prima facie
refugee status for new arrivals, and instead offered a more thorough refugee status
determination procedure that was enacted in conjunction with the repatriation of those
deemed unqualified for international protection. The CPA was mostly seen as a success at
the time. During the closing ceremony for Malaysia’s last refugee camp in 1996, the head of
the UNHCR steering committee remarked:
“There are few happy moments in the career of a refugee official, and this is
one of them. The CPA has been a model for multilateral cooperation, built on
the principles of international solidarity, burden-sharing and proper
acceptance of responsibilities. Its purposes were to end the ongoing tragedy
on the high seas and to preserve asylum while reducing incentives for further
mass outflow. It has been successful.” (Sergio de Mello, 1996)
The CPA was not without criticism however, and some suspected the screening procedures
did not offer the benefit of the doubt to asylum seekers, as was the standard in customary
international law. Aside from this, the consensus has generally been that the CPA is an
example of how “interlocking commitments to asylum, resettlement and repatriation can
promote regional cooperation in response to protracted refugee crises” (Robinson,
2004:319). In subsequent years, many of the policy documents released by UNHCR
concerning protracted refugee situations have recommended an approach that blends the
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three classic durable solutions (voluntary repatriation, local integration in the country of
asylum, and resettlement in a third country). More recently, they have also adopted a more
comprehensive approach titled “Complimentary Pathways”, which looks for solutions
through different pathways such as those ‘used to facilitate international mobility for
education, work and family reunion’ (UNHCR, 2016).
In spite of the general recognition of the efficacy of a blended approach, most
solutions offered in regards to the protracted refugee situation along the Thai-Myanmar
border still revolve around efforts towards voluntary repatriation. This is due in part to the
termination of large-scale resettlement programs coupled with a low level of confidence in
ever achieving significant rates of local integration in Thailand. Additionally, international
humanitarian funding has slowly been shifting from the border into development projects
inside Myanmar, further strengthening the message that return is the preferred outcome
for international stakeholders.

6.3 Labor Migration as the Fourth Durable Solution
“If the Thai government said, those who have stayed here more than 15 years,
they are qualified to remain and stay in Thailand. If they opened up this
opportunity, maybe 75% will remain. That’s the truth.”
~ Moo Beh, 39

The possibility of incorporating labor migration as an official component to
voluntary repatriation programs started to gain traction during the repatriation of Afghan
refugees from Pakistan and Iran in 2002 through 2009. The Afghan repatriation was
significant in this regard as it represented refugees who were returning to a fragile country
that was still emerging from a long-term conflict. Specifically, the remittances provided by
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Afghan refugees who were also working as labor migrants in Pakistan and Iran created ‘an
important source of economic capital for reconstruction, reducing dependency on
international aid and contributing to the state's reconstruction’ (UNHCR, 2003a; Monsutti,
2006; Tennant, 2008; Long 2009:14). In another example, Long (2009) has pointed out that
practices of labor migration in fragile states such as Somalia have played a ‘crucial role in
sustaining economic survival in major segments of the country', with one-third of families
receiving remittances estimated to bring in up to a billion dollars a year (as cited in Fagen
2006:15).
However, the concept of labor migration has not always been a natural fit for
resolving protracted refugee situations. This is largely due to the vehement assertion by
both practitioners and academics of forced migration, that refugees and migrants are two
distinct categories of people. A salient example of this can be seen in the comments made
by Erika Feller, the Director of the Department of International Protection at UNHCR in
2005, when she cautioned that it could be “dangerous and detrimental to refugee
protection, to confuse the two groups, terminologically or otherwise”(Feller, 2005:27). The
inclination to differentiate the two groups lies in the legal protections afforded only to the
official categorization of ‘refugee’, namely in the principle of non-refoulement28. In this
way, it has been argued that while regular migrant workers are usually expected to return
to their country of origin, refugees may still be at risk and should not be expected to return
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The principle of non-refoulement constitutes the cornerstone of international refugee protection. It is
enshrined in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, which is also binding on States Party to the 1967 Protocol.
Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention provides:
“No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of
territories where his [or her] life or freedom would be threatened on account of his [or her] race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”
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should their work come to an end (Moretti, 2015). Long (2013) provides an excellent
analysis and historical contextualization of the separation between ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’
that lends itself to the current discussion of refugee labor migration. She notes that
refugees were essentially separated from migrants in the 1950’s when they were provided
with an exceptional right to cross borders and claim asylum. However, she argues that in
creating a special route for admission deliberately set apart from migration, “the
humanitarian discourse that protects refugees from harm actually prevents refugees from
finding durable solutions, which depend upon securing an economic livelihood and not just
receiving humanitarian assistance” (pg.4-5). Thus the housing of refugees as a separate
population and their exclusion from the labor market exacerbates the protractedness of
refugee situations.
By 2007, UNHCR was actively discussing the benefits of regularization of status in
one’s country of asylum, noting that people could develop skill sets, save money and
provide support to families and communities back home by means of remittance transfers.
They had also amended their formal position on labor migration as an effective compliment
to voluntary repatriation, noting in their 10-Point Action Plan on Mixed Migration and
Refugee Protection that “beyond the classic durable solutions, legal migration opportunities
may open up a complementary avenue for some refugees” (Para. 7). Additionally, UNHCR
recognized that when refugees engaged in the labor market abroad, they effectively
reduced the competition for jobs and other scarce resources in their country of origin,
indirectly contributing to the peace-building process. These changes in policy have come to
represent a more progressive approach towards solving protracted refugee situations and
have been mostly positive for the outlook on the Thai-Myanmar border. However, in order
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for refugee policy involving labor migration to succeed, the receiving country must be
amenable to altering their foreign labor laws to allow for forced migrants. This has been
difficult to achieve across the board, especially in relation to requiring identification and
citizenship documents from a labor migrant’s home country, something most refugees are
unable or unwilling to obtain.
In Thailand alone, there have been seven regularization campaigns organized for
labor migrants from Laos, Cambodia, or Myanmar between 2004 and 2018 (Moretti, 2015;
CSEAS, 2018). This has resulted in the registration of 2.4 million migrant workers and
incentivized employers to continue the effort. However, the trend towards the increased
criminalization of irregular migrants in Thailand coupled with a policy that offers little to
no path for stateless refugees to register is highly problematic. Additionally, the ability of
the government to require that foreign workers live in fixed areas of the country creates a
situation ripe for exploitation not dissimilar to the current context of illegal workers
residing in camps or settlements.
In order for a “fourth solution” to offer a plausible resolution to the protracted
refugee situation along the Thai-Myanmar border, three primary areas would need to be
addressed. First, Thailand must amend its migration law, specifically the Alien Employment
Act B.E. 25512 (AEA 2008), in relation to Nationality Verification (NV) requirements for the
registration of labor migrants. Currently, the country of origin is obliged to process
nationality verification and issue formal identification such as passports or other
documents to irregular migrants. To accommodate those individuals unable to obtain
nationality verification, such as stateless refugees, Thailand would need to accept UNHCR
identity documents (or something similar) for registration in lieu of official documents
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from Myanmar. Secondly, Thailand has frequently raised concerns that a less burdensome
registration policy for irregular migrants, such as one that allows exceptions for national
identity verification, would create an overwhelming pull factor for new labor migrants into
specific regions. In order to allay these fears, stricter refugee status determination
procedure should be implemented by either the Thai Provincial Admissions Boards (PABs)
or UNHCR that guarantees the validity of identification documents for refugees. Thirdly,
Thailand must address the barriers migrant workers face in accessing social protection
benefits to reduce further exploitation. Labor migration cannot be an effective strategy for
resolving the protracted refugee crisis along the border if there are still substantial gaps in
protections for workers. Human trafficking, low wages, and forced labor continue to be
problems for many industries in Thailand including both the fishing and agricultural
sectors. This area does appear to be progressing however; in November of 2017, both
Prime Ministers from Thailand and Myanmar signed the ASEAN Consensus on the
Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers and agreed to abide by its
regulations. This is indeed a hopeful development and potential sign of a more orderly and
effective transnational migration agreement for Thailand and Myanmar.
6.4 Self-Reliance Pending Return
The concept of self-reliance or ‘standing on ones own two feet’ was a topic that came
up time and again in my conversations with Karen living inside Mae La camp. It was an
issue that was deeply linked to notions of pride, self-worth and ancestral history. I
frequently heard stories celebrating the resourcefulness of the Karen, often highlighting the
parents or grandparents who had crossed mountains or survived in jungles for months or
years on end. There were also first hand accounts of living through vicious fires and
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devastating cyclones, civil wars and the myriad internal struggles that come with them all.
Embedded within each of those stories was a resoluteness of character and the possibility
to overcome the deep unfairness that had colored many pages of the past. When
conversations drifted to current circumstances, there was a noted desire to transcend what
was perceived as the paternalistic structure currently governing their lives. “We are all
treated like children here, having to ask permission for everything” one young woman
remarked to me while holding her own child in the same moment. In another conversation,
the inclination towards self-reliance was clear. “I think Thailand might let us stay here,
even if there was no more funding. We already have a lot of shops and some people have
been able to save up a lot of money. We could stay here on our own”. In this way,
incorporating strategies of self-reliance into the management of a protracted refugee
situation are not only natural, but pragmatic as well.
In 2003, Jeff Crisp coined the term of ‘self-reliance pending return’ in a UNHCR
policy paper aimed at solving the protracted refugee situations unfolding in Africa at the
time. Under a section themed ‘Exploring alternative solutions’, Crisp argued that:
“The notion of ‘self-reliance pending return’ has advantages for all of the
stakeholders in a protracted refugee situation. It would improve the quality
of life for refugees, giving them a new degree of dignity and security. It would
enable refugees to make a contribution to the economy of the host country
and thereby make their presence a boon, rather than a burden, to the local
population. And it would enable UNHCR, its donors and implementing
partners to withdraw from costly and complicated ‘care-and-maintenance’
programmes, which only enable refugees to survive at the level of basic
subsistence.” (p.26)
While mostly unclear on the specifics of what such a policy to promote self-reliance would
actually look like, the argument generally centered on the restoration of the rights and
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security to which refugees are entitled under international law29. Additionally, promoting
self-reliance would mean providing access to education, work or income-generating
activities, start-up funding and other forms of financial capital as well as a long-term
commitment from host countries. The problem however, is that many refugee-hosting
countries currently do not support such initiatives, due in part to the fear that refugees
might become too comfortable, and thus never leave. In Crisp’s initial plea for policies
aimed at self-reliance, he pointed to the case of Ukwimi camp for Mozambican refugees in
Zambia. In this instance, research was able to show (Lin, 2001) that when refugees were
able to attain a high degree of self-reliance in the camp, they returned to their own country
almost immediately, once it became safe to do so. Thus the argument can be made that
“refugees who have led a productive life in exile, received an education, developed practical
skills, and accumulated some resources may actually be better prepared and equipped to
go home and contribute to the reconstruction of their country than those who have
languished in camps for years, surviving on minimal levels of humanitarian assistance”
(Crisp:2003:26).
Unfortunately it has taken more than a decade for the argument of self-reliance to
take root in refugee policy and we are just now beginning to see examples in practice. One
such example is that of Kenya’s Kalobeyei settlement. Kenya, a country that has hosted
refugees from Somalia and South Sudan since the early 1990’s, is now leading the way in
reconceptualizing how to resolve protracted refugee situations. The Kalobeyei settlement
was essentially created from scratch in 2015 through a joint endeavor of UNHCR and

29

For a comprehensive overview of these rights, see the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
Agenda for Protection, October 2003, Third edition, available at:
https://www.refworld.org/docid/4714a1bf2.html
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Kenya’s Turkana County Government with the goal of supporting refugee self-reliance and
greater refugee-host interaction. The settlement was designed like a city rather than a
refugee camp, which meant including things like a market and shared public services for
refugees and the indigenous Turkana hosts. Additionally, levels of food security were
raised as the incorporation of a form of cash assistance, called Bamba Chakula (“get your
food” in Swahili) and allocated plots of land for subsistence agriculture were implemented
(Betts and Collier, 2018). In December of 2018, in collaboration with the World Bank,
UNHCR has also developed the Kalobeyei Integrated Social and Economic Development
Programme (KISEDP), which they describe as a multi-agency collaboration to develop the
local economy and service delivery at Kalobeyei. The significance of this approach cannot
be overstated and its potential to affect refugee policy in other regions is substantial. As
described by UNHCR:
“This represents a major paradigm shift. The overall objective of this
initiative is to re-orient the refugee assistance program to contribute to
improvement of the socio-economic conditions of the refugees and host
communities, better prepare the host community to take advantage of
emerging economic opportunities in upcoming extraction and potential
irrigation-fed agriculture and reduce over-dependence on humanitarian aid
and support the refugees to achieve durable solutions.” (in Kalobeyei
Strategic Overview, 2018)
Research is ongoing into the efficacy of the Kalobeyei model and it may be several years
before its success or failure as a durable solution can be measured. However, Kalobeyei’s
mere existence speaks to the emerging will of both host governments and international
humanitarian agencies to try new approaches for old problems. This in itself is a hopeful
development for those who have been wedged within the same set of problems for many
years on the Thai-Myanmar border.
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6.5 The Case of Lay Kay Kaw
In early 2011, Thein Sein, Myanmar’s first non-interim civilian president in 49 years
began to launch the peace process that would eventually lead to the historic (although now
somewhat beleaguered) Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement of 2015. As part of this initiative,
President Thein Sein released a new "Roadmap for Peace" which heavily pushed the
concept of peace through development. The reception was mixed as many of the armed
ethnic groups, including the armed wing of the KNU, were extremely skeptical of
development projects. Over the past several decades, projects sold as “development” were
seen as actually just ways in which the Burmese military executed land grabs and
maintained control over ethnic regions. KNU vice-chair Naw Zipporah Sein summed up this
position when she was quoted in July of 2011 as saying to Karen News, "the new Burma
military government uses development as a weapon to destroy and wipe out the resistance
groups and to persuade ethnic groups to forget about their struggle." In spite of this,
whispers of a curious new development project began to surface and within 4 years, the
first tidy rows of concrete homes began to appear in Southeastern Myanmar.
Lay Kay Kaw, as the new settlement came to be called, was initially billed as a
‘model village’ to accommodate internally displaced Karen and refugees returning to Karen
State. The project began with the support of the Nippon Foundation, a privately held
Japanese non-profit, with an interesting history of its own. The Foundation’s mission is to
direct Japanese motorboat racing revenue into philanthropic work, which it has
successfully done for almost six decades. Among an impressive portfolio of humanitarian
endeavors ranging from eradicating leprosy to traffic safety education, the Nippon
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Foundation worked in the early 1990’s to build model retirement homes for the elderly in
Japan. Thirty years later they found themselves building model villages in Myanmar in
addition to hundreds of schools across Myanmar and Cambodia.
The existence of the project at all is something of a marvel, as an agreement had to
first be reached between the former warring factions of the Tatmadaw and the KNU as well
as the central government of Myanmar. This detail was not lost on many Karen, and the
KNU chairman himself remarked at the project launch "We have fought, we have killed
each other. We have seen them burn our houses and take our land ... So it is very difficult
for us to trust the Burmese." Still, a ‘water under the bridge’ attitude seemed to prevail and
the project, which promised to build 1,250 houses in 24 project sites, along with wells,
health clinics and schools, officially got the green light.
In June of 2013, the economic committee of the KNU formed the Thoolei Company
Ltd, and was subsequently awarded a contract to implement the Lay Kay Kaw New Town
project in June of 2014. The total project, located nine miles south of the border town of
Myawaddy, was spread out over a five-year development period with 10 million dollars in
funding. Oversight was given to the newly formed Lay Kay Kaw rehabilitation committee
and as of today, approximately 600 homes have been built with 3,200 IDPs, former
refugees and family members of the KNU residing in the settlement.
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Photo 2 -Lay Kay Kaw Village, Kawkareik Township, Southeastern Myanmar;
Source: Pattarapong Chatpattarasill, Bangkok Post, April 2017

Photo 3 -An overview of Lay Kay Kaw as seen from footage shot by drone.
Source: Steve Sanford, VOA, November, 2018
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Results so far have been mixed as water shortages, a lack of electricity and little to
no job prospects have created tension among the residents. Additionally, the mostly barren
landscape that Lay Kay Kaw was built on holds little promise for the type of long-term
sustainable agriculture that would be needed to support the entire population. However,
discussions involving improvements in 2019 such as the installation of solar energy and
the construction of a new water pond are currently underway. The Nippon Foundation has
also begun to implement several “make-work” projects at Lay Kay Kaw, including an
attempted agricultural center and other job training programs.
Perhaps the real strength of Lay Kay Kaw though is in its potential to stabilize the
region. A sustained partnership between former enemies would go a long way toward
rebuilding trust amongst the Karen. Bradley (2013) and Long (2013) have both argued that
for repatriation to be successful, the bond between refugee and the state must be restored.
Hargrave (2014) has reasoned that trust is the primary driver for restoring this bond, and
that repatriation policy and related preparedness and integration efforts should be viewed
through a “trust-based lens”. This entails opportunities for refugees to participate in their
own repatriation planning and being granted control of governance over their communities
once returned. In this way, a KNU managed Lay Kay Kaw can potentially facilitate the sort
of trust building between the KNU and the Tatmadaw that will be necessary to maintain the
peace process. While it is clear that a great deal of work remains to be done, how the Lay
Kay Kaw experiment unfolds will offer a unique insight into how matters of place-making,
self-governance and reconciliation intersect with voluntary repatriation.
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6.6 Conclusion
Far removed from the breathless coverage of an emergent refugee crisis, sit those
who have waited in protracted refugee situations for years and sometimes decades of their
lives. Fading in and out of the public discourse with sporadic headlines urging readers to
remember the victims of a forgotten civil war, they bide their time and contemplate the
future. It’s within these lengthy periods of time that return is both conceptualized and
reimagined by those who were forced to flee, and ultimately must come to terms with what
living a life in exile means. Often the problems that led to their flight are complex in ways
that preclude a tidy resolution by way of a packaged “durable solution”. Rather, resolution
is messy and the realities of being stateless in a foreign country force many to rethink what
repatriation actually means.
Repatriation in itself is an abstract concept, one of political ideology that promises
to reunite the citizen with the state that betrayed them. In practice, simply returning to
one’s country of birth does nothing to “repatriate” the individual to a homeland that is
often vastly different than the one they left. As Hammond described, “Many returnees…do
not see the object of repatriation as the ‘rebuilding’ or ‘reconstruction’ of their lives.
Likewise, they often do not aspire to reclothe themselves in the culture of the past or to
rejoin the community that they left” (1999:235). Rather for many refugees who have forged
new ties in their country of asylum or resettled to third countries, ideas of what constitutes
a homeland have become linked to the places that offer a sense of belonging. Nothing so
clearly illustrated this multidimensional sense of home as the description given to me by a
young woman who had recently returned to visit Mae La camp after spending twelve years
in Canada:
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“I do feel like Mae La camp is my home. But I was born in Burma, although I
didn’t live there for a long time, only 7 or 8 years, I felt like that is my home
too. But I haven’t been back. So yes, Mae La camp is home but we have no
legal papers. So becoming a Canadian was my first citizenship ever. Because I
am now a Canadian, I feel like Canada is also my home.”
Thus, repatriation is as much about recreating a bond between a citizen and the state as it
is about creating a sense of belonging and social inclusion. As Edward Said argued, “As any
displaced and dispossessed person can testify, there is no such thing as a genuine,
uncomplicated return to one’s home” (Said 1999, as cited in Oxfeld and Long 2004:15). In
this way, for repatriation to truly work as a resolution for a protracted refugee situation,
multiple avenues of return have to exist. Avenues not only created in linear trajectories
towards the homeland, but also those paths that may weave around or join up with other
routes. We have started to see some of these alternative approaches emerge, and indeed
models such as Kenya’s Kalobeyei settlement offer glimpses of what a smarter more
dignified methodology might entail. Additionally, rethinking the role of labor migration in
the plight of the stateless may have substantial implications for not only eradicating the
confinement of refugee camps, but also for demonstrating how neighboring countries can
help rebuild and lift up marginalized communities. For the Karen in Mae La camp, the road
to repatriation must offer not only reconciliation, but also recognition of what they have
lost. The restoration of rights must include a way to regain control of ancestral lands as
well as opportunities to become self-sufficient, which also means the right to choose where
to live and work. For many, true freedom is born in self-reliance and sustained return will
be impossible without efforts that encourage it.
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSIONS: Protracted Sanctuary

7.1 Introduction

It was during my third month living inside Mae La when Khu Htoo and I arranged to
visit the small care villa set up in camp that assisted the survivors of landmine accidents.
On a sweltering August afternoon we made our way over to the open-air building that
operated as a dormitory for those who were disabled and had no means of family support.
The care villa was situated atop a small hill, with open doors revealing a simple concrete
floor and a row of beds on each side. A faded blue sign greeted us, which hung in front of
two lines of laundry that neatly flanked the path between the beds. We were there to
interview Saw Ehmoo, a 27-year-old former KNLA soldier who had lost his sight and both
hands in a landmine accident 8 years prior. The main room was quiet apart from the
normal sounds drifting in from camp and the soft whirring of a small plastic fan in the
corner.
We greeted Saw Ehmoo and moved into the open space at the front of the building
where we proceeded to talk for the next hour and a half. As Saw Ehmoo told his story I
noted the quiet distinctions he made between ‘before’ and ‘after’ the accident that had so
profoundly changed his life. He spoke about his time as a soldier with the KNLA and how it
was the KNU that had arranged his transport to Mae La after the accident, noting it was the
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only place he could receive care. He explained that with little to do over the past several
years he had become an avid radio listener of the BBC world service, picking up both Thai
and Burmese broadcasts along the border. The inflection in his voice changed when he
began to speak about cross-border politics or the government in Myanmar, becoming
louder and more confident in tone. He offered a nuanced view on the efficacy of the ongoing National Ceasefire Agreement, lamenting the fact that the military still retained 25
percent of seats in parliament, effectively making it impossible to amend the constitution
without their support. Speaking on the topic of reconciliation he argued, “For the peace
process to work, the military, not just the government, needs to meet with the ethnic
groups. It was the military that came to our villages and burned our homes and killed our
families. They need to show us that they want peace. It means nothing if only the
government does this”. His comments spoke to a recognition of the importance of holding
people accountable in some way for their actions in order for a nation to heal. They
reminded me of the Indonesian anti-communist purge of 1965-1966, when those who
committed genocide remained in power, while living side by side with the families of those
they murdered. In situations such as those, peace becomes superficial until there is an
acknowledgment of what others have lost. Or as in the case of post-apartheid South Africa,
when the first Truth and Reconciliation Commission allowed a country to bear witness to
the human rights abuses perpetuated over four decades.
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Photo 4 – Care Villa for Landmine Survivors, Mae La Refugee Camp, Thailand
(Source: Carrie Perkins, 2017)

It struck me during this time how valuable Saw Ehmoo’s contribution to the peace process
negotiations in Myanmar would be. Although still a young man, he had now spent years
thinking deeply about the conflict--about what he had lost personally, but also what the
Karen had lost and how they might regain it. To me it was quite clear what Myanmar had
lost as I listened to Saw Ehmoo speak. They had lost an entire generation whose potential
had languished inside refugee camps instead of thriving in universities and cities and
communities. When I inquired about the availability of prosthetic limbs to perhaps help
regain any functionality, Saw Ehmoo noted that because of his blindness it had not been
attempted. He reasoned that even if there were available prosthetics, he would not be able
to fit them himself or have an opportunity to see a therapist. Instead he said, “There are so
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many things I want for my life, but because of my physical body, the disability, I can never
reach them”. I sat in that moment surrounded by the deep unfairness that so matter-offactly had been laid before me. Landmines still litter 9 of Myanmar’s 14 states and regions
and the government and military have yet to sign a Mine Ban Treaty. While I have seen
news of hospitals in Jordan and Lebanon testing the use of 3D-printed prosthetic limbs to
treat Syrian refugees, it all seems very far away from a sparse Care Villa sitting in a 33 year
old refugee camp. Rather for Saw Ehmoo, his options are severely limited by his disability
and the dependence on foreign aid that ensures his care. Without a mechanism to receive
official refugee status or a path to regularization in Thailand, he joins one of the most
vulnerable populations in Mae La. It is this type of tragedy ––the loss of potential and selfdetermination–– that truly characterizes a protracted refugee situation. While solutions
exist, it is the process of creating the political will to enact them that remains a challenge.
In the following concluding remarks I will address the contribution of my research to the
anthropology of forced migration. Additionally, I will also offer some ideas, within the
framework of applied anthropology, about how we might rethink repatriation in the
context of the protracted refugee situation along the Thai-Myanmar border.
7.2 Scholarly Contributions
In a broad view, this dissertation contributes theoretically to work in the
anthropology of forced migration that is concerned with refugee repatriation and
experiences of exile. However, in a more narrow sense it expands research dedicated to
understanding the link between waiting and resistance specifically in the context of a
protracted refugee situation. Located within domains of migration, anthropology and the
study of temporalities, I demonstrate in Chapter Four how work in the area of waiting has
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primarily focused on those within broader marginalized contexts such as prisoners,
economic migrants and their families, the unemployed or underemployed or the homeless
(Harms, 2010; Brettell, 1986; Kwon, 2015; Main, 2007; Jeffrey 2008, 2010; O’Neill, 2014).
There is a limited amount of research that has peripherally mentioned the experience of
waiting in refugee camps as an experience of being stuck in limbo or liminal spaces
(Bousquet 1987; Hitchcox 1990, 1993; Huseby-Darvas, 1994; Reynell 1989). There has
been even less work that has focused on waiting in the context of protracted refugee
situations, such as with Palestinians (Peteet, 1991, 1995, 2005, 2015; Gren, 2002.).
In this way, this dissertation expands its analysis to focus on refugees specifically
waiting within the confines of a camp in one of the most protracted refugee situations of
record. Additionally, this work considers the unique context of the shifting relationship
between Myanmar and Thailand, the presence of an impending voluntary repatriation
program as well as Thailand’s willingness to regularize labor migrants. In light of these
factors, I have demonstrated in Chapters Four and Five that the introduction of facilitated
return has transformed the act of waiting into an active form of resistance. For example, in
Mae La repatriation was resisted by choosing to wait for a job, a third country resettlement
(pg. 89), or for the situation to improve in Burma (pgs. 72, 84, 91, 102, 120). Additionally,
those who had spent decades in the camp exerted their agency by simply staying put (pg.
90) or ignoring the information about repatriation (pg. 133). Expanding the
conceptualization of ‘waiting as resistance’ in the context of protracted refugee situations is
vital both to furthering the discourse in refugee studies as well as to ensuring the principles
of voluntary repatriation are respected in policy development.
Another primary contribution of this study is to highlight the voices of refugees that
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challenge us to rethink repatriation in terms of the circularity of forced migration. While
much of research in forced migration has looked at repatriation as a process of
homecoming, where linear trajectories flow in a single direction toward one’s country of
birth, I have shown in Chapters Five and Six that this does not accurately reflect the feelings
of many Karen in Mae La. Rather, the story of ‘Kawthoolei’ has become the narrative of a
homeland that is “constructed, imagined, and contested in the context of displacement and
political exile in the margin of two other nations” (Horstmann, 2011:86). Thus a return to
the ‘homeland’ is more about regaining independence and freedom than occupying a
specific physical territory. In this way, many Karen voiced their preference to stay in
Thailand (pg. 120, 138, 143) in order to obtain economic self-sufficiency and the freedom
of movement. In the following section I will discuss how these empirical findings translate
into applied contributions of this work.
7.3 Applied Contributions: Towards Protracted Sanctuary
Many anthropologists who work on forced migration place importance on how their
research can inform policy while also giving voice to those who may have been excluded
from the bureaucratic conversations that structure their time in exile. As Dawn Chatty
(2014) has argued, anthropological engagement with forced migration has created:
“…a body of work that has helped maintain a balance between state-centric
work in politics, international relations, and law with a continuing interest in
the refugees and forced migrants themselves […] the primacy of the vision of
anthropology has been the perspective and voice of the forced migrant, the
phenomenological encounter that permits the uprooted, the displaced, and
the refugee to break out from the category of ‘object of study’ and to bring to
life the individual experience of dispossession.” (p. 83)
Colson (2003) provides another, perhaps more pragmatic answer in her assertion that,
“Since anyone, including social scientists, may be uprooted, we want to know what to
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expect and how one learns to live with the uncertainties, the loss of trust, and the
indignities that [forced migrants] are experiencing and surviving” (p.4).
However, the task of translating anthropological research into a tangible outcome
can become complicated as ethical considerations arise concerning issues of objectivity and
the role of advocacy. Applied anthropology provides a basis in which to weigh these
considerations, by offering a framework to balance the core principle of “Do No Harm30”
with the responsibility that many feel to give back to the communities in which they
conduct research. In their aptly named paper Beyond ‘Do No Harm’, Mackenzie et al. (2007)
argue that, “In our view, it is unethical for researchers merely to document the difficulties
of refugees and their causes without, whenever possible, offering in return some kind of
reciprocal benefit that may assist them in dealing with these difficulties and, where
possible, in working towards solutions (p. 310)”. I tend to agree with this position and
indeed, my past work in applied anthropology has often colored the lens in which I view
what my own research may offer.
In this way, I recognize that how Thailand will ultimately resolve the protracted
refugee situation along it’s Western border with Myanmar will have long lasting
implications for global refugee policy. Throughout the course of this study and with the
benefit of many conversations with refugees and other stakeholders, I have often thought
about how the situation could move toward resolution. Thailand has a unique opportunity
30

The American Anthropological Association Code of Ethics (2012) describes the fundamental principle of
“Do No Harm” as “It is imperative that, before any anthropological work be undertaken each researcher think
through the possible ways that the research might cause harm. Among the most serious harms that
anthropologists should seek to avoid are harm to dignity, and to bodily and material well-being, especially when
research is conducted among vulnerable populations. Anthropologists should not only avoid causing direct and
immediate harm but also should weigh carefully the potential consequences and inadvertent impacts of their
work.”
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to demonstrate the power of transforming a perceived burden into an economic benefit
while also maintaining a commitment to humanitarian principles.
In light of Thailand’s growing support for regularizing labor migrants, I argue that it
would be an ideal time to introduce a new solution for refugees who have lived in Thailand
for extended periods of time. Within this vein and building upon the ideas discussed in
Chapter 6 surrounding self-reliance pending return, I would suggest a hypothetical new
category of status termed “Protracted Sanctuary Status” (PSS) for those living as refugees
along the border. The framework for such a status would be similar to that of a “Temporary
Protected Status” (TPS) in the United States, which provides freedom of movement and
work rights for foreign nationals already in the United States from countries experiencing
armed conflict, natural disaster, or other extraordinary circumstances that prevent their
safe return. As Jill Wilson noted in her recent analysis of TPS for the members of congress,
“TPS is a blanket form of humanitarian relief. It is the statutory embodiment of safe haven
for foreign nationals within the United States who may not meet the legal definition of
refugee or asylee but are nonetheless fleeing—or reluctant to return to—potentially
dangerous situations” (2018:2).
There are a few key differences that I imagine would exist between the TPS model
and the proposed PSS model (see table 5 below). I offer an example here of a potential
solution as a tangible recommendation and outcome of my engagement with the subject.
While implementing regularized labor migration as a component of a durable solution is
crucial, so too is ensuring adequate protection while acknowledging resistance to return. A
policy that combines these elements within a recognizable framework may effectively offer
a way in which protracted refugee situations can move from camps to communities.
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Comparison of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) vs. Protracted Sanctuary Status (PSS)
Category

TPS

PSS

Eligibility:

For migrants already in the U.S.
originating from a country (1)
experiencing ongoing armed conflict that
poses a serious threat to personal safety;
(2) temporarily cannot handle the return
of nationals due to an environmental
disaster; or (3) extraordinary and
temporary conditions in a foreign state
that prevent migrants from safely
returning.

For forced migrants residing in Thailand for
a protracted period of time (5 years or
longer) originating from a country (1)
experiencing ongoing armed conflict that
poses a serious threat to personal security
and safety; (2) cannot handle the return of
nationals due to an environmental disaster; or
(3) extraordinary conditions in a foreign state
that prevent migrants from safely returning

Allowed
Length of Stay:

The Secretary of DHS can designate a
country for TPS for periods of 6 to 18
months and can extend these periods if the
country continues to meet the conditions
for designation

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom
of Thailand will grant a period of stay for 5
years, after which the resident will need to
reapply for PSS, request a transfer of status
to regularized migrant worker (RMW) or
apply for Permanent Resident Status (PRS)

Required
Documentation

An application to the USCIS must include
supporting documentation as evidence of
eligibility (e.g., a passport issued by the
designated country and records showing
continuous physical presence in the
United States since
the date established in the TPS
designation)

PSS applications must include either (1)
identity documents from the country of
origin; (2) UNHCR identity card; OR (3)
identification issued by the Thai PAB.
Additionally, applicant must provide
evidence of continuous physical presence in
Thailand (e.g. ration receipts from refugee
camp administration, household registration
documents)

Employment
Authorization?

Yes

Yes

Travel
Restrictions:

May travel abroad with the prior consent
of the DHS Secretary

Must have permission from the Governor of
the province you currently reside in to travel
abroad. Restrictions may be implemented on
amount of time allowed outside of Thailand

Public
Assistance?

May be deemed ineligible for public
assistance by a state

Required to pay 2,200 Thai baht (THB) each
year to obtain health insurance. Disability
assistance will be available.
May apply for free Thai Language Classes or
Job Readiness Training if available

Path to
Citizenship?

Does not provide a path to lawful
permanent residence or citizenship, but a
TPS recipient is not barred from adjusting
to nonimmigrant or immigrant status if he
or she meets the requirements

An individual granted PSS status may apply
for Permanent Resident Status after 5 years,
and may apply for citizenship after 3 years as
a Permanent Resident

Prepared by C. Perkins, Jan. 2019
Table 5: Protected Status (TPS) vs. Protracted Sanctuary Status (PSS). (Source: Carrie Perkins, 2019)
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7.4 Final Remarks and Recommendations for Future Research
In the year following the completion of fieldwork, there have been some notable
developments along the border. Unfortunately, most prominent among these
developments is the resurgence of fighting in the ethnic regions of Myanmar. Starting in
January of 2018 there were several reported clashes between the Tatmadaw and ethnic
armed groups occurring in Shan, Karen and Kachin states. A report from the Institute of
Peace and Conflict Studies stated that:
“Overall, there were 17 broad instances and at least 60 micro incidents of
violence between January-May 2018, and only eight visible instances of
dialogue (albeit without settlement) between core negotiating parties. The
pattern—some emergent and others a continuation of the past—reflect the
complex escalation dynamics in Myanmar’s protracted civil war.”
(Choudhury 2018:1)
Further, in March of 2018, violence erupted in Karen State's Hpapun district, ultimately
leading to the killing of local humanitarian aid worker Saw O Moo by the Tatmadaw. Saw O
Moo’s death was widely criticized by both local and international aid organizations and
was seen as a gross violation of the NCA Code of Conduct and International Human Rights
law. In October of 2018, the KNU announced its temporary suspension from peace process
negotiations amid dissatisfaction over recent high-level talks between the government,
Tatmadaw and signatories of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). They made their
position official on January 3rd of 2019 stating that they believed the talks no longer
focused on the principles of equality, self-determination, democracy and federalism or
implementing the issues agreed to in the NCA. While they have agreed to continue to try
and find a solution through informal meetings with the Myanmar government and military
officials, the formal withdrawal from the process is highly problematic. As Choudhury
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noted back in June of 2018, “The KNU is the most powerful and influential of all NCA
signatories, and therefore a crucial dialogue partner for Naypyitaw. A fallout with the
group would reverse all positive gains painstakingly accrued over the past five years in this
sensitive ethnic state and more importantly, damage the NCA’s credibility as an instrument
of reconciliation” (2018:2).
It is against this background that I place my suggestions for future research. As the
protracted nature of the conflict in Myanmar continues to preclude a substantial or
sustained voluntary repatriation effort, anthropology will have a role to play in
understanding how to best implement a solution that is both human-centered and effective.
As anthropology has become more politically engaged31, there is a wider body of literature
to pull from in which to understand best practices of policy implementation. Additionally,
the growth of virtual and digital anthropology have transformed cyberspace into a field site
where one can observe how national and transnational communities connect, organize and
shape social narratives. Within this context, the research contained in this dissertation
would be best built upon by asking questions such as: “How is political will generated in
Thailand in the context of offering protection for refugees?” or “How are public perceptions
shaped in Thailand by the discourse surrounding refugees and migrants from Myanmar?”
and “How do policies towards refugees in Thailand impact local integration as a durable
solution to protracted refugee situations?”
Only through continuous and proactive engagement will the resolution of a
protracted refugee situation ever be achieved in a way that ensures the security and dignity

31

See Setha Low and Sally Engle Merry’s 2010 edited volume of Current Anthropology on ‘Engaged
Anthropology: Diversity and Dilemmas’ for an excellent overview of the growing interest in engaged political
anthropology
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of those who are displaced. By nature, protracted refugee situations fall to the wayside, to
the back burners of international consciousness while our attention is given to what is
directly in front of us. Donor fatigue and the slow decline of public support over decades
can effectively create impossible choices for those who are not afforded a way to earn an
income in their country of asylum. Thus simply rejecting repatriation is only the first step
in asserting the agency that is required to advocate for better solutions. Solutions that
reject narratives that paint refugees as mere passive recipients of aid, and instead offer
routes to self-sufficiency and freedom.
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1.2 Interview Guide
C Perkins
Study ID: H17-037-PERC
Dissertation Title: A Life in Limbo: Waiting for Repatriation on the Thai-Burma Border
Skeleton Interview Guide- Sample Questions
Interview Questions concerning daily life and boredom:
Why did you leave Burma?
Can you tell me about your journey to Mae La?
How long have you lived in Mae La camp?
Can you tell me about your life here?
Do you consider Mae La to be your home? Why or why not?
Do you have a job here?
If so, what do you do?
How much time each day do you spend working?
How much time each day do you spend with your family?
How much free time do you have each day?
What do you do in your free time?
Do you ever feel bored? Why or why not?
Do you feel that there is too much free time, not enough free time, or just enough free time?
Do you feel like time passes slowly or quickly here? Why?
Questions concerning repatriation and migration:
Have you heard any information about possible repatriation back to Burma? If so, what
have you heard? And from whom?
How do you feel about this information?
Do you feel like the information you receive is true? Why or why not?
Who are your trusted sources of information in your community?
How do you presently get information on services/assistance?
Do you have family members or friends that intend to return to Burma? Why or Why not?
Do you know anyone who has returned to Burma?
If so, what do you know about their return? Where did they go? Has the return been
successful?
What would you say your willingness to return to Burma is on a scale of 1-3? (0undecided)
0- undecided 1- not willing at all 2- somewhat willing 3- very willing
Do you have any fears or concerns about going back to Burma?
Do you have family members or friends that have moved to Malaysia or another country?
If so, what do you know about their move? Where did they go? Has the move been
successful?
Would you consider moving to another country?
0- undecided 1- not willing at all 2- somewhat willing 3- very willing
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